Structured Evidence Charts and Scrutiny of Circumstantial Evidence in Child Sexual Offence Trials:
Commentary on Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (Rohit) v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1433

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (Rohit) v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Appeal No. 2973 of 2023, decided on 15 December 2025) is a deeply consequential judgment at multiple levels.

On the individual level, it concerns the brutal sexual assault of a four-year-old girl and the conviction of the appellant under:

Sections 363, 376(2)(i) and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).

On the systemic level, the Court exposes:

serious investigative apathy and procedural lapses,
uncritical acceptance of a weak circumstantial case by the trial court and High Court, and
a real possibility that true perpetrators have been shielded while an innocent man languished in prison for nearly thirteen years.

And at a structural level for criminal justice administration, the Court lays down an important new practice direction for all criminal trial courts across India:

the mandatory incorporation of standardized tabulated charts of witnesses, documentary exhibits, and material objects at the end of every criminal judgment.

The judgment, authored by Mehta, J. (for a Bench also comprising Vikram Nath, J.), therefore combines:

a searching re-evaluation of a conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence; and
a forward-looking procedural reform aimed at improving the readability, traceability and quality of criminal judgments.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. The Incident and FIR

On the night of 13 June 2013, complainant Nazir Mohammed (PW-1) was resting outside his house in Kalol.
He claims to have seen three to four boys passing by with a four-year-old girl, naked and bleeding from her private parts.
The boys allegedly said:
- they suspected she was from the Nayak community,
- she might have gone missing, and
- they were taking her to Nayak Faliya to trace her family.
They went to Nayak Faliya but could not locate the family. The complainant then inspected the child with a torch, noticed continuous bleeding, and suspected sexual assault.
The child was taken by ambulance (called by journalist Vivekbhai Suthar, PW-2) to Kalol Government Hospital, where Dr. Shakuntala Parmar (PW-10) opined that she had been sexually assaulted.
On this basis, Nazir lodged a written complaint (Exh. 10) at Kalol Police Station, registering Crime No. I-68/2013 under Sections 376(1)(i) and 201 IPC against unknown persons.

Crucially, the FIR does not contain:

the names or even descriptions of the “3–4 boys” who brought the child, or
any allegation that those boys had seen the present appellant with the child or at a crime scene.

2. Investigation and Prosecution Theory

Investigation was conducted by Inspector Hareshbhai Pallacharya (PW-15), later succeeded by Inspector Pankajkumar Darji (PW-14).
The “four boys” were subsequently identified as:
- Arifkhan (PW-3),
- Shahejadkhan (PW-4),
- Bilal Ahemad (PW-5), and
- Mohsin Gafurkhan (PW-6).
On 14 June 2013, their statements under Section 161 CrPC were recorded; two of them (PW-3, PW-4) later claimed to have seen the accused pushing the child out of his house naked.
The appellant, Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar, was arrested. Police claim to have seized from his alleged house:
- blood-stained bedsheet, mattress, curtain,
- child’s clothes (legging and t-shirt), and
- accused’s clothes (mobile, handkerchief, night pant, t-shirt, underwear),
- all of which were later sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL).
The prosecution alleged:
- the accused kidnapped the child (Section 363 IPC),
- raped her at his house (Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Section 3/4 POCSO),
- and attempted to destroy evidence (Section 201 IPC) by throwing her out naked.

3. Trial and Conviction

The case was tried as Special (POCSO) Case No. 08/2014 before the Additional Sessions & Special Judge, Panchmahal, Godhra.
The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and produced 19 documents and material objects.
The accused, in his Section 313 CrPC statement, denied the allegations and claimed false implication.
The trial court nonetheless held:
- the “last seen together” evidence of Arifkhan (PW-3) and Shahejadkhan (PW-4) to be strong and credible;
- medical evidence supported a brutal sexual assault;
- FSL findings on blood and semen connected the accused to the crime; and
- no reason existed for the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused.
The accused was convicted and sentenced:
- Section 363 IPC – 3 years RI + fine;
- Section 376(2)(i) & 201 IPC – life imprisonment + fine;
- Section 3/4 POCSO – life imprisonment + fine.

4. High Court Appeal

The Gujarat High Court (Criminal Appeal No. 448/2016) upheld the conviction by judgment dated 5 April 2016.
The High Court endorsed:
- the last seen theory,
- the incriminating recoveries, and
- the medical and forensic evidence as forming a complete chain.

5. Supreme Court Appeal

The appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
By the time of hearing, he had already spent approximately 13 years in custody.
The Supreme Court:
- reassessed the entire evidence with particular care, given that the case rested purely on circumstantial evidence; and
- eventually set aside the conviction and ordered acquittal, while laying down major directions on how criminal trial judgments must henceforth be structured.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

1. Acquittal of the Appellant

The Supreme Court held that:

there was no direct evidence linking the accused to the assault;
the prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence (last seen together, alleged recoveries, and medical/FSL evidence);
the last seen theory was wholly unreliable, involving:
- grave omissions in the FIR,
- contradictions between prosecution witnesses,
- highly unnatural conduct of key witnesses, and
- pre-existing animosity between at least one “last seen” witness and the accused’s family;
the recoveries from the alleged house were deeply suspect, with:
- failure to prove ownership/possession of the house by the accused,
- contradictory versions by panch witnesses and Investigating Officers, and
- no chain of custody or sealing evidence to support the FSL reports;
the child victim’s own testimony (PW-18) did not implicate the accused; she could not identify him and admitted being tutored by her mother; and
the alleged incriminating circumstances fell far short of the “must be” standard required for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the judgments of:

the trial court (3 November 2015), and
the High Court (5 April 2016),

and directed that the appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

2. Censure of Investigation and Trial

The Court was unusually forthright in criticising:

the “hopelessly botched” investigation,
the pedantic and mechanical approach of the trial court, and
the failure of the High Court to engage with glaring contradictions and omissions.

It lamented that:

when investigation “betrays its foundational purpose” and trials “become mechanical exercises divorced from the quest for truth”,
the resulting miscarriage of justice not only harms the accused and victim, but also “erodes public faith” and turns criminal law into an instrument of “unintended cruelty”.

3. Prospective Directions on Structured Evidence Charts

In paragraphs 81–90, the Court issued binding directions to all criminal trial courts across India to:

Append standardized tabulated charts at the end of every criminal judgment, listing:
- all witnesses (with names and roles),
- all documentary exhibits (with description and by whom proved), and
- all material objects/muddamal (with description and proving witness).
Follow specimen formats provided by the Court for:
- witness charts,
- exhibit charts, and
- material object charts.
Apply these directions mutatis mutandis to defence evidence as well.
In voluminous cases, confine charts to material and relied-upon witnesses and documents, indicating this limitation.
Leave it open to High Courts to consider similar formats for civil cases with heavy evidence.

The Registry has been directed to circulate the judgment to all High Courts so that these directions can be incorporated in their rules and effectively implemented.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Law on Circumstantial Evidence and Its Application

1. Reliance on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

The Supreme Court anchors its evaluation in the classic five‑fold test for conviction on circumstantial evidence laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116:

The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must be fully established (“must or should” be established, not merely “may be”).
The established facts should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused.
The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved (i.e., the guilt of the accused).
There must be a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, showing that in all human probability the act must have been done by him.

The Court emphasises the distinction (citing Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade) between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty”; the mental distance between these is what separates conjecture from proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Applying this to the present case, the Court holds that:

even if one assumes sexual assault is proved,
the identity of the perpetrator is not established in a manner that meets this strict test;
the prosecution’s circumstantial chain is broken at multiple points:
- the last seen theory,
- alleged recoveries,
- forensic linkage, and
- child’s testimony.

2. “Last Seen Together” – A Weak and Fabricated Link

The prosecution’s central link was that:

four boys allegedly saw the accused push the naked child out of his house at night; and
they then took her towards Nayak Faliya and later handed her to Nazir (PW-1).

Two of these boys, PW‑3 (Arifkhan) and PW‑4 (Shahejadkhan), tried to support this theory. But the Court painstakingly demonstrates why their evidence is “totally unworthy of credence”.

(a) Omission from FIR despite alleged prior knowledge

According to Nazir (PW-1), even before lodging the FIR:
- he knew the boys’ names; and
- they had told him they had seen the accused push the girl out of his house.
He also informed journalist Vivekbhai (PW-2) before going to the police.
Yet, the written complaint (Exh. 10):
- does not mention the names or description of the boys; and
- does not mention that they had seen the accused with or near the child at all.

The Court treats these as vital omissions, not minor lapses. Had this information genuinely existed at the time of FIR, it would almost certainly have appeared in the complaint—especially given that:

the complainant presented himself as well-informed and proactive; and
he was assisted by a journalist used to documenting facts.

(b) Precedents on omissions in FIR: Amar Nath Jha and Ram Kumar Pandey

The Court relies on two key precedents:

Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137:
- the informant knew of crucial eyewitnesses and the accused’s identity but did not mention them in the FIR;
- the Supreme Court held that while an FIR need not be an “encyclopaedia”, non-reporting of essential facts known at the time can create serious doubt about the prosecution version and even suggest that the crime narrative may be “staged”.
Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026:
- the informant (father of the deceased) failed to mention that certain witnesses had seen the accused inflicting a fatal injury, although such knowledge would almost certainly have been communicated to him;
- the Court held that omissions of such important facts are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act as they affect the probabilities of the case and undermine witness credibility.

In Parmar, these precedents are applied to conclude that:

the attempt to later introduce the four boys as “last seen” witnesses is a clear embellishment and afterthought;
the failure to name them, or to state that they saw the accused with the child, is a fatal infirmity in a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence.

(c) Unnatural and incriminating conduct of PW‑3 & PW‑4

The Court notes that the conduct of these witnesses is not only unnatural but suggestive of possible guilt:

They allegedly saw a naked, bleeding child late at night but:
- did not immediately inform the police,
- did not call their parents or elders,
- did not attempt to cover the child with clothing, and
- instead chose to walk her around to Nayak Faliya and then to Ashiana Society.
PW‑4 candidly admitted:
- he and his friends did not tell anyone that they had seen the accused push the child out of his house;
- they feared their parents would suspect them on seeing the girl bleeding.
There is an unexplained discrepancy in the timing of the incident: PW‑3 speaks of 11–11:30 p.m., PW‑4 of about 10 p.m.
Given that the accused’s house was 40–50 feet away and it was night, the claim that they saw him “throwing the child out of the house” is also improbable.

(d) Motive to falsely implicate the accused

Further undermining their credibility, PW‑3 admitted:

the accused’s father had lodged a criminal case in 2006 against his uncle and father; this points to existing animosity between the families.

The trial court dismissed the possibility of false implication merely because no specific motive was proved. The Supreme Court characterises that approach as illogical in the face of admitted prior enmity and the other suspicious features in their testimony.

(e) The role of PW‑1 (Nazir) and PW‑2 (journalist)

The Court finds the conduct of:

Nazir (PW‑1) – complainant, and
Vivekbhai (PW‑2) – journalist,

to be equally suspect:

Neither called Nazir’s wife or neighbours to help or to provide clothing to the child, despite the obvious urgency and indecency of the situation.
PW‑2 claimed that the boys told him at the hospital that the accused had raped the girl, but:
- it is common ground that the boys never went to the hospital;
- this makes his version “a bundle of lies”.
Despite being educated and socially aware (a journalist), PW‑2 did not ensure the boys were immediately identified or their statements recorded.
Nazir admitted that:
- he never disclosed the names of the four boys to police in his initial statement;
- he did not mention that they had seen the accused push the child out of his house;
- he knew the boys were sons of persons against whom the accused’s father had earlier filed a complaint.

The Court therefore draws a strong inference:

it is “highly probable” that PW‑1 and PW‑2 connived to protect the four boys, who belonged to the same community as PW‑1,
and shifted the blame onto the accused, who was from another community and had a pre-existing dispute with the boys’ families.

Given this, the “last seen” circumstance is not just weak; it is affirmatively tainted and cannot form part of any reliable chain of circumstantial evidence.

B. Investigative Lapses and Forensic Shortcomings

1. Failure to Identify and Test the Four Boys

The Investigating Officers, PW‑14 (Darji) and PW‑15 (Pallacharya), admitted that:

they knew from the complaint that the child was brought by “3–4 boys” to Nazir;
they did not:
- immediately ascertain the identity of these boys,
- record their statements at the earliest,
- subject them to medical examination, or
- collect their blood/semen/nail samples for FSL analysis.

It is only on the next day (14 June 2013) that the boys “somehow popped up” and their statements were recorded. The Court characterises the explanation—“their names cropped up during investigation”—as entirely vague and unconvincing.

In a case of violent sexual assault on a child, the first line of suspicion naturally falls on:

those who last had custody of the child, and
those who were present near the scene.

The police’s failure to treat the four boys as potential suspects and to test them scientifically is, in the Court’s assessment, not a minor lapse but:

a serious abdication of investigative responsibility; and
a factor that reasonably supports the hypothesis that the real assailants may have been shielded.

2. Non-use of DNA Profiling and Scientific Evidence

The Court notes that:

given the nature of the crime, the Investigating Officer had ample opportunity to collect and preserve samples suitable for DNA profiling from:
- the victim,
- the accused, and
- other potential suspects (the four boys).
However, no such steps were taken.

This omission is significant because:

DNA evidence provides highly objective corroboration in sexual offence cases; and
its absence, especially where easily obtainable, can weaken the prosecution’s case and raise doubts about the fairness and thoroughness of the investigation.

The Court therefore holds that the failure to pursue this “available and reliable scientific avenue” undermines the credibility of the entire prosecution case.

3. Suspect Recoveries and Broken Chain of Custody

The prosecution claimed to have recovered from the accused’s alleged house:

blood-stained bedsheet, mattress, curtain,
the child’s legging and t-shirt, and
the accused’s clothes (mobile, handkerchief, night pant, t-shirt, underwear).

However, the Supreme Court underlines multiple defects:

(a) No proof that the house belonged to or was occupied by the accused

Both IOs (PW‑14 & PW‑15) admitted:
- they did not collect any documentary proof (revenue records, rent receipts, electricity bills, neighbours’ statements) to establish that the house at Oad Faliya belonged to or was in the possession of the accused;
- the Circle Officer (PW‑12) who prepared the site map also did not verify who occupied the premises.

Without proof of exclusive possession by the accused, recovery of incriminating articles from those premises loses much of its probative value.

(b) Contradictions among panch witnesses and IOs

PW‑7 (Krunalkumar):
- stated that when he came to the place of offence at night:
  - police were already present;
  - about 50 people had gathered; and
  - no article was seized in his presence;
- police went into the house, but panchas did not enter and did not see what happened inside.
PW‑8 (Altaf Husenbhai):
- claimed that on 17 June 2013:
  - the accused was found sleeping inside the house in an intoxicated state; and
  - the child’s clothes and other blood-stained articles were recovered along with accused’s clothes on that same day.
PW‑15 (IO Pallacharya):
- did not clearly support the timing or sequence of recoveries as claimed by PW‑7 and PW‑8;
- did not specifically mention the recovery of the child’s clothing in his deposition.

These contradictions make the entire story of recovery “absolutely unacceptable”.

(c) Missing chain of custody and sealing

The Court highlights a critical evidentiary gap:

neither IO (PW‑14, PW‑15) testified:
- how the seized items were sealed,
- where they were stored (malkhana), or
- how and when they were transmitted to the FSL;
no “link evidence” was produced to show that the items examined by FSL were the same as those allegedly seized from the accused’s house.

As a result:

the Court holds that neither the recoveries nor the FSL reports can safely be read in evidence against the accused;
any reliance by the trial court or High Court on such forensic results, in the absence of a proven chain of custody, is legally unsustainable.

4. Failure to Have Parents Identify the Child’s Clothes

The only persons who could have authenticated the victim’s clothes as hers were:

PW‑16 (mother – Veenaben Pagi) and
PW‑17 (father – Ranchhodbhai Pagi).

The prosecution, however:

did not have them identify the seized clothes during investigation; and
did not elicit such identification in evidence.

This omission further weakens the alleged incriminating nature of the recovered clothing.

C. Medical Evidence and Child’s Testimony

1. Medical Evidence

The treating doctor (PW‑10) confirmed:

the child had suffered sexual assault;
she was bleeding from her private parts;
there were injuries corroborative of rape.

However:

the medical evidence established the fact of assault, not the identity of the assailant;
the Court also notes that medical evidence negated the presence of semen on the child victim, further weakening the specific FSL-based link to the accused.

2. Testimony of the Child Victim (PW‑18)

The child, examined as PW‑18, could not:

identify the accused as the perpetrator; or
give any coherent account connecting him to the crime.

She also stated that she was tutored by her mother. The Court underscores that:

in POCSO cases, while the testimony of the child victim is often vital and may, if “sterling”, suffice by itself,
here it did not support the prosecution theory at all.

This crucial aspect was completely overlooked by the trial court, a major error in its appreciation of evidence.

D. Systemic Critique: Investigation, Prosecution and Judicial Scrutiny

Beyond the factual acquittal, the Court delivers a pointed systemic critique:

It describes the case as “enveloped in layers of investigative apathy and procedural infirmities”.
It notes that:
- “When investigations are carried out in a manner that betrays their foundational purpose, and trials become mechanical exercises divorced from the quest for truth”,
- the resulting miscarriages of justice “erode public faith” and inflict “unintended cruelty” on both victims and accused.
It stresses that:
- courts must be alert to serious investigative lapses, particularly where they suggest that real culprits may be being shielded;
- appellate courts have a heightened duty to scrutinize circumstantial evidence cases, especially involving grave offences like child sexual assault, where the moral outrage may unconsciously lower the evidentiary threshold.

The judgment thus firmly reiterates that:

however heinous the crime, proof beyond reasonable doubt is non-negotiable; and
the criminal process cannot be used to “sacrifice” a possibly innocent accused in order to demonstrate that “something has been done” in response to a horrific offence.

V. New Procedural Directions: Standardised Evidence Charts in Criminal Judgments

A. Content of the Directions (Paras 81–90)

The Court notes that while the trial court and High Court had appended certain charts, there was no uniform or structured practice. To enhance legibility and facilitate appellate scrutiny, it issues the following binding directions for all criminal trial courts:

1. Mandatory Tabulated Charts (para 82)

Every criminal judgment must, at its conclusion, include tabulated charts summarising:

Witnesses examined;
Documents exhibited; and
Material objects (muddamal) produced and exhibited.

These charts shall form an appendix or concluding segment of the judgment and must be prepared in a clear, structured and easily comprehensible format.

2. Standardised Chart of Witnesses (paras 83.1–83.3)

Each judgment must contain a “witness chart” with at least the following columns:

Serial Number;
Name of the Witness;
Brief Description/Role of the Witness (e.g., Informant, Eye-witness, Medical Jurist/Doctor, Investigating Officer, Panch Witness, etc.).

This description must be concise but sufficiently indicative of:

the evidentiary character of the witness (what kind of evidence they provided); and
their function in the narrative (complainant, last seen witness, IO, etc.).

3. Standardised Chart of Exhibited Documents (paras 84.1–84.4)

A separate chart must list all documentary exhibits with:

Exhibit Number;
Description of Document (e.g., FIR, complaint, seizure memo, panchnama, medical certificate, FSL report, site plan, dying declaration, etc.);
Name/number of the Witness who proved or attested the document.

The Court explicitly links this to:

ensuring traceability of proof; and
facilitating compliance assessment under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 / Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

4. Standardised Chart of Material Objects (paras 85.1–85.3)

Where material objects are produced and marked as exhibits, a third chart must identify:

Material Object (M.O.) Number;
Description of the Object (e.g., weapon of offence, clothing, mobile phone, vehicle, jewellery, etc.);
Witness who proved its relevance (usually the seizing officer or panch witness, or the victim/owner).

5. Voluminous Evidence Cases (para 86)

In complex or voluminous cases (e.g., conspiracies, economic offences), where the number of witnesses/documents is very large, trial courts:

may restrict the charts to material and relied-upon witnesses/documents; and
must clearly indicate that the charts are confined to that subset.

6. Defence Evidence (para 87)

The same charting requirement applies mutatis mutandis to defence witnesses and defence exhibits. This ensures that the defence case is documented with equal clarity and dignity.

7. Specimen Formats and Civil Cases (paras 88–89)

The specimen charts appended in the judgment are to serve as a standard format.
High Courts are invited to consider extending similar practices to civil matters involving voluminous evidence, in the interests of clarity and uniformity.

8. Implementation (paras 90–91)

High Courts may incorporate these directions in their rules for subordinate courts.
The Supreme Court Registry must circulate the judgment to all High Courts for due compliance.

B. Legal Nature and Impact of These Directions

These directions:

are binding nationwide on all criminal trial courts by virtue of Article 141 (law declared by Supreme Court) and the Court’s inherent powers to issue practice directions (often read with Article 142);
introduce a procedural standard aimed not at changing substantive rights, but at:
- improving documentation practices;
- enhancing transparency and readability;
- facilitating appellate review; and
- reducing inadvertent omissions or misappreciation of evidence.

Practical impacts likely include:

For trial judges:
- a more disciplined method of tracking which witness proves which document or object;
- an in-built reminder to consider defence evidence and not just prosecution evidence.
For appellate courts:
- ready reference for the evidentiary landscape of the case without constantly shuttling between judgment and record;
- easier identification of gaps, contradictions, or misreading of evidence.
For lawyers:
- clearer understanding of what exactly has been proved through which witness;
- ease in preparing grounds of appeal or revision.
For the system overall:
- movement towards uniform judicial documentation standards across the country;
- better training tools: new judges can be taught using these standard formats.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts Illustrated in the Judgment

1. First Information Report (FIR)

An FIR is the earliest information given to police about a cognizable offence, leading to registration of a case.
It is not substantive evidence but a previous statement:
- it can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker; and
- its omissions and contents can be relevant under the Evidence Act (especially Section 11) to test probabilities.
Essential facts known at the time (like names of eyewitnesses, known identity of assailants) ought to be mentioned; unexplained failure to do so can seriously damage the prosecution’s case.

2. “Last Seen Together” Theory

This is a circumstantial evidence doctrine whereby:
- if the accused was last seen in the company of the victim shortly before the occurrence (e.g., death, disappearance), and
- no plausible explanation is offered,
a presumption may arise that the accused is responsible.
However:
- it is only an auxiliary circumstance, not conclusive in itself;
- the time gap must be small and other circumstances must support the inference;
- if the “last seen” evidence itself is unreliable or fabricated (as here), it cannot be used at all.

3. Circumstantial Evidence and Chain of Circumstances

Circumstantial evidence involves proving facts from which guilt is inferred (e.g., presence at site, possession of weapon, conduct, recoveries), instead of direct eyewitness testimony.
As per Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, the chain must be:
- complete,
- consistent only with guilt, and
- exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.
Broken or unreliable links (like fabricated last seen evidence or doubtful recoveries) break the chain and require acquittal.

4. Hostile Witnesses

Witnesses who depart from their earlier statements or support the opposite party may be declared “hostile”.
Their evidence is not automatically discarded; courts may accept the truthful parts and reject the rest.
In this case, two of the four boys (PW‑5 & PW‑6) turned hostile; PW‑3 & PW‑4, though “supporting” the prosecution, were found by the Court to be fabricating critical facts.

5. Section 27 Evidence Act – Recovery on Accused’s Statement

Section 27 allows limited admissibility of information given by an accused in custody, but only to the extent it leads to the discovery of a fact.
For such recoveries to be credible:
- the memorandum statement must be proved,
- panch witnesses should support the recovery, and
- chain of custody of recovered items must be shown.
Here, the Court flags that:
- no proper proof of any Section 27 memorandum was led;
- panch and IO testimony was contradictory; and
- chain of custody was missing.

6. Chain of Custody and Forensic Reports

For an FSL report to be reliable, the prosecution must prove that:
- the seized item was sealed at the time of seizure;
- it was stored securely (usually in the police malkhana);
- it was transmitted to the laboratory intact; and
- tampering or substitution is improbable.
Absent this “link evidence”, courts cannot safely rely on FSL findings to convict.

7. Standard of Proof: “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” vs Suspicion

In criminal law, the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Strong suspicion, moral conviction, or outrage at the crime cannot substitute for legal proof.
As the Court reiterates (via Shivaji Bobade), the gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is decisive.

8. POCSO Cases and Child Witnesses

POCSO reflects heightened concern for child victims and often relies heavily on their testimony.
However:
- the child’s statement must still be evaluated for reliability; and
- tutored or non-identifying testimony cannot convict unless supported by strong independent evidence.
The present judgment confirms that even in POCSO cases, due process norms and evidentiary standards remain fully applicable.

VII. Broader Impact and Significance

1. For Sexual Offence and POCSO Trials

The judgment is a reminder that:
- the seriousness of the offence cannot justify relaxing the burden of proof;
- investigations in child sexual assault cases must be meticulous and scientific, not perfunctory;
- the risk of diverting blame to an innocent person—particularly someone from a different community or with prior disputes—is real and must be guarded against.

2. For Police and Prosecution Practices

The decision underscores:
- the necessity of early identification and examination of key witnesses mentioned in the FIR;
- the importance of DNA profiling and other scientific methods where available;
- the need to investigate fairly, including by:
  - testing those who first had custody of the victim (here, the four boys); and
  - avoiding tunnel vision focused solely on a convenient suspect.

3. For Appellate Scrutiny of Circumstantial Evidence Cases

The judgment strengthens the message that appellate courts must:
- carefully re-examine all links in the circumstantial chain;
- be especially wary of:
  - post‑hoc embellishments,
  - grave omissions in FIRs,
  - unexplained or suspicious conduct of key witnesses, and
  - contradictory evidence about recoveries and forensic evidence.

4. For Judicial Writing and Record Management

The directions on structured charts represent a systemic reform in how criminal judgments are drafted.
This reform:
- is simple yet powerful,
- encourages discipline in judicial reasoning, and
- will likely reduce the risk of overlooking key witnesses or exhibits in both trial and appeal.
If extended to civil matters (as the Court suggests), it may also modernise case management in complex civil litigation.

VIII. Conclusion

Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (Rohit) v. State of Gujarat is a landmark in at least three respects:

Reassertion of strict standards for circumstantial evidence:
The Court insists that every link in the chain must be proven to the “must be” standard and not merely raise suspicion. In a case of horrific child sexual assault, it refuses to allow moral outrage to dilute the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and acquits the appellant because the prosecution failed to establish a complete, credible chain of circumstances.
Systemic indictment of investigative apathy and institutional negligence:
The judgment is a searing critique of perfunctory investigations, particularly where they create a possibility that real perpetrators are shielded while an innocent person is incarcerated. It emphasises that criminal law, if not administered with diligence and fairness, can become an instrument of cruelty rather than protection, especially in cases involving vulnerable victims.
Precedent on structured evidence charts in criminal judgments:
By mandating standardised tabulated charts of witnesses, documents, and material objects at the end of every criminal judgment, the Court lays down an important procedural norm. This will significantly enhance the legibility, transparency, and reviewability of criminal trials across the country and may serve as a template for civil proceedings in appropriate cases.

In sum, the judgment reconciles two imperatives: uncompromising insistence on fairness to the accused and deep concern for the integrity of the criminal justice system in responding to grave offences against children. It stands as a reminder that justice is not served by conviction at any cost, but by a process that is careful, honest, and oriented solely towards the discovery of truth.

Structured Evidence Charts and Scrutiny of Circumstantial Evidence in Child Sexual Offence Trials: Commentary on Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (Rohit) v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1433