Reaffirming Parity and Consistency in Bail Orders through Reference Judgments: Commentary on Furkan Ilahi v. State of U.P. and Another

Case: Furkan Ilahi v. State of U.P. and Another
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Bench: Hon’ble Anil Kumar-X, J.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 10042 of 2025
Date of Judgment: 24 November 2025
Parties: Appellant – Furkan Ilahi; Respondents – State of U.P. and Another
Order Type: Bail appeal – order granting bail by reference to another judgment

1. Introduction

The order in Furkan Ilahi v. State of U.P. and Another is a short but legally significant bail order of the Allahabad High Court. On its face, the judgment consists of only two operative sentences:

“Bail is granted. Appeal is allowed.”
“For orders, see order of date passed in Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025 (Aznan Khan v. State of U.P. & Anr.).”

Although extremely concise, this form of order is not unusual in practice. It represents what may be called a “speaking-through-reference” bail order: the Court does not repeat its reasoning in full, but incorporates by reference the detailed reasoning contained in a separate but related appeal decided on the same date – here, Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025 (Aznan Khan v. State of U.P. & Another).

The legal importance of this order does not lie in articulating a new doctrinal rule of bail, but in illustrating – and thereby reinforcing – two central principles of criminal adjudication:

Parity and non-discrimination among similarly placed accused persons; and
Judicial consistency and efficiency through incorporation by reference, rather than repetitive reasoning in multiple, factually similar bail appeals.

Since the full text of the referenced judgment in Aznan Khan is not before us, this commentary focuses strictly on what can be derived from the order in Furkan Ilahi itself, and on the general legal framework and implications of issuing such reference-based bail orders.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The operative content of the order can be summarised as follows:

Appeal allowed and bail granted:
The High Court allows Criminal Appeal No. 10042 of 2025 and directs that bail be granted to the appellant, Furkan Ilahi. Though the precise terms and conditions of bail (amount of bond, sureties, conditions, etc.) are not reproduced in this order, they are evidently meant to be the same as those prescribed in the referenced order.
Incorporation of reasons by reference:
Instead of setting out independent reasons, the Court states: “For orders, see order of date passed in Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025 (Aznan Khan v. State of U.P. & Anr.).” This indicates:
- The two appeals are closely connected (most likely arising out of the same FIR or occurrence, or involving co-accused with similar roles); and
- The Court considers that the legal and factual reasoning in Aznan Khan applies mutatis mutandis (with necessary modifications, if any) to Furkan Ilahi.

There are no explicit factual recitals (such as nature of the offence, sections involved, dates, or role of the accused) and no explicit citation of precedents within this particular order. All substantive reasoning is to be found in the cross-referenced order.

3. Analytical Framework

3.1 Nature and Procedural Posture of the Case

Certain features of the order allow us to infer the procedural setting, even though the facts are not detailed:

The matter is styled as a “Criminal Appeal” rather than merely a “Criminal Misc. Bail Application”. This suggests that the appeal is likely against an order of a lower court rejecting bail, brought under a statutory provision that allows an appeal against such orders (for example, under provisions analogous to section 14-A of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, or another special statute providing a right of appeal in bail matters). However, the exact statutory basis is not specified in the text and must not be assumed.
The respondents are “State of U.P. and Another”, which commonly indicates that the second respondent is the informant/complainant or victim, joined as a necessary or proper party in the bail appeal, especially in matters under special statutes or in serious offences where the victim has a statutory right of participation.
The presence of a Government Advocate (“G.A.”) as counsel for the respondent evidences that the State opposed (or at least was heard in) the appeal, as is standard in bail proceedings.

From the structure and style, it is fair to characterise this as:

An appellate bail matter;
In which the High Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction to overturn a prior refusal of bail; and
Where the appellant is treated on the same footing as a similarly placed accused whose bail appeal (in Aznan Khan) was decided by a reasoned order the same day.

3.2 The Technique of “Speaking-through-Reference” Orders

The most notable feature of this order is its reliance on another judgment as the reservoir of reasons. This technique is frequently used when multiple accused, arising out of the same incident or FIR and against whom similar allegations are made, file separate bail applications or appeals. Once the Court has passed a detailed, reasoned order in one matter (the “lead case”), subsequent connected matters are disposed of by:

Expressly relying on the reasoning in the lead case;
Confirming that the subsequent applicant is similarly situated; and
Granting (or refusing) bail on parity.

While the present order does not spell out the parity assessment in words, the very fact that the Court disposes of the matter “for orders, see…” implies:

The Court has concluded that there is no material distinguishing factor between the appellant’s case and that in Aznan Khan; and
The reasons which justified bail in Aznan Khan equally justify bail for Furkan Ilahi.

This is an accepted judicial practice so long as:

The referenced order contains sufficient reasons;
The cases are truly comparable on facts and legal position; and
The reference is clear and the referenced judgment is accessible to the parties and to the public (ensuring transparency and accountability).

4. Precedents and Broader Jurisprudential Context

The order in Furkan Ilahi itself does not cite any case law. However, the reasoning it incorporates by reference in Aznan Khan would necessarily be grounded in the established jurisprudence governing bail. Without attributing specific citations to this order, we can identify the key strands of bail law that typically inform such decisions.

4.1 Constitutional and Statutory Underpinnings of Bail

Bail is fundamentally rooted in the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Statutory provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and special statutes regulate:

When bail can or must be granted;
What factors the Court should consider; and
How appellate or revisional courts review lower court decisions on bail.

Though the exact statutory provision invoked in this appeal is not recited, any bail appeal of this nature would be guided by the general parameters recognised in criminal jurisprudence:

Nature and gravity of the offence;
Severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
Prima facie assessment of involvement;
Likelihood of absconding;
Possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses;
Past criminal antecedents; and
Period of pre-trial detention.

4.2 Supreme Court Guidance on Bail (Contextual, Not Cited)

While not referred to explicitly in the order, several leading Supreme Court decisions shape how High Courts, including the Allahabad High Court, approach bail:

State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308
Famously articulated the principle that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”, subject to legitimate concerns about misuse of liberty.
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 SCC 240
Stressed that bail decisions must balance individual liberty with the interests of the community and justice, focusing on the risk of non-appearance and potential interference with the trial.
Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018) 3 SCC 22
Emphasised the presumption of innocence until conviction, cautioning courts against a punitive approach at the pre-trial stage and reiterating that reasons must be given in bail decisions.
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528
Discussed the parameters for granting bail, including the need for a prima facie satisfaction of the Court, while also warning against arbitrary or capricious decisions.
Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Makwana (2021) 6 SCC 230
Highlighted the necessity of reasoned bail orders and the need to ensure consistency and parity in granting bail to co-accused, while still recognising that parity is not a rigid, inflexible rule.

The present order can be seen as sitting within this tradition: it honours the need for reasons (through a referenced reasoned order) and respects the equality and parity dimension of bail adjudication.

5. Legal Reasoning and Principles Reflected in the Order

5.1 Principle of Parity Among Co-Accused

Although the order does not explicitly say so, its entire structure signals an application of the principle of parity. In bail jurisprudence, parity refers to the idea that:

If one accused has been granted bail and another accused is similarly placed in terms of role, allegations, and circumstances, then the second accused is ordinarily entitled to similar treatment, unless there is a material distinguishing factor.

The reference “For orders, see order of date passed in Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025 (Aznan Khan v. State of U.P. & Anr.)” strongly indicates that:

The Court treated Furkan Ilahi and Aznan Khan as similarly situated for bail purposes; and
The High Court declined to re-write or re-argue the entire reasoning, instead adopting it wholesale by reference.

Parity serves multiple functions:

Fairness: It avoids arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of co-accused.
Predictability: It allows parties to anticipate likely outcomes in connected matters.
Efficiency: It prevents repetitive judicial work where the factual matrix is materially identical.

At the same time, parity is not an absolute entitlement. Courts have consistently held that:

Parity applies only where the roles and circumstances are genuinely comparable;
If the appellant has a graver role (e.g., alleged main assailant, conspirator, or mastermind), or worse antecedents, parity may be denied; and
The Court must be satisfied that extending parity will not compromise the administration of justice.

By granting bail in Furkan Ilahi by direct reference to Aznan Khan, the Allahabad High Court implicitly concluded that these parity conditions were satisfied.

5.2 Incorporation by Reference and the Duty to Give Reasons

Higher courts, including the Supreme Court, have repeatedly emphasised the duty to provide reasons in bail orders, both for granting and refusing bail. This duty arises from:

The constitutional right to personal liberty;
The need for transparency and accountability in the exercise of judicial discretion; and
The requirement that superior courts, and the public, be able to understand and scrutinise the basis of the decision.

The question naturally arises: Does an extremely brief order such as “Bail is granted. Appeal is allowed. For orders, see…” satisfy this requirement?

In legal practice, the answer is yes, provided that:

The referenced order is a reasoned order that fully sets out the facts, issues, principles, and analysis;
The reference is clear and precisely identified (as is the case here, with the specific appeal number and case name); and
The connection between the two cases (such as same FIR or identical allegations) is apparent from the record, even if not spelt out in the short order.

In essence, the Court here has chosen a method of “incorporation by reference”: instead of reproducing the reasoning verbatim, it incorporates another judgment’s reasoning as if it were set out in full. The reasons for granting bail to Furkan Ilahi are therefore:

Identical in substance to those advanced in favour of Aznan Khan; and
Accessible by reading that lead judgment.

Such practice conserves judicial time and avoids redundancy, while still satisfying the requirement of a reasoned decision.

5.3 Appellate Intervention in Bail Matters

By allowing the criminal appeal and granting bail, the High Court is:

Overturning an adverse bail order of a lower court (most likely a Sessions Court or Special Court); and
Substituting its own assessment of the bail parameters for that of the lower court.

The power of appellate courts in bail matters typically involves:

Re-assessing whether the lower court correctly appreciated the nature of allegations, evidence, and relevant statutory constraints (if any);
Correcting errors such as:
- Failure to consider material exculpatory factors;
- Overemphasis on the gravity of the offence without balancing other considerations;
- Ignoring long pre-trial custody or delay; or
- Inconsistent treatment of co-accused.
Ensuring that Article 21 is not rendered illusory by mechanical or punitive denial of bail.

In the context of Furkan Ilahi, the allowance of the appeal implies that the High Court disagreed with the earlier denial of bail and saw no sufficient reason to treat him differently from the appellant in Aznan Khan.

6. Impact and Future Implications

6.1 Practical Impact on Co-Accused and Connected Matters

The direct and immediate impact of this order is:

On the appellant: He is enlarged on bail, subject to conditions analogous to those in Aznan Khan (which would typically include appearance at trial, non-tampering with evidence, etc.).
On other co-accused: If there are additional accused in the same case who are similarly situated but not yet on bail, this order – coupled with the lead order in Aznan Khan – strengthens their claim to parity-based bail.

Lawyers often use such orders strategically: once a reasoned bail order is obtained in a lead case, subsequent bail applications/appeals are filed with a prayer for parity, and courts often dispose of them swiftly by reference, as seen here.

6.2 Reinforcement of Parity and Non-Arbitrariness

In broader terms, this order reinforces that:

Courts must strive for consistency in the treatment of co-accused to avoid violations of Article 14 (equality before the law);
Disparate outcomes in bail matters among similarly placed accused require justifiable distinctions, otherwise they are liable to be corrected on appeal; and
Once a High Court has laid down a considered position on bail in a particular factual matrix, it will generally extend that position to similarly placed appellants to maintain coherence and fairness.

6.3 Judicial Efficiency and Case Management

The technique of reference-based orders, as applied in Furkan Ilahi, also speaks to:

Judicial economy: Avoiding duplicated hearings and judgments where the issues substantially overlap.
Expedited relief: Ensuring that an accused does not remain in custody solely because the Court must re-draft what has already been decided in substance.
Clear case linkage: By expressly referencing the connected case number and party names, the Court creates an intelligible trail for future judicial and academic analysis.

In high-volume jurisdictions like the Allahabad High Court, such mechanisms are vital to handling a large docket while still upholding substantive fairness.

6.4 Limits of the Precedential Value

It must be underscored that:

This particular order is not a landmark pronouncement laying down a new bail doctrine; it is essentially an application of an existing, detailed decision (Aznan Khan) to another, similar appellant.
The real substantive precedent – in terms of detailed legal principles and factual analysis – lies in the referenced judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025.
The present order’s precedential weight is therefore more about affirming parity and consistency than about articulating fresh legal propositions.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Bail”

Bail is the release of an accused person from custody, subject to conditions, while they await trial or appeal. It does not mean that the charges are dropped or that the person is acquitted. It simply means the person does not remain in jail during the trial/appeal process, on the understanding that they will:

Attend court as required;
Not commit further offences; and
Not interfere with the evidence or influence witnesses.

7.2 “Criminal Appeal” in Bail Context

A “criminal appeal” in the context of bail generally means:

An appeal against an order of a lower court refusing or cancelling bail; or
An appeal under a specific statutory provision granting a right to challenge an order affecting liberty.

The High Court, in its appellate capacity, reviews the correctness of the lower court’s decision and may:

Confirm the refusal of bail;
Grant bail subject to conditions; or
Modify or impose different conditions compared to the lower court’s order.

7.3 “For Orders, See Order of Date Passed in…”

This phrase means:

The present decision adopts the same reasoning and directions as contained in another judgment, decided on the same date, in a specified case.

It is a shorthand way for the Court to say:

“We have already dealt with the facts and legal issues in detail in this other case.”
“We see no reason to repeat ourselves; therefore, the same order (in essence) will apply here.”

7.4 “Parity” in Bail

Parity refers to equal treatment of similarly placed individuals. In bail:

If two accused are alleged to have played a similar role in the same incident under similar circumstances, and one gets bail, the other should generally also get bail, unless there are special reasons to deny it.
It prevents inconsistent or arbitrary decisions among co-accused.

7.5 “Counsel for Appellant/Respondent; G.A.”

Counsel for Appellant(s): The advocate representing the person seeking bail (here, “Amar Jeet Singh”).
Counsel for Respondent(s): G.A. “G.A.” stands for “Government Advocate” – the lawyer representing the State of Uttar Pradesh in the High Court.

8. Conclusion

The order in Furkan Ilahi v. State of U.P. and Another is, in textual terms, very brief – it states simply that:

Bail is granted and the appeal is allowed; and
The detailed reasoning is to be found in Criminal Appeal No. 9437 of 2025 (Aznan Khan v. State of U.P. & Anr.).

Despite its brevity, the order is doctrinally meaningful in several ways:

It exemplifies the principle of parity, indicating that similarly placed accused in the same or connected matters are entitled to similar bail treatment, absent distinguishing factors.
It demonstrates a legitimate technique of incorporation by reference, by which the Court honours its duty to give reasons (through the detailed lead order) while avoiding redundant repetition in multiple connected appeals.
It underscores the role of the High Court as an appellate authority safeguarding personal liberty, ready to correct lower court refusals of bail when they are inconsistent with established principles or with the Court’s own assessment in analogous matters.
It contributes to judicial efficiency and consistency, both of which are vital in a high-volume criminal docket, particularly in large jurisdictions such as Uttar Pradesh.

In sum, while Furkan Ilahi is not a landmark case forging new bail doctrine, it is an instructive illustration of how courts operationalise existing principles of equality, fairness, and efficient case management in day-to-day bail adjudication. For lawyers and scholars, its chief significance lies in how it reflects and reinforces the practice of granting bail on the basis of parity and prior reasoned orders in connected appeals.