In re M.A.

McAdams

In this dependency proceeding, the mother of five dependent children appeals from post-permanency visitation orders. She challenges the juvenile courts decision to reduce visitation to once every three months, characterizing it as an abuse of discretion that is lacking in evidentiary support and not in the childrens best interests. Finding no error, we affirm the orders.

BACKGROUND

This appeal concerns five children: M.A., a boy born in 1996; A.A. and A.A., twin girls born in 1997 (collectively, the three middle children); I.A., a girl born in 2000, and N.R., a girl born in 1991 (collectively, the two other children). All five children share the same mother, appellant Maria G. (the mother).

The current dependency proceedings began in 2004 for the three middle children, and in 2006 for the two other children.

Proceedings Initiated in 2004 Involving the Three Middle Children

In March 2004, the Santa Cruz Human Resources Agency brought dependency petitions on behalf of the three middle children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) In the petitions, the Agency alleged that the children had suffered serious physical harm, because the mother engaged in "excessive discipline and abuse" and also permitted her boyfriend to hit the children with a belt or a shoe. The petitions further alleged that another older half-sister, L.G., was a dependent child who had been sexually abused by two men, both prior boyfriends of the mother.

At the same time, the Agency also filed a petition for I.A., the childrens younger half-sister, which the court sustained. But I.A.s case did not proceed along the same procedural track, as she was returned to the mothers custody in April 2004 with family maintenance services. That dependency proceeding for I.A. was dismissed two years later, in March 2006.

Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

In April 2004, the petitions were sustained. The three middle children were ordered removed from the mothers custody. They were placed together in a licensed foster home, where they have remained throughout this dependency proceeding. The juvenile court ordered reunification services for the mother. It ordered twice-weekly supervised visitation.

In November 2005, following a contested 18-month review hearing, the court terminated the mothers reunification services. (§§ 366.21, 361.5.) Visitation was decreased to once per month, supervised.

In March 2006, a hearing was held to select a permanent plan for the three middle children. (§ 366.26.) The court identified long-term foster care (permanent planned living arrangement) as the childrens permanent plan, with a goal of legal guardianship. At that point, however, the childrens foster parents "no longer were interested in legal guardianship." Visitation was increased to twice a month, supervised.

In April 2007, the juvenile court conducted a post permanency review hearing. (§ 366.3.) The Agency recommended reducing visits to once per month. Following a contested hearing, the court maintained visitation at twice monthly.

In August 2007, the juvenile court conducted another permanency planning hearing for the three middle children. (§ 366.26.) Following this contested hearing, the court found that the children were adoptable but hard to place because of their ages, the desire to keep them together as a sibling group, and the absence of an identified prospective home. The court continued the matter for 180 days and ordered the Agency to seek an adoptive family for the three middle children.

At the same hearing in August 2007, the court also terminated visitation, having found it detrimental to the children. Two weeks later, the Agency petitioned for modification of the visitation order. As alleged in the petitions, the childrens therapists were of the opinion that they would be harmed by abruptly severing all face-to-face contact with the mother. Based on this new information, the Agency asked the court to order "monthly, supervised therapeutic" visits.

In September 2007, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the Agencys modification petitions. (§ 388.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the petitions. Based on the new information, the court vacated its previous determination that visitation was detrimental and it ordered monthly visits, to "be supervised in a therapeutic setting."

At a review hearing held in February 2008, the court continued the children on the same permanent plan (permanent planned living arrangement), and it maintained the same monthly visitation schedule. (§ 366.3.)

Proceedings Initiated in 2006 Involving the Two Other Children

In 2006, the Agency sought jurisdiction over the two other children, N.R. and I.A.

In October 2006, the Agency brought a dependency petition on behalf of N.R, which alleged that she had "been sexually abused by her mothers live-in boyfriend" and that the mother had failed to protect her. (§ 300.) Both N.R. and I.A. were taken into protective custody. I.A. was placed with her father; within weeks, however, he expressed his unwillingness to care for her. Both girls were then placed together in a licensed foster home, though not with the three middle children. The following month, the Agency filed a petition on I.A.s behalf. (§ 300.)

In March 2007, the juvenile court sustained amended petitions for N.R. and I.A. The mother was not offered family reunification services.

In July 2007, the court conducted a permanency planning hearing for N.R. and I.A. (§ 366.26.) The court found that the permanent planned living arrangement was "appropriate" for the two girls. The court ordered supervised monthly visits.

Proceedings in 2008 Involving All Five Children

In May 2008, the Agency petitioned for modification of visitation for all five children. As to each child, the Agency sought a reduction in visits with the mother to once every three months.

In July 2008, the court held a contested hearing concerning visitation. Procedurally, with respect to the three middle children, the issue was before the court on the Agencys modification petitions. (§ 388.) As to the two other children, however, the visitation issue was presented as part of post permanency review. (§ 366.3.)

The court received both documentary and testimonial evidence. The documentary evidence included post permanency review reports from the Agency for N.R. and I.A.; CASA reports from the court appointed special advocates for all five children; a memorandum from the Agency concerning visitation; and attachments to the modification petitions, including meeting notes from the childrens Difficult Case Staffing Team. The court heard testimony from the three middle children, who testified in chambers; from the social worker; and from the mother.

The Difficult Case Staffing Team comprised numerous participants, including at various times the childrens assigned social worker; a social worker supervisor; the childrens therapists; the childrens attorney; the childrens court appointed special advocates; and the CASA case supervisor.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court reduced the mothers visitation with all five children to once every three months.

Appeal

The mother brought this appeal challenging the juvenile courts July 2008 visitation orders. The mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by reducing visitation, and she attacks the evidentiary basis for the finding of changed circumstances and for the finding that the childrens best interests are served by the decrease in visits. The Agency defends the orders. The children do not appear on appeal.

DISCUSSION

To establish the proper framework for our consideration of the issues raised here, we first summarize the legal principles that govern our analysis, including the applicable standard of appellate review.

I. Statutory Background

A. In General

The Legislature has provided for juvenile court jurisdiction over dependent children. (See § 300 et seq.) In dependency proceedings, there are generally four phases: jurisdiction; disposition; reunification (unless bypassed) or family maintenance; and the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391.)

1. Permanency Planning

In cases that reach the permanency planning phase, the juvenile court must "conduct a hearing to select and implement an appropriate permanent plan from among those specified—including, in order of mandatory preference, adoption (after termination of parental rights), legal guardianship, and long-term foster care." (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 884-885.)

If the court "orders long-term foster care, there must be a status review every six months at a hearing to determine whether it continues to be appropriate." (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 885; § 366.3, subds. (d), (e).) "A review of a permanent plan hearing is held to fulfill an `important purpose of dependency proceedings, which is `to provide children with stable, permanent homes." (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145.) At this stage in a dependency proceeding, the focus has shifted away from efforts to maintain biological ties. (Id. at p. 1148; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Thus, "after a child has spent a substantial period in foster care and attempts at reunification have proved fruitless, the childs interest in stability outweighs the parents interest in asserting the right to the custody and companionship of the child." (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419-420.)

2. Visitation

Generally speaking, it is the juvenile courts role to "define the rights of the parties to visitation. The definition of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation." (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [visitation in the context of dispositional orders following removal from parental custody]; but see In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 , fn. 8 [noting "some controversy as to whether the courts visitation order must specify the frequency and length of visitation"].)

Prior to permanency planning, during reunification efforts, visitation generally must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the dependent child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) But the court need not order visitation "when the parent is not participating in the reunification efforts." (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 458-459; see § 361.5, subd. (f).)

In cases that have reached the permanency planning stage, where the juvenile court has selected a permanent plan of either guardianship or long-term foster care for the dependent child, it must order visitation with the parent unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(6)(E); In re Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.)

3 Modification

Throughout the dependency, interested persons may petition the juvenile court for modification of its prior orders, as provided in section 388. To warrant modification, the petitioner must prove (1) that new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) that the proposed change will be in the dependent childs best interests. (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415; In re M. V. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1059; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1).)

A section 388 modification petition is an appropriate vehicle to "extend or limit the right to visitation or to terminate visitation altogether." (In re Jennifer G., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 757.) The standard of proof for such visitation issues is preponderance of the evidence. (In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 760, 764.)

B. Appellate Review

The grant or denial of a petition brought under section 388 is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Its "ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established." (Ibid.) Likewise, a juvenile courts visitation order typically is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6; In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.)

To the extent that an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile courts ruling, we "review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the courts conclusions." (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649.) When the facts in evidence give rise to more than one reasonable inference, we will not substitute our determination for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.) In other words, "evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling." (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)

II. Analysis

With the foregoing principles in mind, we analyze the juvenile court orders challenged here.

A. Modification Orders for the Three Middle Children

As noted above, the challenged visitation orders for the three middle children were made following a hearing on the Agencys modification petitions. "At the hearing on the petition pursuant to section 388, the juvenile courts task was to determine whether the [Agency] had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there was new evidence or a change of circumstances demonstrating that it was in [the childrens] best interests that the previous ... order ... be changed, modified or set aside." (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415.)

The mother challenges the evidentiary basis for both elements of the determination, changed circumstances and the childrens best interests. In response, the Agency argues that the mother has forfeited her claim on the first point, for failure to raise it below. On the merits, the Agency also defends the courts findings on both elements.

1. Forfeiture

At the outset, we reject the Agencys assertion that the mother forfeited her evidentiary challenge to the changed circumstances finding by failing to raise it at the contested hearing.

First, as the hearing record discloses, the mothers trial counsel objected to some of the proffered documentary evidence on the ground that it reflected events prior to February 14, 2008, the date of the last visitation orders, which the Agency wanted modified. As counsel put it: "In order to consider changes of court orders, the Court has to consider new circumstances and evidence after the hearing on February 14." Counsel thus addressed the issue of changed circumstances.

Second, claims of insufficient evidence typically are not forfeited. It is true, as a general rule, that "points not urged in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal." (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17.) That rule applies with equal force in dependency proceedings. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222.) "The contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, however, is an obvious exception to the rule." (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips at p. 23, fn. 17; accord, People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126.) Thus, for example, the "claim that there was insufficient evidence of the childs adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the juvenile court." (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623.)

2. Changed Circumstances

By statute, the modification petition must rest upon "grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence ...." (§ 388, subd. (a).) In this case, in support of its May 2008 modification petitions, the Agency cited various circumstances, including continuing problems with the children acting out after visits, continuing difficulties with the mother breaking visitation rules, and an agreement by the childrens Difficult Case Staffing Team that visitation should be reduced.

According to the mother, the evidence shows that the childrens tendency to decompensate after visits was not new, having been noted in reports since November 2005. In the mothers words (with her emphasis, and her quotes from the modification petitions): "Very little changed subsequent to the September 13, 2007 order for resumed monthly visitation. As the petitions alleged, visits with the mother `continue to be problematic, the children continued to exhibit aggressive behaviors after contact with their mother, the mother continues to break the rules established for visitation and continues to give the children false hope about their future ...." The mother thus maintains that the facts disclosed at the contested hearing "establish that circumstances surrounding visitation had not changed in any significant way since the prior orders setting a monthly visitation schedule."

At the hearing, the juvenile court observed that "the visitation has been problematic for some time. Its been at least a couple of years now that the records show that there has been issues regarding visitation, because the children, once theres a call or a contact with mother in person or through phone calls, the behavior is extreme." As described by the court, "the behaviors surrounding visitation" included "aggressive tantrums, using profanity, actively cussing at their caregivers, being defiant, damaging property, damaging the things in their rooms, stealing." As the court further commented, "theres very troubling conduct there and discussion that shows that this has been a long, ongoing pattern."

From these facts, the mother posits that the record lacks evidence of changed circumstances. We disagree.

In the first place, the fact that the childrens problems with visitation continued over a long period of time does not necessarily undermine the courts implicit finding that the Agency proved the first element, changed circumstances or new evidence. In the context of this case, the court could treat the long passage of time, coupled with the lack of improvement in the childrens behaviors after visits, as new evidence of continuing detriment to the children. On that point, this case shares some factual similarity to In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th 398. There, the California Supreme Court cited as changed circumstances "that the father was failing to comply with the court-ordered transition plan, that there was still no adequate parent-child relationship (despite months of effort during the transition plan), and that the child had alleged an act of sexual abuse." (Id. at p. 415, italics added.) As the juvenile court judge explained here: "In this particular case, there has been a lack of therapeutic progress on the part of these children. In fact, one of the reports that I reviewed even indicated that, that the children arent progressing in their therapy. Theyre stuck. They have extreme loss and grief issues that theyre not able to move past. Those loss and grief issues, weve got to try something different than what were doing. And what Im seeing is no change over the past year with visitation as it is. In fact, a continuation of negative behaviors. And at this point, we need to move forward." Information in the February 2008 Difficult Case Staffing Team meeting notes supports that conclusion. Those notes reflect statements by the twins therapist that they "are continuing to be shut down. [The therapist] believes that is due to their feelings of uncertainty — the girls still dont know where theyll be long term." The record in this case thus contains new evidence of the childrens lack of progress toward emotional health.

Furthermore, the Difficult Case Staffing Team meeting notes — which the court described as "[e]specially illuminating" — disclosed other new information. Of particular relevance are the minutes from a team meeting that took place on February 21, 2008, a week after the last review hearing for the three middle children where the juvenile court maintained their monthly visitation schedule. According to the minutes from that February 2008 meeting, all team members agreed that visitation should be reduced. Previous minutes (from August 2007) indicate some differences of opinion among team members about visitation. The fact that the childrens team reached agreement in supporting a reduction in visitation constitutes new evidence supporting a change. (Cf. Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881 ["two psychological evaluations of mother that demonstrated she was incapable of benefiting from reunification services within the time period prescribed by law" constituted "substantial new evidence supporting the juvenile courts determination that it was in the childrens best interests to not provide reunification services to mother"].)

Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that there was new evidence before it to support a change in visitation. We will not substitute our determination for that of the juvenile court on that point. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)

3. Childrens Best Interests

"The concept of best interest `is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a childs opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult." (State Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 273, 286.) The concept has been described as "a complex idea." (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) For that reason, in assessing the childs best interests, "a number of factors should be examined." (Ibid.) Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, those factors might include "(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been." (Id. at p. 532.) Where placement is at issue, "a primary consideration in determining the childs best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity." (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) "`When custody continues over a significant period, the childs need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role." (Ibid.; see also, e.g., In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 419-420.)

In this case, the juvenile court explicitly assessed the childrens best interests, explaining that it was considering what "is going to be consistent with their well being and what is going to provide the most stable placement for them." In making that assessment, the court reasoned that a reduction in visits would serve the childrens best interests by enhancing their prospects for stability in at least two ways.

First, the court saw a reduction in visits as a means to alleviate the harm caused by the childrens divided allegiances. (See In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1100 [child "was confused and experienced divided loyalties between [her foster parents] and her mother"].) The court observed that "for all these children, what clearly is the main theme is a difficulty the children are having with split loyalties and with their ability to bond and the confusion that they clearly experienced throughout this entire experience, which is causing them frustration and negative behaviors." The court found that the mothers conduct during visits — including "promises ... giving [the] children false hope ... of reuniting with mother" — had "been detrimental to the children and their ability to move forward" toward a future that does not include a return to the mothers care. As stated in its April 2008 memorandum, the Agency sought to "decrease visitation gradually, and in a way that does not disrupt the minors routine. This would be so that the minors are better able to connect to their foster families, address their own attachment issues, and work towards more permanency in their lives." The court could reasonably conclude that this step toward strengthening the childrens bond with their caretakers is in their best interests. (Cf. In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 "the disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion"].)

Second, the court viewed a reduction in visits as a way to bolster the stability of their placement. Characterizing the childrens behaviors after visits as "pretty extreme," the court wondered aloud "how long these foster families are gonna be able to tolerate this kind of behavior." As the court also observed, "legal guardianship for these children has moved further and further away from them. We have what would have been probably very adoptable children a few years back. Now we have children that the caregivers who clearly love them and have provided safe homes for them are reluctant to take on legal guardianship because of the extreme behaviors surround the visitation. [¶] What that tells the Court is that their placements are in jeopardy ... their stability is in jeopardy. And the Court cannot ignore that." The record supports the courts assessment. According to the Difficult Case Staffing Team minutes from February 2008, the foster mother for the three middle children "stated that she would be in favor of legal guardianship, but not if visits are continuing because they cause so much disruption and conflicting feelings of loyalty for the twins." Because legal guardianship generally offers a more secure placement than foster care, its pursuit better serves these children. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 735 ["guardianship may provide some measure of short-term stability over foster care"].)

Nor are we persuaded to a different conclusion by the fact that the children expressed a desire for more visitation, not less. Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, the wishes of dependent children may provide "powerful demonstrative evidence" of their best interests. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [childs desire to return to mothers care].) Even so, "a childs wishes are not determinative of her best interests ...." (Ibid.) And as this court has explained, "visitation may not be dictated solely by the child involved...." (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) More to the point, in this case, it is the childrens very desire to see their mother — and even to return to her care — that is contributing to their confusion and divided loyalties. Whatever their expressed wishes, it is in the childrens best interests to limit contact with her. As stated in the February 2008 report from M.A.s court appointed special advocate: "A recent positive development for [M.A.] therapeutically has been the minimization of the biological mothers influence on [M.A.] and his sisters."

Here, the record strongly suggests that reunification is unlikely. The children have "spent a substantial period in foster care and attempts at reunification have proved fruitless ...." (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 420.) That being so, their best interests are served by protecting their current foster placement and moving toward legal guardianship in order to maximize their stability. As stated in its April 2008 memorandum, the Agency wanted to "decrease visitation gradually, and in a way that does not disrupt the minors routine. This would be so that the minors are better able to connect to their foster families, address their own attachment issues, and work towards more permanency in their lives." The record supports the courts determination that a reduction in visits with the mother may achieve the objectives of permanency and stability and thus may serve the childrens best interests.

4. Conclusion

In this case, the juvenile court had new evidence that a reduction in visitation would be in the best interests of the three middle children. Therefore, "the record supports the lower courts exercise of its discretion to reduce visitation." (In re Megan B., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 953.)

B. Review Orders for the Two Other Children

The challenged visitation orders for N.R. and I.A. arose in a different procedural context from those of the three middle children. Although the Agency petitioned for modification on behalf of all five children, the court treated the section 388 petitions for I.A. and N.R. as moot, having made its visitation order for those two children as part of its post permanency review under section 366.3.

The mother does not tailor her arguments to these procedural differences, even though they affect at least one aspect of the analysis — the need to show changed circumstances. Unlike section 388, section 366.3 does not require a showing of changed circumstances, either explicitly or implicitly. Given these differences and the mothers failure to address them, we see no reason to discuss the issue of changed circumstances as it relates to N.R. and I.A.

We thus begin our analysis by considering the proper legal standard for assessing the visitation orders for N.R. and I.A, which were made at the section 366.3 review hearing. Visitation is a proper subject at such hearings. At "section 366.3 post-permanency planning review hearings," the court "may modify visitation orders ... as the childs needs require." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1002 [sibling visitation]; see also, e.g., In re Kelly D. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 433, 438 ["visitation is a proper issue to address at the hearing"].) But section 366.3 does not specify a legal standard to guide the juvenile court in undertaking its review. Nevertheless, as a general proposition, "the Legislature has mandated that the juvenile courts consider `the best interests of the minors in all deliberations." (In re J. C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 992-993, quoting and italicizing § 202, subd. (d).) "The best interests of the child is certainly a factor the court can look to in exercising its discretion to permit or deny visitation." (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 459 [affirming the juvenile courts discretionary denial of visitation under § 361.5, subd. (f), following bypass of reunification services].) We find that standard appropriate here.

Applying the "best interests" standard, we review the juvenile courts implied determination that the ordered reduction in visitation is in the best interests of N.R. and I.A. We conclude that it is.

As with the three middle children, the two other children need stability in their lives. The court was referring to all five children when it remarked on their difficulties "with split loyalties and with their ability to bond" to their caregivers. The courts observations concerning stability and permanence thus are equally valid as they relate to N.R. and I.A.

Concerning I.A., her case shares other factual similarities with those of the three middle children. Thus, for example, the court had evidence of "a dramatic change in [her] behavior before and after visits. She uses vulgar language, steals, lies, manipulates, and behaves aggressively." In addition, the court noted, "she also physically acts out towards her foster mother, kicking her, cussing at her, calling her a liar ...." The court found I.A.s reaction to visits "especially ... troubling, because she is the youngest, and her behavior, quite frankly, is ... the worst." As with the three middle children, these behaviors are concerning, not only because they reflect the childs distress from uncertainty and divided loyalties but also because they threaten to jeopardize her placement.

By contrast, N.R.s case presents different reasons for curtailing visits. According to a report submitted by the Agency, the mother "continues to blame [N.R.] for the loss of all of her children, and subsequently does not invite [N.R.] to any visits, nor does she engage in any conversation with [N.R.]. This results in [N.R.] feeling rejected and unimportant in the life of her family." As reported in the February 2008 team notes, N.R. "wanted to go to the last visit and brought her boyfriend, Raul. The visit was very tense and awkward. [N.R.] said hi to her mom, and her mom said hi back, but that was their only interaction. They stayed on opposite sides of the room. [N.R.] cried a great deal and was very hurt after the visit because her mother ignored her." In a July 2008 report to the court, N.R.s court appointed special advocate provided similar information, saying that the "mother does not speak to [N.R.] when she calls the foster home to speak to [I.A.], she does not express any interest in visiting with [N.R.], and she has accused [N.R.] of making up the allegations of abuse." The CASA also stated: "Although [N.R.] is making progress ..., the psychological abuse from her mother continues. When her mother calls and refuses to speak to her, when she gives presents to her younger sister (who shares a room with her) and not to [N.R.], and when she blames [N.R.], in front of the siblings during visits, for the children being out of the home (which is then repeated to [N.R.] in the home), [N.R.s] psychological well-being is compromised." The CASA further opined that N.R. "is psychologically at risk following any contact her mother has with her siblings. She benefits from the reduction in visits of the birth mother with her sister, [I.A.]." The court apparently was persuaded by all of this evidence, observing that "the oldest child, [N.R.], still very much feels that mother continues to blame her for the loss of the other children not being in the home. As the victim of sexual abuse, she has enough on her plate, enough on her shoulders. And she has felt very rejected through the lack of ongoing contact with mother and not being part of continued visits and phone calls." This constitutes substantial evidence that N.R. was harmed by contact with her mother. Reducing the frequency of visits thus is in her best interests. "What is in the best interests of the child is essentially the same as that which is not detrimental to the child." (In re Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169.)

In sum, as to both I.A. and N.R., the record contains substantial evidence to support the courts implicit determination that a reduction in visitation to once every three months is in the two girls best interests. That being so, we find no abuse of discretion and no basis for reversing the order.

DISPOSITION

As to all five dependent children, the July 2008 visitation orders are affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

Mihara, J.