Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,<BR> v. <BR>ANTHONY VANGLAHN, Defendant.

Denis E. Dillon, District Attorney of Nassau County, Mineola, for plaintiff. Legal Aid Society, Hempstead (Matthew Muraskin of counsel), for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SUSAN T. KLUEWER, J. The People's application for a temporary order of protection is denied. Defendant, who is 18 years old, presently stands accused of endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]) by engaging in sexual relations with the "victim." The "child" cause shown." What constitutes "good cause," and how thorough the hearing for demonstrating that "good cause" need be are not spelled out in the statute, but the Legislature's intent in authorizing the issuance of orders of protection under article 530, originally limited to the protection of victims of domestic violence but now expanded to include victims of, and witnesses to, any offense, is to prevent intimidation, abuse and threats by a defendant against those involved in the accusation against him or her (see People v Meggie, 184 Misc 2d 883 [Nassau Dist Ct 2000, Gartner, J.]; People v Koertge, 182 Misc 2d 183 [Nassau Dist Ct 1998, Feichter, J.]; cf. People v Forman, 145 Misc 2d 115 [Crim Ct, NY County 1989, Gruner Gans, J.]). There is nothing in the legislative history of CPL 530.13 (see e.g. L 1981, ch 575, § 1; L 1986, ch 794, § 2) indicating that the "best interests" of a victim are to be considered when determining whether "good cause" for issuance of an order of protection exists. Indeed, it appears that a criminal court is not the place to determine whether young people on the verge of adulthood should, because of their sexual activity, be banned from seeing each other (cf. Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417 [1990]; see also Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 [1965]). I am not unmindful of the concerns, fears and understandable upset of Ms. Jones' parents. And it may generally be inappropriate for a defendant charged with violating Penal Law § 260.10 (1) to have contact with the child whom that defendant is alleged to have endangered. This is not, however, a typical case of "criminal" endangerment. Moreover, the "child" involved is herself on the path to motherhood, and she has articulated her wish that no order of protection be issued. Finally, while the People assert they are acting on Ms. Jones' behalf, it is clear they are instead speaking for her parents, who, it appears, are trying to exert control over their daughter by having limitations imposed on her boyfriend. Use of CPL 530.13 for this purpose is inappropriate. Since there is absolutely no indication that defendant has threatened, intimidated or physically or mentally abused anyone involved in this case, I deny the People's application.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

People v. VanGlahn
(Oct 5, 2001)