Reinforcing the Narrow Scope of Section 37 and Arbitrators’ Power to Award Quantum Meruit: A Commentary on Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. (BALCO), 2025 INSC 1457

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), 2025 INSC 1457, is an important addition to Indian arbitration jurisprudence. It clarifies:

• how narrowly courts must exercise appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”), especially after an award has already survived a Section 34 challenge; and
• the circumstances in which an arbitral tribunal may legitimately award compensation on a quantum meruit basis under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, without being accused of “rewriting the contract”.

The case arises from a mining and transportation contract between BALCO and contractor Ramesh Kumar Jain for supply of bauxite. After the original contractual quantity was completed, the contractor continued to mine and transport substantial additional quantities on BALCO’s request, without any agreed rate for this extra work being finalised. This triggered claims for:

• extra work beyond the agreed quantity,
• additional transportation cost allegedly arising from restrictions on truck capacity,
• idle machinery and manpower during a strike, and
• interest on delayed payment.

A sole arbitrator allowed the bulk of the contractor’s claims. The Commercial Court, in a Section 34 petition, upheld the award as well‑reasoned and free from the vices contemplated in Section 34(2). The High Court, however, in an appeal under Section 37, set aside the award, branding it as vitiated by “patent illegality”, mainly on the ground that the arbitrator had supposedly rewritten the contract and indulged in guesswork unbacked by evidence.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Aravind Kumar J. (Anjaria J. concurring), allowed the contractor’s appeal, restored the award and decisively rejected the High Court’s approach. The judgment combines a doctrinal survey (Sections 34, 37, patent illegality, Section 70) with a fact-sensitive review limited to checking whether the arbitrator had any evidentiary and contractual foundation for his conclusions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual Background and Procedural History

2.2 Core Legal Issue Framed by the Supreme Court

The Court crystallised the central issue (para 26) as:

2.3 Key Holdings

1. Scope of Section 37 is co-extensive with Section 34 and is even narrower where the award has already survived a Section 34 challenge. The High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view on facts and contract interpretation, especially when the Section 34 court has already upheld the award.
2. “Patent illegality” is a very limited ground. It means a glaring illegality going to the root of the matter — e.g. decision beyond contract, contrary to substantive law, in violation of the A&C Act, or based on no evidence. It does not cover mere erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence.
3. Arbitrators may award quantum meruit (Section 70, Contract Act) for extra work if the contract is silent on the rate and the benefit has been enjoyed. Determination of a reasonable rate in such circumstances does not amount to rewriting the contract.
4. “No evidence” is different from “insufficient or weak evidence”. As long as there is some material on record from which a reasonable mind could draw the arbitrator’s conclusion, courts cannot set aside the award as patently illegal merely because they would have preferred a different view.
5. Arbitrators are masters of the quantity and quality of evidence. They may employ “honest guesswork” or a “rough and ready” method of quantification, when damages are proved in principle but not with mathematical precision, provided the method is not arbitrary and is anchored in evidence and logic.

3. Analysis of the Judgment

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.1.1 ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705

Role in this case: The Court traces the origin of the “patent illegality” ground to ONGC v. Saw Pipes (para 28, 31). In that case, while interpreting “public policy” under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), the Court expanded it to include “patent illegality” — such as an award granting interest contrary to express contractual prohibition, or deciding ex aequo et bono without express authorisation.

In Jain v. BALCO, the Court uses Saw Pipes as the starting point but then situates it in the post‑2015 framework where “patent illegality” is separately codified in Section 34(2A), subject to an explicit bar against using it for reappreciation of evidence or for mere errors of law. The Court essentially acknowledges the legacy of Saw Pipes but confines its expansive potential by referring to subsequent developments.

3.1.2 Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49

Associate Builders organised “patent illegality” under three heads (para 42.1–42.3): (i) contravention of substantive law of India, (ii) contravention of the A&C Act, and (iii) contravention of Section 28(3) (deciding contrary to the contract).

In the present case, the Supreme Court (para 32) reiterates one of the key cautions from Associate Builders:

This principle is directly used to criticise the High Court for substituting its own interpretation of the contract (e.g., about the rate for extra work) over the arbitrator’s reasonable view.

3.1.3 SsangYong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131

SsangYong is the leading post‑2015 case defining “patent illegality” under Section 34(2A) as:

• a glaring illegality that goes to the root of the matter, including deciding issues beyond the contract or reference;
• contradicting substantive law or the A&C Act; or
• an irrational, unreasoned award.

The present judgment (para 34, 40, 42) adopts this framework. It stresses that patent illegality must be something that no fair-minded person could endorse — not a mere difference of opinion. This understanding is then deployed to hold that the High Court’s interference was outside Section 37’s narrow remit.

3.1.4 MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163

In MMTC v. Vedanta, the Supreme Court held that the scope of Section 37 is no wider than Section 34. An appellate court cannot revisit the merits beyond Section 34 limits.

In Jain v. BALCO, this principle is expressly invoked (para 9, 29) to emphasise that:

• Section 37 is a limited appellate remedy against orders under Section 34;
• its scope is “co-extensive” with Section 34; and
• an appeal does not convert the court into a court of first appeal on facts or contract interpretation.

The High Court is thus faulted for acting like a first appellate court, re-evaluating witness testimony and documentary evidence.

3.1.5 Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking, (2023) 9 SCC 85

Cited at para 29, Konkan Railway reiterates that Section 37 does not enlarge the jurisdiction already circumscribed by Section 34.

This supports the Court’s holding that once the Commercial Court has upheld an award, the High Court’s scrutiny becomes even more constrained; it can interfere only if the Section 34 order itself is inconsistent with Section 34 principles, not simply because it takes a different view of the evidence.

3.1.6 Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, 2023 INSC 768 / (2024) 2 SCC 613

The Court (para 29) cites HCC v. NHAI (where one of the present judges was on the Bench) to reiterate:

• the standard of judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards is “very narrow”;
• it is not judicial review in the administrative law sense; and
• courts must be even more cautious where the arbitrator has interpreted contractual terms in a reasoned fashion.

3.1.7 Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India, (2023) 15 SCC 472

At para 29, the Court refers to Larsen to point out that interference under Section 37 is even narrower where:

• the award has already been substantially upheld under Section 34; and
• the appellate court is invited to re-open factual findings.

This supports the Court’s disapproval of the High Court treating the Section 37 appeal as a broad reconsideration of factual and contractual issues.

3.1.8 Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills, 2024 INSC 742

Cited at para 29, this decision reinforces that:

• even an unreasonable or non‑speaking award is not, by itself, a ground for interference;
• unreasonableness must affect public or fundamental policy of Indian law; and
• courts cannot reappraise evidence merely because another view is possible.

3.1.9 Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL, 2023 INSC 850

At para 29, the Court relies on Batliboi to restate that:

• the arbitrator is the “ultimate master of quality and quantity of evidence”;
• even an award based on “little or no” evidence is not automatically invalid; and
• arbitrators may at times act on equity, and such decisions are not to be lightly overridden under Sections 34 and 37.

This underpins the Court’s tolerance of the arbitrator’s use of approximate quantification (e.g., 75% of idle machinery claim) grounded in overall evidence and context.

3.1.10 MTNL v. Tata Communications Ltd., (2019) 5 SCC 341

The High Court had invoked MTNL v. Tata Communications to deny application of quantum meruit where the contract fixed a price. The Supreme Court (para 5, 40) finds that reliance misplaced.

In MTNL, the Court held that where a contract clearly governs the field and the price for the very work in dispute is fixed, Section 70 (quantum meruit) cannot be used to override the bargain. Here, by contrast, the extra work of 1,95,000 MT was done after the original quantity was exhausted, and the letter of 05.01.2002 expressly left the rate to be decided later. Thus, there was a “vacuum” as to price for that extra work, and MTNL actually supports, rather than negates, the arbitrator’s resort to Section 70.

3.1.11 Construction and Design Services v. DDA, (2015) 14 SCC 263

Cited by the appellant (para 13), this case legitimises “honest guesswork” in quantifying damages where loss is proved but precision is impossible. The Court in Jain v. BALCO implicitly endorses that approach for:

• idle machinery and manpower (awarding 75% of claim); and
• quantification of reasonable additional rate for extra work (₹10/MT).

3.1.12 Other Authorities Cited

Additional decisions cited by counsel and discussed in the judgment include:

• Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC 131 – on limited scope of interference and deference to arbitral findings;
• Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. RRVUN Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 236 – underlining that arbitral tribunals are masters of evidence;
• Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, (2015) 4 SCC 136 – relied upon by the High Court to criticise alleged guesswork, but in fact dealing primarily with forfeiture of earnest money and proof of loss;
• Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588 – classic authority on sanctity of contracts and limited role of courts in adjusting bargains;
• Satyanarayan Construction Co. v. Union of India, (2011) 15 SCC 101 – on arbitrators not rewriting contracts.

The Supreme Court distinguishes or confines the latter group of cases by stressing that here the arbitrator did not contradict any express contractual rate for the extra work; he filled a gap where no rate had been agreed at all.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Minimal Judicial Intervention: Sections 5, 34 and 37 A&C Act

The judgment begins (paras 27–29) by reaffirming the legislative policy of “minimal judicial intervention” under Section 5 A&C Act. Courts may interfere only under the specific remedies created in Part I — notably Sections 34 and 37.

Regarding Section 34, the Court reiterates:

• It is a supervisory jurisdiction, not an appellate one.
• Interference is permissible only on grounds listed in Section 34(2)–(3), including:
  • contravention of public policy of India,
  • contravention of fundamental policy of Indian law,
  • violation of most basic notions of morality or justice, and
  • patent illegality (for domestic awards, post‑2015).
• The Court cannot examine the “legality, reasonableness or correctness” of factual or legal findings unless they fall within those grounds.

For Section 37, the Court emphasises that:

• Section 37 is a limited appeal from an order under Section 34;
• it cannot enlarge the grounds for interference beyond Section 34 (MMTC, Konkan Railway); and
• where the Section 34 court has already upheld the award, an appellate court’s scope of review is “even narrower” (Larsen).

On this foundation, the Supreme Court holds that the High Court transgressed the statutory limits by:

• re-assessing witness evidence and documents; and
• substituting its own evaluation of reasonableness of damages for that of the arbitrator.

3.2.2 Clarification of “Patent Illegality” After the 2015 Amendment

The Court devotes significant discussion (paras 31–35) to explaining “patent illegality”:

1. Judicial origin (Saw Pipes) and early expansion.
   The Court notes how Saw Pipes expanded “public policy” to include patent illegality, citing examples such as granting interest contrary to contract or deciding on pure equity without authorisation.
2. Systematisation in Associate Builders.
   Patent illegality was structured into three subcategories (substantive law, A&C Act, and Section 28(3) / contract breach).
3. Statutory codification in Section 34(2A) and its proviso (2015 Amendment).
   Patent illegality became an independent ground for domestic awards. Crucially, the proviso declares that an award:
   “shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.”
   This is aimed at curbing over-intervention.
4. Refinement in SsangYong.
   SsangYong characterises patent illegality as “glaring” and going to the root, including awards:
   • beyond the contract or reference;
   • contrary to substantive law or to the A&C Act; or
   • wholly irrational or unreasoned.

Building on this, the Court in Jain v. BALCO offers an operational test (paras 35–36):

• The arbitrator’s findings must either:
  • shock the judicial conscience;
  • ignore vital matters or consider irrelevant matters so as to produce injustice; or
  • be so irrational that no fair or sensible person could have arrived at them on the same facts.
• A classic example is where an award is based on “no evidence”, not merely weak or scanty evidence.
• If there is some evidence (a witness, correspondence, charts, etc.) on which the arbitrator could reasonably rely, courts cannot reject that view as patently illegal simply because they think the evidence is insufficient or unpersuasive.

Applying these standards, the Court holds that none of the High Court’s objections — such as reliance on claimant’s charts, percentage reductions, or inferred losses — cross the threshold of patent illegality.

3.2.3 Arbitrators and the Contract: Interpretation vs. Rewriting

The respondent’s core argument was that the arbitrator rewrote the contract by:

• awarding an additional ₹10/MT for extra work; and
• allowing compensation for matters allegedly barred (e.g., idle machinery during strike, transportation losses).

The Supreme Court acknowledges the fundamental principle (para 36):

• arbitrators are bound by the contract;
• they cannot award something expressly prohibited, or contradict clear contractual terms; and
• doing so may indeed constitute patent illegality under Section 28(3) and public policy.

However, the Court draws a critical distinction:

• Silence or gaps in the contract are not the same as prohibitions.
  Where the contract is silent (e.g., no clause on rate for extra work after the agreed quantity is exhausted), arbitrators can:
  • interpret implied terms; and
  • use restitutionary principles (quantum meruit) to avoid unjust enrichment.
• Express prohibition vs. omission.
  Only when a contract expressly bars a certain payment (e.g., “no variation in rate for extra quantities”) would an award granting such payment be plainly illegal.

The Court illustrates (para 36):

• If the contract is silent on interest for delayed payment, an award of reasonable interest is not rewriting the contract; it is consistent with Section 31(7)(a) A&C Act.
• Similarly, if the contract does not say anything about compensating extra work done at the other party’s request, the arbitrator may imply a term or apply Section 70 to grant a reasonable amount.

The Court also gives a policy reason (para 36–37):

3.2.4 Section 70 Contract Act and Quantum Meruit in Arbitration

Section 70 of the Contract Act provides:

The Court (paras 36–37, 40–41) characterises Section 70 as:

• a statutory, quasi-contractual obligation, independent of any express contract; and
• a foundation for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims.

Applying this to the facts:

• After the original 2,22,000 MT were supplied, BALCO requested further supply of 1,95,000 MT of bauxite.
• BALCO’s letter dated 05.01.2002 expressly recorded that the rate would be decided later in consultation with the contractor.
• The contractor lawfully did the extra work, not gratuitously, and BALCO undeniably enjoyed the benefit.

Therefore:

• there was a “vacuum” on the rate for this extra work — the original contract did not fix a price for it;
• the arbitrator, in awarding an additional ₹10/MT (over ₹634.20/MT), was not “rewriting” or “varying” any agreed contractual rate; and
• he was filling a gap via Section 70, determining a reasonable compensation to avoid unjust enrichment.

The Court thus holds (para 40–41) that:

• MTNL v. Tata Communications (which disallows quantum meruit when the contract already fixes the price for the very work done) is distinguishable; and
• Section 70 claims can be decided by arbitrators if they fall within the scope of disputes referred, explicitly or by implication (here, the dispute over payment for extra work was clearly within the reference).

On quantification, the Court reminds that:

• the measure of compensation under Section 70 is usually the value of benefit obtained or the claimant’s cost, whichever is reasonable;
• the tribunal must still base its figure on evidence; but
• exactness is not required; reasonable approximation is permitted (paras 41–42).

3.2.5 Evidence, “Guesswork” and the Arbitrator as Master of Evidence

The High Court labelled the award as based on “oral statements” and “guesswork”, especially with respect to:

• extra transportation cost purportedly due to truck load restrictions (Claim 19.2); and
• idle machinery and manpower during the 67‑day strike (Claim 19.4).

The Supreme Court responds at two levels:

(a) Conceptual Level

• Arbitrators are not bound by the strict rules of the Evidence Act (Section 19 A&C Act). They can draw inferences from commercial documents, letters, charts, and industry practice.
• “Honest guesswork” is permissible where:
  • liability and loss in principle are proved; but
  • the exact quantum is not susceptible to precise proof.
  This draws from Construction and Design Services and similar authorities.
• The crucial test is: Is the path of reasoning discernible and rational? If yes, brevity or approximations do not equate to patent illegality.

(b) Application to Facts

The Court (para 39–40) undertakes a limited review of the award just to check if there exists:

• some evidentiary basis; and
• coherence in reasoning, even if succinct.

Examples:

• Extra transportation cost (Claim 19.2).
  – The contractor claimed extra cost because truck loads were restricted below previous practice (e.g., down from 11 MT to ~10.2 MT).
  – The arbitrator noted that even after the High Court stayed a District Transport Officer’s order, BALCO did not permit full loads.
  – This fact (not controverted by BALCO) was treated as evidentiary support for additional trips and cost.
  – The arbitrator used the contractor’s tabular statement as a working basis but also applied his judgment in calculating the amount.
  The Supreme Court holds that this is not “no evidence”; it is a plausible inference from proved facts.
• Idle machinery and manpower (Claim 19.4).
  – There was a strike at BALCO’s plant for 67 days, which the arbitrator found to be a dispute between BALCO management and its workers, not a “force majeure” or an “act of God”.
  – Mining operations were adversely affected; the contractor’s machinery and manpower were partly idle.
  – Though exact documentary proof of each head of loss was limited, the arbitrator used a tabular chart and granted only 75% of the claimed amount, discounting possible exaggeration.
  The Court sees this as an equitable, reasoned adjustment, not arbitrary guesswork.
• Rejection of certain claims (e.g., overburden removal, Claim 19.3).
  – The arbitrator refused some claims for want of sufficient proof, demonstrating that he did not treat all contractor assertions as gospel truth.
  – This selective approach itself shows application of mind and evidentiary evaluation.

The Court concludes (para 39–42) that:

3.3 Impact and Significance

3.3.1 Strengthening Finality of Arbitral Awards

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation that:

• the combined effect of Sections 34, 37 and 5 is to make arbitral awards highly resistant to judicial disturbance; and
• “patent illegality” cannot be used as a pretext for appellate-style review of merits.

In particular, the Court underscores that:

• once a Section 34 court has upheld an award, a Section 37 appeal must be approached with even greater restraint;
• interference is warranted only if the Section 34 court itself applied the wrong legal standard or ignored the narrow confines of Section 34; not simply because the High Court finds the award unpersuasive.

This will likely curb a trend where some High Courts have treated Section 37 appeals as an opportunity for a second, fuller review of facts. The decision aligns India more closely with pro-arbitration jurisdictions where curial review is tightly limited.

3.3.2 Clarifying Patent Illegality vs. Erroneous Merits

The Court’s detailed exposition of “patent illegality” post‑2015 helps practitioners and courts draw a sharper line between:

• Genuine patent illegality: e.g.,
  • award awarding something clearly prohibited by contract;
  • decision on an issue beyond the scope of reference;
  • violation of mandatory substantive law or provisions of the A&C Act; or
  • findings literally unsupported by any evidence.
• Mere errors or alternative views on facts/law, which are not grounds for setting aside.

Courts now have a relatively well-defined toolkit:

• Saw Pipes, Associate Builders and SsangYong for doctrinal test;
• Section 34(2A) proviso to bar reappreciation of evidence or mere legal mistakes;
• MMTC, Konkan Railway, Larsen, HCC v. NHAI and now Jain v. BALCO for scope of appellate interference.

3.3.3 Quantum Meruit and Extra Work in Commercial Contracts

The judgment has notable implications for construction, mining and infrastructure contracts, where:

• parties often proceed with extra work on urgent instructions while rates are to be “finalised later”; and
• disputes arise when the paying party refuses to agree to reasonable rates ex post.

Key takeaways:

• Arbitrators may apply Section 70 (quantum meruit) if:
  • work is done lawfully for the other party;
  • it is not intended to be gratuitous; and
  • the other party enjoys the benefit.
• If the contract is silent on the price for such extra work (or the parties consciously leave it to be decided later), a tribunal can treat the situation as giving rise to a quasi-contractual obligation to pay reasonable compensation.
• This does not amount to rewriting the contract; it prevents unjust enrichment consistent with Section 70 and commercial fairness.

This provides comfort to contractors who might otherwise fear that performing extra work without an immediately agreed variation order exposes them to non-payment. It also encourages drafters to be clearer about how extra work will be valued, if they wish to minimise quasi-contractual disputes.

3.3.4 Evidentiary Standards and “Honest Guesswork”

The Court’s acceptance of approximate quantification on a base of some evidence reinforces a pragmatic, commercial approach:

• Parties need not (and often cannot) prove every rupee of loss with mathematical precision.
• Courts should respect arbitrators’ commercial judgment in using conservative approximations, discounts (e.g., 75% of claim), and experience-based adjustments.
• The threshold for interference is crossed only when the arbitrator’s figure is literally “plucked from thin air” with no evidentiary or logical trail.

For arbitral practice, this reduces the risk that awards will be struck down simply because quantification is not expressed in forensic detail, so long as a coherent rationale is discernible.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Section 34 vs. Section 37 of the A&C Act

• Section 34: A party can ask a court to set aside an arbitral award on limited grounds, such as:
  • incapacity, invalid arbitration agreement, lack of notice, etc.;
  • award dealing with disputes beyond the scope of the arbitration; or
  • conflict with public policy of India, including patent illegality (for domestic awards).
  The court does not hear the case afresh; it examines whether the award is fundamentally flawed.
• Section 37: Allows an appeal from a Section 34 order (among other orders). But the grounds remain those in Section 34 — the appellate court does not get a wider power; it only checks whether the Section 34 court applied the law correctly.

4.2 Patent Illegality

“Patent illegality” means a clear and obvious error in the award that:

• goes to the root of the matter, not a minor mistake; and
• includes things like:
  • ignoring a binding law or contract clause;
  • deciding issues that were never referred to arbitration; or
  • making findings with no evidence at all.

It does not mean:

• a different legal view that another judge might have taken; or
• merely believing that the arbitrator misread some evidence.

4.3 “No Evidence” vs. “Insufficient Evidence”

• No evidence:
  • literally nothing in the record that supports a finding; and
  • e.g., awarding loss of profit without any proof that any profit was expected or lost.
• Insufficient evidence:
  • there is some evidence, but it is weak, disputed, or might not convince everyone; and
  • courts cannot overturn an award just because they think the evidence was not strong enough if the arbitrator found it sufficient.

4.4 Quantum Meruit and Section 70 (Contract Act)

• Quantum meruit (Latin: “as much as he has earned”) is a principle that when someone does work or provides goods for another:
  • lawfully,
  • not intending to do it for free, and
  • the other person accepts and benefits from it,
  they should be paid a reasonable amount, even if there is no agreed price.
• Section 70 writes this into Indian law. It prevents one party from being unjustly enriched at another’s expense.
• In arbitration, if extra work is done at the other party’s request but the contract does not fix a price, the arbitrator can award a reasonable sum under Section 70.

4.5 Arbitrator as “Master of Evidence”

• Arbitrators are not bound by the strict technical rules of the Indian Evidence Act.
• They can rely on commercial documents, correspondence, charts, and industry norms.
• Court review is limited: if the arbitrator’s conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the material, it should not be disturbed.

5. Conclusion

Ramesh Kumar Jain v. BALCO is a significant decision consolidating and extending India’s pro-arbitration framework. Its key contributions may be summarised as follows:

1. It firmly reiterates that Section 37 does not permit a second look at the merits of an arbitral dispute once an award has survived a Section 34 challenge. Appellate scrutiny is co-extensive with Section 34 and, if anything, even narrower.
2. It clarifies the contours of patent illegality post‑2015, insisting that only glaring, root-level defects — such as decisions beyond contract, contrary to statute, or unsupported by any evidence — justify setting aside an award. Mere disagreement with the arbitrator’s view of the facts or law does not suffice.
3. It provides important guidance on quantum meruit and Section 70 in arbitration, holding that arbitrators may:
   • fill contractual gaps regarding rates for extra work; and
   • award reasonable compensation to prevent unjust enrichment,
   so long as this does not contradict any express contractual prohibition.
4. It endorses a practical approach to evidence and quantification, legitimising reasonable approximations (“honest guesswork”) where losses are proved in principle, and rejecting the notion that brevity or partial reliance on claimant’s calculations is per se illegal.

In broader context, the judgment strengthens commercial confidence in arbitration by affirming that:

• arbitral awards, once made and upheld at first instance, will not easily be set aside; and
• courts will respect both the substantive autonomy of parties’ bargains and the procedural autonomy of arbitral tribunals, intervening only when truly necessary to correct fundamental legal wrongs.

As such, Jain v. BALCO stands as an authoritative precedent on the limits of judicial interference under Section 37 and on the legitimate scope of arbitrators’ powers to apply quasi-contractual principles like quantum meruit in resolving commercial disputes.