Downward Adjustment, Not Second Appointment: Supreme Court on Liberal, Welfare-Oriented Interpretation of Compassionate Appointment Schemes

Downward Adjustment, Not Second Appointment: Supreme Court on Liberal, Welfare-Oriented Interpretation of Compassionate Appointment Schemes

I. Introduction

In Managing Director, M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board & Ors. v. Harpal Singh & Ors., 2025 INSC 1490 (decided on 28 November 2025), the Supreme Court of India (per Sanjay Karol, J. and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.) has laid down an important and nuanced principle on the scope and implementation of compassionate appointment schemes.

The case concerns the termination of a compassionate appointee who failed to acquire a prescribed computer qualification (CPCT) within the stipulated time for a Class-III post (Assistant Grade-III), and the High Court’s direction to consider him instead for a lower, Class-IV post which did not require that qualification. The central question was whether such a “downward adjustment” amounts to an impermissible second compassionate appointment, and whether courts can direct such relief consistently with the governing policy and constitutional principles of equality.

The judgment is significant because it:

  • Affirms that compassionate appointment is a welfare measure that must be interpreted purposively and humanely, not mechanically.
  • Recognises that, in appropriate cases, a compassionate appointee who fails to meet higher post-specific credentials can be considered for a lower suitable post without treating this as a prohibited “second appointment”.
  • Clarifies the distinct nature of compassionate appointment vis-à-vis ordinary “direct recruitment” and the operation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in this context.

II. Background and Facts

1. Parties

  • Appellants: Managing Director, M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board and others (employer/Board and its officers).
  • Respondent No. 1: Harpal Singh, son of late Ramjilal Kushwah, a Peon (Class-IV employee) who died in harness.

2. Factual Matrix

  1. Late Ramjilal Kushwah was employed as a Peon in the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Alampur, District Bhind, Madhya Pradesh. He died in harness on 28 February 2019.
  2. Under the compassionate appointment policy issued by the General Administration Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, via Memorandum No. C-3-12/2013/1/3 dated 29 September 2014, his son, Harpal Singh, was sanctioned compassionate appointment to a Class‑III post, i.e., Assistant Grade-III in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena.
    • Sanction order by Additional Director (Personnel), M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board: 26 August 2020.
    • Appointment order by Secretary, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Morena: 11 September 2020.
  3. This appointment was made subject to Clause 6.5 of the 29.09.2014 Memorandum, which mandated that a dependant appointed as Assistant Grade-III must acquire specified computer qualifications (including passing CPCT and related computer/typing exams) within three years of appointment, extendable by one year. Failure even after the extended period could lead to termination of service.
  4. The appointment order of 11.09.2020 reproduced this condition in Conditions 15 and 16, clearly stating that:
    • It would be mandatory to pass CPCT within 3 years from a recognised institution, failing which services would be terminated.
    • It would likewise be mandatory to pass the specified computer diploma/typing exams from recognised institutions within 3 years, failing which services would be terminated.
  5. Harpal Singh did not obtain the requisite CPCT qualification within three years. The authority, however, granted an additional one-year extension, from 15.09.2023 to 14.09.2024. Even within this extended period, he failed to submit the required CPCT scorecard.
  6. Consequently, his services as Assistant Grade-III were terminated on 30 September 2024 by the appointing authority.

3. Proceedings before the High Court

  1. Harpal Singh filed Writ Petition No. 36707 of 2024 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench, challenging the termination order and seeking reinstatement.
  2. The Single Judge did not quash the termination but, invoking the welfare character of compassionate appointment, directed the competent authority to sympathetically consider appointing him to a lower post (Class‑IV) where CPCT was not required, subject to his willingness.
  3. The employer appealed. A Division Bench, in Writ Appeal No. 894 of 2025, by judgment dated 7 April 2025, upheld the Single Judge’s order.

4. Appeal before the Supreme Court

The employer/Board challenged the Division Bench order before the Supreme Court in the present Civil Appeal (arising out of SLP (C) No. 26798 of 2025), contending that:

  • After participating in the selection and accepting the terms, the respondent could not later seek to alter conditions or obtain another appointment.
  • The direction to consider him for a Class-IV post amounted to a second compassionate appointment, allegedly barred by Clause 13.1 of the 29.09.2014 Memorandum, which provides that once a compassionate appointment has been granted, it cannot be granted again on any other post.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Division Bench’s order, thereby upholding the Single Judge’s direction to the authorities to:

  • Consider Harpal Singh for compassionate appointment to a Class‑IV post (equivalent to the post held by his deceased father),
  • Within six weeks, and
  • Subject to his willingness and compliance with ordinary eligibility norms for the Class‑IV post.

The Court emphasised that:

  • The objective of compassionate appointment is humanitarian relief to the family of a deceased employee to prevent destitution.
  • In the peculiar facts, directing consideration for a Class‑IV post was:
    • Consistent with the object of the scheme,
    • Not a “second” or fresh compassionate appointment within the meaning of Clause 13.1, but a downward adjustment within the scheme, and
    • Caused no prejudice to the administration or to any other candidate.
  • Compassionate appointment, being an exception to normal recruitment based on open competition, must be interpreted liberally and purposively to advance its welfare objective and not thwarted by rigid or literal interpretations of procedural clauses.

IV. Core Legal Issues

The decision turned substantially on the following issues:

  1. Whether a compassionate appointee who failed to acquire a post-specific qualification (CPCT) within the allowed time can be considered for appointment to a lower post under the same compassionate scheme, instead of being left without any relief.
  2. Whether such consideration for a lower post amounts to a barred second compassionate appointment under Clause 13.1 of the 29.09.2014 Memorandum.
  3. Whether the High Court’s direction to consider the respondent for a Class‑IV post violates:
    • the policy framework on compassionate appointment, or
    • the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution regarding equality and equality of opportunity in public employment.
  4. Whether precedents dealing with candidates participating in a regular selection process and later challenging the method or conditions (e.g., Sadananda Halo, Vijendra Kumar Verma, Manish Kumar Shahi) apply to compassionate appointments.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85

The Court cited Hakim Singh to restate the foundational principle that:

The rule of appointments to public service is that they should be on merits and through open invitation… However… there are a few exceptions… As per one such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependants in a vacancy… The object is to give succour to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury… The object of providing such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment.

This precedent supports two critical propositions:

  • Compassionate appointment is a narrow exception to normal recruitment by merit and open competition.
  • Its purpose is ameliorative—to provide immediate relief to a bereaved family—and must not be converted into a parallel avenue of recruitment.

The present judgment leans on this humanitarian rationale to justify a flexible approach in implementing the scheme to prevent the family’s economic collapse.

2. General Manager, State Bank of India v. Anju Jain, (2008) 8 SCC 475

The Court relied on Anju Jain to underscore that compassionate appointment is:

  • An exception carved out from the equality rule in public employment (Articles 14 and 16).
  • Not a heritable or vested right to a post of choice, but a concession confined to what the scheme itself provides.

In the present case, this precedent is used not to restrict relief, but to emphasise that the usual doctrinal tools applicable to open competitive recruitment cannot be transplanted wholesale into the realm of compassionate appointment. Accordingly, the appellants’ reliance on decisions relating to regular selection processes was rejected as inapposite.

3. Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774

Quoting Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, the Court recalled:

Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive… it is too puritanical for a legal system to sacrifice the end product of equity and good conscience at the altar of processual punctiliousness and it is not too radical to avert a breakdown of obvious justice by bending sharply, if need be, the prescriptions of procedure. The wages of procedural sin should never be the death of rights.

This classic dictum is invoked to justify a liberal, justice-oriented construction of procedural conditions in welfare schemes like compassionate appointment. The CPCT requirement and Clause 13.1 are treated as processual instruments which must not be allowed to defeat the substantive goal—preventing destitution of the deceased employee’s family.

4. Precedents Relied on by the Appellants

The appellants cited:

These cases embody the principle that a candidate who participates in a selection process, knowing the rules, cannot later challenge the procedure or conditions after being unsuccessful. The Supreme Court held that such precedents are:

  • Factually distinguishable, as they concern open, competitive recruitment, not compassionate appointment.
  • Legally inapplicable, because compassionate appointment is, as recognised in Anju Jain, an exceptional mechanism driven by humanitarian considerations, not the logic of competitive selection or equal competition inter se applicants.

The Court concluded that doctrines developed in the context of competitive recruitment processes cannot be mechanically imported into compassionate appointment cases, where the constitutional and policy objectives are qualitatively different.

VI. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Nature and Object of Compassionate Appointment

The Court devoted substantial attention to the philosophical and constitutional underpinning of compassionate appointment:

  • The sudden death of a breadwinner “often disrupts the economic stability of the entire household” and can push the family into deprivation and marginalisation.
  • A welfare State, in line with the Directive Principles of State Policy (particularly Article 39), cannot permit bereaved families to slip into destitution by rigid, mechanical adherence to procedural or technical rules.
  • Compassionate appointment is not a mere concession or largesse but a “structured response of the State to ensure that the death of an employee does not mark the beginning of economic calamity for those left behind.”

Thus, the Court framed the interpretive exercise through a welfare and human-rights lens, placing the scheme in the context of social justice obligations of the State.

2. Distinction from Direct Recruitment

Central to the Court’s reasoning is the sharp distinction between:

  • Appointments through direct recruitment based on open competition (merit, exams, etc.), and
  • Compassionate appointments, which are exceptional, humanitarian arrangements.

The Court made it explicit that:

  • If this had been a case of direct recruitment, the respondent could not have been permitted, after failing to meet the eligibility for a higher post, to seek a lower post in substitution. That would have violated established principles governing competitive selection.
  • However, compassionate appointment operates in a distinct framework:
    • It is confined to posts earmarked under the scheme.
    • It is designed to meet a specific social contingency—death of an employee in harness—rather than to fill posts through a contest of merit.

Because of this distinction, the Court rejected the appellants’ attempt to read into the case the jurisprudence on acquiescence in selection procedures or bar to post-facto challenge to recruitment rules.

3. Interpretation of Clause 6.5 and CPCT Requirement

Clause 6.5 of the 29.09.2014 Memorandum stipulates:

  • Compassionate appointees to the post of Assistant Grade‑III must pass CPCT and related computer/typing exams within three years of appointment.
  • The appointing authority may extend this period by one year.
  • Failure even after this extension may lead to termination of services.

These conditions were duly incorporated into the respondent’s appointment order. The Court acknowledged that:

  • The respondent failed to acquire the CPCT qualification within the total period (3+1 years); and
  • Termination of his service from the post of Assistant Grade‑III was in conformity with those conditions.

However, the crucial move in the Court’s reasoning is this:

  • Termination from the Class‑III post does not logically or legally foreclose the possibility of reconsidering him for a Class‑IV post that does not require CPCT, particularly when:
  • He was originally eligible for a Class‑IV post, identical to his late father’s position.
  • The CPCT requirement was post-specific (for Assistant Grade-III), not a universal precondition for any appointment under the compassionate scheme.

Therefore, while the Court did not disturb the termination order, it treated the respondent’s request for a lower post as a legitimate attempt to preserve the substantive benefit of the scheme, without insisting on a higher, computer-centric post.

4. Clause 13.1: “Second” Appointment or Downward Adjustment?

Clause 13.1 of the 29.09.2014 Memorandum provides that once a compassionate appointment is granted, it shall not be granted again on any other post.

The appellants argued that:

  • Granting, or even considering, Harpal Singh for a Class‑IV post would amount to a second compassionate appointment.
  • This is expressly barred by Clause 13.1.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument by carefully characterising the nature of the relief sought:

  • The respondent is not seeking a new or additional appointment; rather, he is asking for a “downward adjustment” within the same compassionate appointment framework.
  • This is akin to a reallocation or re-designation to a suitable lower post consistent with his qualifications and the scheme’s purpose.
  • Treating this as a “second appointment” would be a “narrow or mechanical” reading of Clause 13.1, divorced from the welfare-oriented context.

The Court held that such a downward adjustment:

  • Does not violate Clause 13.1;
  • Does not relax any essential qualification for the lower post (CPCT was never required for Class‑IV); and
  • Prevents the object of the scheme from being defeated merely because the beneficiary was initially placed on a higher, more technically demanding post.

5. No Prejudice to Administration or Other Candidates

A recurring theme in compassionate appointment jurisprudence is the need to balance:

  • The welfare needs of the deceased employee’s family; and
  • The rights and expectations of other potential candidates and the integrity of the recruitment system.

The Supreme Court concluded that, in this case:

  • No prejudice is caused to:
    • The administration, or
    • Any other aspirant to public employment.
  • The appointment, if granted, would be confined to a post under the compassionate quota, not one earmarked for open competition.
  • Harpal Singh had, in any event, rendered about four years of prima facie unblemished service, demonstrating his suitability in terms of conduct and general capability.

This framed the Class‑IV consideration as a minimal interference with administrative discretion, fully in line with the policy’s purpose and without displacing any other candidate’s rights.

6. Procedural Rigidity vs. Substantive Justice

Drawing from Sushil Kumar Sen, the Court stressed that:

  • Procedural stipulations should not be allowed to “kill” substantive rights or defeat welfare objectives.
  • In welfare schemes like compassionate appointment, procedures are meant to provide structure, “not to become cracks through which the most vulnerable slip.”
  • Where a rule’s rigid application ceases to advance, and instead frustrates, the benign purpose of the scheme, courts must prefer a liberal, purposive interpretation.

Accordingly, the CPCT requirement and the “one-time appointment” clause were interpreted in a way that preserved rather than destroyed the scheme’s humanitarian character.

7. Constitutional Perspective: Articles 14, 16 and the DPSPs

The Court situated its reasoning within the constitutional framework:

  • Article 39 (Directive Principles) mandates the State to strive for economic justice and reduction of inequalities. The compassionate appointment scheme is a tool to fulfil this obligation.
  • Articles 14 and 16 guarantee equality and equality of opportunity in public employment. However, as recognised in Anju Jain, compassionate appointment is a constitutionally permissible exception, narrowly tailored to meet an exceptional situation (death in harness).

The Court held that:

  • Since the Class‑IV appointment, if granted, would:
    • Be confined to posts under the compassionate appointment scheme, and
    • Not intrude upon vacancies meant for general recruitment or other reservation categories,
    it does not violate Articles 14 or 16.
  • The appellants’ attempt to invoke equality principles as a ground to deny compassionate relief was misconceived.

VII. Key Holdings / Ratio Decidendi

The core legal principles that emerge from the judgment may be summarised as follows:

  1. Compassionate appointment is a welfare measure rooted in the State’s obligation to prevent bereaved families from sinking into destitution. It is not a mere concession or largesse, but a structured response to a specific social contingency.
  2. The rules governing compassionate appointment, including post-specific qualifications and “one‑time appointment” clauses, must be interpreted liberally and purposively, so as to advance the scheme’s humanitarian objective, not undermine it through rigid or mechanical construction.
  3. Where a compassionate appointee to a higher, qualification-intensive post (e.g., Assistant Grade‑III requiring CPCT) fails to acquire the requisite qualifications within the stipulated/extended period, it is open to the authorities (and to the courts, in appropriate cases) to consider placing him on a lower post under the same scheme, provided:
    • That lower post does not require the unmet qualification;
    • He otherwise meets the essential eligibility norms for that lower post; and
    • Such adjustment does not prejudice other candidates or disturb regular recruitment.
  4. Such a downward adjustment to a lower post does not amount to a “second” or fresh compassionate appointment barred by clauses like Clause 13.1. It is a reallocation within the same compassionate framework intended to preserve, rather than replicate, the benefit.
  5. The jurisprudence applicable to open, competitive recruitment (e.g., estoppel against challenging the process after participation) is not directly applicable to compassionate appointments, which operate under a distinct legal and constitutional logic.
  6. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice to similarly situated candidates or encroachment upon open recruitment vacancies, directing consideration for a lower post under the compassionate scheme does not infringe Articles 14 or 16.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Compassionate Appointment

A mechanism by which a dependant of a government employee who dies while in service (or retires on medical invalidation in some schemes) is offered a job in government or a public body. The primary purpose is:

  • To immediately support the bereaved family,
  • Prevent economic hardship and destitution, and
  • Ensure a basic livelihood is preserved.

It is an exception to the usual rule of recruitment based on open competition and merit.

2. Direct Recruitment

Standard mode of filling public posts through:

  • Open advertisement,
  • Competitive examinations/interviews, and
  • Selection based on merit and applicable reservation policies.

Compassionate appointment does not follow this model and is therefore governed by different considerations.

3. Class‑III and Class‑IV Posts

  • Class‑III (often re-labelled Group C): Typically clerical or technical posts such as Assistant Grade‑III, requiring higher educational and sometimes technical qualifications (e.g., computer proficiency, typing).
  • Class‑IV (Group D): Basic support or menial posts such as Peon, with lower formal educational/technical requirements.

4. CPCT (Computer Proficiency Certification Test)

A computer proficiency and typing test mandated by some State governments (including Madhya Pradesh) for clerical and allied posts. Passing CPCT evidences:

  • Basic computer operation skills, and
  • Typing proficiency.

In this case, CPCT (and related computer diplomas) was mandatory for Assistant Grade‑III but not for Class‑IV posts.

5. “Death in Harness”

A legal expression meaning that an employee dies while still actively in service, before retirement. It is this situation that typically triggers eligibility for compassionate appointment of dependants.

6. Downward Adjustment

In the context of this case, “downward adjustment” refers to:

  • Re-allocating a compassionate appointee from a higher post (requiring more qualifications) to a lower post under the same scheme,
  • Without treating it as a new or second appointment, and
  • Solely to preserve the intended benefit of the compassionate scheme when the beneficiary fails to meet the higher post’s additional technical requirements.

IX. Impact and Implications

1. For Future Compassionate Appointment Cases

  • Courts now have clear authority to:
    • Uphold termination from a higher post for failure to meet its specific qualifications, yet
    • Still direct consideration for a lower, suitable post under the same compassionate scheme.
  • Beneficiaries who were placed on technically demanding posts (often by the employer’s own choice) are no longer automatically left remediless if they fail such requirements, provided:
    • They were originally within the zone of consideration for lower posts, and
    • Such downward movement does not prejudice other candidates.

2. For Administrative Practice and Policy Design

  • Government departments and public bodies are effectively encouraged to:
    • Adopt humane, flexible approaches in implementing compassionate schemes,
    • Consider designing internal mechanisms for re-allocation to lower posts when higher post qualifications are not met within time, and
    • Avoid treating “one‑time appointment” clauses as absolute bars to any form of course-correction that benefits the same dependant family.
  • Policies that place dependants directly on high-skill posts (e.g., with computer requirements) may need:
    • Clear fallback options for lower posts, and
    • Explicit provisions recognising downward mobility where warranted.

3. For Equality Jurisprudence

  • The judgment reinforces that Articles 14 and 16 are not rigid obstacles to welfare schemes but must be harmonised with Directive Principles and social justice measures.
  • It clarifies that exceptional mechanisms like compassionate appointment, when narrowly targeted and not encroaching on general recruitment, sit comfortably within the constitutional framework.

4. Litigation Strategy

  • Litigants representing compassionate appointees who have failed to meet time‑bound training/qualification conditions can now:
    • Seek relief in the nature of re-designation or reallocation to lower posts, rather than insisting solely on reinstatement to the original higher post.
    • Rely on this judgment to argue that such relief is not barred as a second appointment, and that a purposive interpretation must be preferred.
  • Employers should anticipate that rigid, literal defences based on “one‑time” clauses are less likely to succeed where they result in manifest hardship and defeat the object of the scheme.

X. Conclusion

The judgment in Managing Director, M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh marks an important development in India’s compassionate appointment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has:

  • Reaffirmed that compassionate appointment is a humanitarian exception to regular recruitment, grounded in the State’s duty as a welfare State under the Directive Principles.
  • Clarified that procedural and post-specific conditions in such schemes—like CPCT requirements or “one‑time appointment” clauses—must be interpreted in a liberal, purposive manner that sustains, rather than frustrates, the scheme’s social objective.
  • Established that downward adjustment to a lower post within the compassionate scheme, after failure to meet a higher post’s technical requirements, does not amount to a prohibited second appointment and is permissible so long as no prejudice is caused to others and the beneficiary meets the lower post’s eligibility norms.

By upholding the High Court’s direction to consider Harpal Singh for a Class‑IV post, the Supreme Court has provided a doctrinally sound and practically humane template for resolving similar disputes. The message is clear: in implementing welfare measures like compassionate appointment, justice, equity and social purpose must take precedence over rigid technicalities. Procedures are tools to deliver welfare, not traps that deprive the most vulnerable of the very protection such schemes were designed to offer.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Sanjay KarolJustice N Kotiswar Singh

Advocates

SUNNY CHOUDHARY

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