Donnan v. Parole Board – Costs Consequences When a Statutory Body Moots Judicial-Review Proceedings by Corrective Action

1. Introduction

Donnan v Parole Board ([2025] IEHC 328) is a High Court decision dealing solely with costs after the underlying judicial-review application became moot. The applicant, prisoner Damien Donnan, challenged a September 2024 decision of the Parole Board which had treated as discretionary its otherwise mandatory duty under s.13 of the Parole Act 2019 to obtain a written report once the Board decides to direct one. After judicial-review papers were filed and briefly opened ex parte, the Court invited the parties to correspond. The Parole Board then indicated it would, on receipt of a new parole application, issue the s.13 direction and treat the resulting report as obligatory. That concession resolved the substantive complaint, rendering the case moot. What remained was the question: Who should pay the costs?

2. Summary of the Judgment

Mr Justice Conleth Bradley applied the settled four-part framework for mootness-costs (derived from Cunningham and restated in Hughes v Revenue Commissioners). He held that:

The event rendering the case moot was the Parole Board’s unilateral letter of 26 March 2025 conceding the mandatory nature of s.13.
That event lay wholly within the Parole Board’s control and occurred in response to the proceedings.
Accordingly, the default rule that “costs follow the event” applied, and the Parole Board must pay the applicant’s costs of: (i) the leave application, (ii) the application for costs, and (iii) any reserved costs.
No reduction was warranted; quantum is to be agreed or adjudicated by the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator. Certification for senior and junior counsel was granted.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court relied mainly on an unbroken line of Irish appellate authority on costs in moot judicial-review proceedings:

Cunningham v President of the Circuit Court [2012] 3 I.R. 222 – formulated the basic four-question test for deciding costs where a case becomes moot.
Godsil v Ireland [2015] 4 I.R. 535 – applied Cunningham, emphasising fairness and responsibility for mootness.
MATA v Minister for Justice [2016] IESC 45 – reaffirmed the centrality of party responsibility.
MKIA (Palestine) v IPAT [2018] IEHC 134 – a High Court example of unilateral administrative action triggering costs.
P.T. v Wicklow CoCo [2019] IECA 346 – refined the approach for local-authority decisions.
Hughes v Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5 – Murray J.’s comprehensive synthesis; quoted extensively by Bradley J. as the governing statement of principle.

In quoting paras 31-40 of Hughes, the Judge anchored his reasoning to the idea that if the mootness results from a respondent’s unilateral act undertaken in reaction to proceedings (and not forced by external change), costs normally fall on that respondent.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in four logical steps aligning with the Cunningham/Hughes test:

Identify the event of mootness – the 26 March 2025 letter where the Parole Board accepted the mandatory nature of s.13 and undertook to issue the required direction.
Nature of the event – entirely within the Parole Board’s control; no external change in law or fact compelled it.
Causation – the Board’s action was precipitated by the judicial-review proceedings (the ex parte opening and the Court’s invitation to engage).
Default cost consequence – per Hughes para 40, costs follow where the respondent’s unilateral act causes mootness and is reactionary. No discretionary counter-factor warranted deviation.

Bradley J. rejected the Board’s alternative plea for a partial reduction, noting the applicant had taken a “practical approach” by not insisting on a full hearing for certiorari once the defect was conceded.

3.3 Impact

While the judgment does not break new conceptual ground, it strengthens the message to public bodies that:

If they concede unlawfulness only after judicial-review proceedings are on foot, they will normally bear costs.
Attempts to characterise subsequent “corrective” decisions as ordinary statutory functioning will be scrutinised; the key question remains whether an external change truly required the new decision.
Practitioners can cite Donnan as a crisp High Court application of Hughes, especially in parole and other administrative-law contexts where statute makes some functions mandatory and others discretionary.
The judgment implicitly encourages early engagement and, where appropriate, pre-litigation correction, thereby minimising costs exposure.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A case is moot when the underlying dispute is resolved or no longer exists, so the court’s decision would have no practical effect.
Functus Officio: Latin for “having performed the office” – once a decision is made, the decision-maker generally cannot revisit it unless statute allows.
Certiorari: A High Court order quashing an administrative decision because it is unlawful.
Costs Follow the Event: The usual rule that the losing or culpable party pays the legal costs.
Unilateral Act: An action taken by one party alone, without agreement from the other side, that resolves or changes the dispute.
s.13 Parole Act 2019 (): Allows the Parole Board to direct reports (e.g., a release plan). Once directed, preparation of the report is mandatory.

5. Conclusion

Donnan v Parole Board underlines that late corrections by a statutory body will not immunise it from an adverse costs order. Applying the clear four-step test restated in Hughes, Bradley J. treated the Parole Board’s post-filing concession as a unilateral, responsive act, squarely attracting liability for the applicant’s costs. The decision therefore:

Reaffirms predictability in administrative-law costs: when a public authority’s corrective action moots proceedings, responsibility for costs usually lies with that authority.
Illustrates the mandatory/discretionary divide in the Parole Act 2019, guiding Board practice in future cases.
Encourages both applicants and public bodies to consider pragmatic, early resolution of procedural errors, while making clear that delay in doing so has tangible financial consequences.

In the broader context of Irish public-law litigation, Donnan adds yet another data point confirming that the courts will deploy costs as an instrument of fairness and efficiency, incentivising lawful and timely decision-making by the State and its agencies.