Section 5 Recast: “Within such period” covers the entire limitation continuum; no special leeway for State delay — Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104

Introduction

In a reportable decision of lasting significance, the Supreme Court of India in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025; 2025 INSC 1104) has reset the doctrinal compass on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Delivering a deep textual, contextual, and policy-driven exposition, the Court clarifies what “within such period” means, recalibrates the test for “sufficient cause,” delineates when appellate courts may interfere with discretionary condonation, and emphatically reiterates that post-Postmaster General jurisprudence does not afford government entities any special indulgence for bureaucratic laxity.

The case arose from an extraordinary condonation of 3966 days (nearly 11 years) granted by the High Court of Karnataka to the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) to file a second appeal against a 2006 first appellate decree that had declared the plaintiff’s title and moulded the relief by directing compensation in lieu of possession. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, imposed costs, and directed the execution court to conclude proceedings within two months, while laying down controlling principles that will shape delay-condonation practice nationwide.

Key issues framed

What is the meaning and import of the expression “within such period” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
When can an appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court condoning delay?
Whether the High Court was justified in condoning a delay of 3966 days in the facts of the case?

Summary of the Judgment

Re-interpretation of “within such period” (Section 5): The Court holds that “within such period” encompasses the entire continuum from the date on which limitation begins to run up to the actual date of filing — not merely the period after limitation expires. Consequently, a litigant must explain “sufficient cause” throughout the full span, including the statutory limitation period and the post-expiry delay.
“Extension” not “exclusion”: Condonation under Section 5 entails an extension of the prescribed period (to admit the belated filing), not an exclusion of time, which would otherwise alter what must be explained. The explanation must cover the whole continuum.
Content of “sufficient cause”: The Court consolidates the law: liberal in approach but no indulgence for negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides, or “excuses” masquerading as explanations. The length of delay is instructive but not determinative; merits of the underlying case are irrelevant at the condonation stage.
Appellate interference: An appellate court may interfere with condonation if the lower court’s exercise is contrary to law, capricious, unsupported by material, or influenced by extraneous considerations (including preliminary peeks into merits). The Court articulates a two-pronged inquiry: (1) Was “sufficient cause” made out for the entire period? (2) Was discretion properly exercised?
Government delay: The Court emphatically reaffirms the post-Postmaster General position: the State and its instrumentalities are to be judged by the same yardstick as private litigants; bureaucratic red-tape or “impersonal machinery” is not, by itself, a sufficient cause. Condonation is the exception, not the rule.
Application to facts: The High Court erred in condoning 3966 days based on administrative lethargy and by being swayed by perceived merits (questioning moulding of relief). The Supreme Court set aside the condonation, imposed additional costs of Rs 25,000 payable to KSLSA, and directed the executing court to conclude execution within two months.
Systemic directions: The Court cautions High Courts against becoming “surrogates for State laxity,” directs that delays should not be condoned on superficial grounds, and orders circulation of the judgment to all High Courts.

Factual Background in Brief

Dispute over land in Survey No. 56/A, 9 acres 13 guntas; 4 acres “donated” to Government during pendency of a 1971 partition suit.
KHB took possession circa 1979. A compromise decree in 1989 made the appellant absolute owner including the 4 acres. Suit O.S. 1100/1989 for declaration and possession was dismissed in 1997.
First Appeal No. 405/2004 allowed on 03.01.2006: declaration granted, possession declined (construction already made), compensation directed instead.
Execution commenced 20.01.2011. KHB filed second appeal only on 14.02.2017, seeking condonation of 3966 days. High Court condoned on 21.03.2017.
Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside condonation, imposed costs, and directed speedy execution.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Rewa Coalfields (AIR 1962 SC 361) and its progeny

Rewa construed “within such period” to require explanation of the delay from the last day of limitation to the date of filing, not the entire limitation period. It also minimised “general considerations” of diligence in construing Section 5 (while allowing some role in the exercise of discretion after sufficient cause is shown). This understanding was followed in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, which stated it is enough to explain the interval from the last day of limitation until filing.

The present judgment respectfully disapproves this approach on multiple grounds: textual, contextual, structural (within the Limitation Act), and precedential. It points out that Rewa Coalfields neither engaged with, nor harmonised, earlier larger-bench strands that embed diligence within “sufficient cause.”

2) Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat (1981) 1 SCC 495 and State of M.P. v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC online SC 3612

These authorities emphasise that a party entitled to wait until the last day cannot, after limitation expires, rely on only post-expiry events; the sufficient cause for not filing in time must be traced to circumstances arising before expiry. The present Bench embraces this line, explaining that it effectively requires explanation of the whole continuum, not just the post-expiry sliver.

3) Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (1954) 1 SCC 800 (Five-Judge Bench)

Approving the Madras Full Bench in Krishna v. Chathappan, this authority established that “sufficient cause” must advance substantial justice where no negligence, inaction, or want of bona fides is imputable. The present Court invokes this as a foundational anchor that Rewa neglected.

4) Sitaram Ramcharan v. M.N. Nagarshana (1959 SCC OnLine SC 89)

Notably decided by the same Bench that later delivered Rewa, Sitaram held that explanations must cover the whole period of delay; the Court here reads it as implicitly requiring an explanation spanning both the limitation period and post-expiry interval.

5) Hameed Joharan (2001) 7 SCC 573; N. Balakrishnan (1998) 7 SCC 123; Basawaraj (2013) 14 SCC 81; Esha Bhattacharjee (2013) 12 SCC 649; Pathapati Subba Reddy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513

Together, these cases crystallise guiding principles: law of limitation rests on public policy (finality, diligence), “sufficient cause” is elastic but not a refuge for negligence; length is not decisive; conduct matters; “liberal” must remain tethered to reasonableness; merits are irrelevant at the condonation stage; Section 3 is to be applied strictly while Section 5 permits judicious flexibility.

6) Government delay: from Katiji and Chandra Mani to Postmaster General (2012) 3 SCC 563, Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC 654, University of Delhi (2020) 13 SCC 745, Sunanda Mahakuda (2021) 11 SCC 560, Sabha Narain (2022) 9 SCC 266

Earlier liberal indulgence for State delay (owing to “impersonal machinery” and “red-tape”) has been decisively recalibrated. Postmaster General insists that law of limitation binds all equally; bureaucratic excuses are insufficient; condonation is an exception. Subsequent cases have reinforced this correction, often imposing costs for “certificate cases” filed only to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court.

The present judgment consolidates this shift and distils the ratio: no preferential treatment for government; bureaucratic lethargy rarely qualifies as “sufficient cause” unless the explanation shows genuine, diligent efforts and absence of negligence.

7) Appellate interference: Sheo Raj Singh (2023) 10 SCC 531; Manjunath Anandappa (2003) 10 SCC 390; Gujarat Steel Tubes (1980) 2 SCC 593

Appellate courts ordinarily defer to discretionary condonation orders, but may interfere if the lower court acted unreasonably, capriciously, ignored relevant facts, relied on extraneous considerations (like merits), or proceeded contrary to law. The present decision operationalises this standard via a structured two-pronged test.

8) Extension vs exclusion and retrospective application of changing law: Shakuntala Devi Jain (1969); Indian Oil (2010) 14 SCC 419; DRI v. Raj Kumar Arora [2025 INSC 498]

The judgment emphasises the doctrinal difference between “extension” (Section 5) and “exclusion” (e.g., Section 14). It also clarifies that intervening changes in law can be applied by appellate courts when assessing the legality of the condonation order under challenge.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Textual and structural interpretation of Section 5

The phrases “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period” are read together. “Such period” refers back to the original limitation period within which the appeal/application ought to have been filed; “after the prescribed period” covers the interregnum up to actual filing. Both are included.
“Within such period” cannot be conflated with “during such period” (only limitation span) nor pared down to “for such period” (only post-expiry period). To give coherent meaning to every phrase, the Court adopts a holistic construction that spans the entire continuum.
Section 5’s marginal note — “Extension of prescribed period” — and the mechanism of condonation confirm that the court extends time to admit the filing, but the applicant must explain the entire duration from the start of limitation to the date of filing.

2) Harmonisation with Section 3 and the canons of limitation

Section 3 creates a duty to dismiss time-barred proceedings. Sections 4–24 are exceptions to that duty, not exceptions to the foundational policy of diligence and finality.
The maxims interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt undergird the Act. Reading Section 5 to ignore inaction during the limitation period would erode these bedrock principles.

3) “Sufficient cause”: explanation, not excuse

The test is flexible but principled: no condonation for negligence, indolence, or lack of bona fides. The focus is on a candid, coherent explanation demonstrating reasonable diligence through the entire period.
Length of delay is not decisive; merits of the case are irrelevant at this preliminary stage; courts must avoid “merit-hunting.”

4) Government/public bodies

No special pedestal post-Postmaster General. Bureaucratic delays, file movement, absence of individual stake — these are, by themselves, not sufficient causes.
In the rare case where delay is caused despite bona fide and diligent efforts, courts may condone; but the ordinary stance must be one of circumspection and reluctance.

5) Appellate interference with condonation

The Court prescribes a two-step inquiry for appellate courts:

Step 1: Existence of sufficient cause. Did the lower court accept an explanation that plausibly and evidentially covers the entire period from the start of limitation to filing, free from negligence or mala fides?
Step 2: Propriety of discretion. Was discretion exercised reasonably, rationally, and for advancing justice — not perfunctorily or based on extraneous considerations (such as merits)? An appellate court may interfere where the view below is contrary to law, unsupported by material, or clearly wrong.

C. Application to the Present Case

Delay of 3966 days: KHB’s narrative pinned blame on an Executive Engineer and other officers; yet the Board took no timely corrective measures, even after execution was initiated in 2011. Disciplinary action was initiated only in March 2017 — a month after seeking condonation.
Explanation did not cover the entire period: Crucially, there was no sufficient cause shown for the period within limitation (up to July 2006) or for the massive interregnum thereafter. The decision to file an appeal itself surfaced only in October 2006, already beyond limitation.
High Court’s reliance on merits: The High Court allowed condonation influenced by a prima facie view on maintainability/moulding of relief. This is impermissible at the condonation stage.
Outcome: The Supreme Court set aside the condonation order; imposed additional costs (Rs 25,000) payable to KSLSA; directed execution court to conclude within two months; and admonished High Courts against condoning delay on superficial grounds, particularly for State entities.

D. Doctrinal Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

New controlling interpretation: “Within such period” in Section 5 now authoritatively means the entire period from the start of limitation to filing. Affidavits for condonation must therefore narrate a day-to-day or period-specific explanation covering both the limitation period and post-expiry interval, showing continuous diligence.
Sharper scrutiny of Government condonation pleas: The judgment completes the jurisprudential shift begun in Postmaster General. Departments can no longer rely on “red-tape” tropes. Legal cells, diarisation, and accountability become operational imperatives; failure may invite costs and personal responsibility.
Appellate discipline: High Courts must desist from peeking into merits when deciding delay. Appellate interference is warranted where lower courts condone delay contrary to law or based on extraneous considerations.
Litigation practice changes: Drafting of Section 5 applications must:
- Map the entire timeline from accrual to filing;
- Demonstrate bona fides and reasonable diligence;
- Avoid boilerplate “bureaucratic delay” assertions;
- Exclude merits arguments.
Public policy alignment: Reinforces finality, certainty, and equality before law — closing the door to habitual, institutionally-induced delay that burdens courts and prejudices decree-holders.
Caveat on special statutes: While the decision interprets Section 5, cognate regimes (e.g., statutes with self-contained limitation and condonation clauses) may apply bespoke timelines or caps. The spirit of this ruling — diligence over indulgence — will nonetheless influence interpretation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Within such period” (Section 5): Not just the period after limitation expires. It covers the whole stretch from the day limitation starts to the day you actually file. Your explanation must span that entire stretch.
Extension vs Exclusion: Section 5 extends time to admit a late filing; it does not exclude time (that is the domain of provisions like Section 14). Even though only the post-expiry time is “extended,” your explanation must cover the whole period.
Sufficient cause: A real, bona fide, cause-based explanation — not a convenient excuse — showing that despite diligence, you could not file in time. Negligence, inaction, or casualness defeats it.
Length vs sufficiency: A long delay can be condoned if well-explained; a short delay can be refused if poorly explained. Length affects the rigour of scrutiny, not the outcome by itself.
Merits are irrelevant: Whether your case is strong or weak is not to be considered when deciding condonation. The only question is whether there was sufficient cause for not filing in time.
Government’s position: The State has no automatic advantage. “File movement” and “red-tape” do not count unless the explanation shows bona fide, diligent effort without negligence.
Appellate review: Higher courts defer to discretion, unless the lower court’s condonation is contrary to law, unsupported by material, or influenced by extraneous factors (like merits).
Explanation vs Excuse: An explanation sets out facts showing responsibility and diligence; an excuse attempts to avoid responsibility. Courts accept the former, reject the latter.

Conclusion

Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board is a landmark in the law of limitation. It restores coherence to Section 5 by reading “within such period” to require litigants to justify their inaction across the entire limitation continuum. It places “sufficient cause” back on its principled rails — liberal in order to advance justice, but not lax to legitimise indolence. It further cements the post-Postmaster General position that the State enjoys no presumptive indulgence, and it equips appellate courts with a clear two-step lens to test discretionary condonation.

On the facts, the Court rightly refused to reward an extraordinary 11-year delay grounded in administrative lethargy and compounded by an impermissible foray into merits by the High Court. The strong directions to expedite execution, impose costs, and circulate the judgment to all High Courts signal a systemic reset: courts must guard finality, deter delay, and ensure that decree-holders are not forced into perpetual litigation. Procedure may be the handmaid of justice, but the law of limitation is its discipline. This judgment powerfully enforces both.