State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Bherulal ., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court of India with a delay of 663 days. An accompanying application sought condonation of that delay, citing difficulties in obtaining necessary documents and the slow pace of bureaucratic processing. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, writing for the Court, issued the present order addressing only the application for condonation of delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioning State’s Arguments

The delay occurred “due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents.”

Reference was made to the manner in which “bureaucratic process works,” suggesting that such procedural hurdles made the delay inadvertent.

An implied contention that the merits of the case justified overlooking the extensive delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
LAO v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107	Earlier judicial leniency toward governmental delay when technology and administrative processes were less advanced.	Court notes that the government continues to rely on this older precedent but considers its rationale outdated in the current technological era.
Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563	Government must provide “plausible and acceptable” reasons for delay; law of limitation applies equally to the State.	Court quotes extensively to reinforce that governmental delay cannot be automatically condoned and that procedural inefficiency is no excuse.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

LAO v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107

Earlier judicial leniency toward governmental delay when technology and administrative processes were less advanced.

Court notes that the government continues to rely on this older precedent but considers its rationale outdated in the current technological era.

Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563

Government must provide “plausible and acceptable” reasons for delay; law of limitation applies equally to the State.

Court quotes extensively to reinforce that governmental delay cannot be automatically condoned and that procedural inefficiency is no excuse.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court observed that despite earlier admonitions, government departments continue to file appeals well beyond statutory limits, banking on judicial tolerance.
2. It rejected the State’s explanation—unavailability of documents and bureaucratic processes—as wholly insufficient, terming the reasoning “casual” and “preposterous.”
3. The Court rejected the notion that a potentially meritorious case could justify ignoring the statutory bar of limitation, emphasizing that limitation laws can “shut out good cases.”
4. Identifying a pattern of “certificate cases,” the Court found that some government appeals are filed merely to obtain a dismissal from the Supreme Court to shield errant officers from accountability.
5. Applying the principles from Postmaster General v. Living Media, the Court held that modern technology and efficient administration negate any special leeway for governmental delay.
6. Given the extraordinary 663-day delay and the lack of a cogent explanation, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary power to condone the delay.
7. To deter similar conduct and compensate for wasted judicial time, the Court imposed a cost of Rs 25,000, directing that it be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee and recovered from the officers responsible.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for condonation of a 663-day delay is dismissed; consequently, the Special Leave Petition stands DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED. Costs of Rs 25,000 are imposed, recoverable from responsible officers, with non-compliance to invite contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary of Madhya Pradesh.

Implications: The order reinforces strict adherence to limitation periods for government litigants, signals financial accountability for officials causing delay, and cautions that future lapses could attract contempt. While it sets no new legal precedent, the decision underscores the Court’s intolerance toward bureaucratic lethargy and misuse of judicial forums to obtain “certificate” dismissals.

State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Bherulal .

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.—

IA No. 62372 of 2020—Condonation of delay in filing

1. The special leave petition has been filed with a delay of 663 days. The explanation given in the application for condonation of delay is set out in Paras 3 and 4.

2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counselling to the Government and government authorities has fallen on deaf ears i.e. the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes prescribed.

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 wherein the Court observed as under: (Postmaster General case (2012) 3 SCC 563)

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”

Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!

4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only “due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents”. In para 4, a reference has been made to “bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs”.

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider it appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.

9. The special leave petition is dismissed as time barred in the terms aforesaid.

10. We make it clear that if the aforesaid order is not complied within time, we will be constrained to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary. A copy of the order be placed before the Chief Secretary, State of Madhya Pradesh.

Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 9217 of 2020

State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Bherulal .

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioning State’s Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Bherulal .

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