HODGSON v. MINNESOTA

Subdivision 2 of Minn. Stat. § 144.343 provides that no abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours after both of her parents have been notified. The two-parent notice requirement is mandatory unless, inter alia, the woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in which event notice of her declaration must be given to the proper authorities. Subdivision 6 provides that, if a court enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same two-parent notice requirement is effective unless a court of competent jurisdiction orders the abortion to proceed without notice upon proof by the minor that she is "mature and capable of giving informed consent" or that an abortion without notice to both parents would be in her best interest. Two days before the statute's effective date, a group consisting of doctors, clinics, pregnant minors, and the mother of a pregnant minor filed suit in the District Court, alleging that the statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court declared the statute unconstitutional in its entirety, and enjoined its enforcement. The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc, reversed. Although it rejected the State's submission that subdivision 2's two-parent notice requirement was constitutional without any bypass procedure, the court held that subdivision 6 was valid and that its bypass procedure saved the statute as a whole. The court also rejected the argument that the 48-hour waiting period imposed a significant burden on the minor's abortion right.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

853 F.2d 1452, affirmed.

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, concluding that subdivision 2 of § 144.343 violates the Constitution insofar as it requires two-parent notification. Pp. 436-444, 450-455.

(a) Since none of this Court's abortion decisions dealing with parental consent or notification statutes focused on the possible significance of making the consent or notice applicable to both parents instead of just one, the District Court's extensive and unchallenged findings on the question are significant. On the basis of extensive trial testimony, the District Court found, inter alia, that the two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful effects on both the minor and the custodial parent when the parents were divorced or separated, especially in the context of an abusive or dysfunctional family; that the requirement also had adverse effects in families in which the minor lives with both parents, particularly where family violence is a serious problem; that the requirement actually impairs family communication in many instances, since minors who otherwise would inform one parent were unwilling to do so when such notification would involve going to court for a bypass in any event; that few minors can take advantage of the abuse exception because of the obligation to report the information to the authorities and the attendant loss of privacy; and that the two-parent requirement did not further the State's interests in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity. The court also found that, in many cases, the statutory 48-hour waiting period was extended to a week or more by scheduling considerations, thereby increasing the risk associated with the abortion to a statistically significant degree. Pp. 436-444.

(b) The requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest. Any such interest in supporting the authority of a parent, who is presumed to act in the minor's best interest, to assure that the abortion decision is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate, would be fully served by a one-parent notification requirement as to functioning families, where notice to either parent would normally constitute notice to both. As to the many families in which the parent notified would not notify the other parent, the State has no legitimate interest in questioning the first parent's judgment or in presuming him or her incompetent to make decisions regarding the child's health and welfare. Moreover, as the record demonstrates, the two-parent requirement actually disserves the state interest in protecting and assisting the minor with respect to the thousands of dysfunctional families affected by the statute, where the requirement proved positively harmful. There is no merit to the argument that the two-parent requirement is justified because, in the ideal family, the minor should make her decision only after consultation with both parents, who should naturally be concerned with her welfare. The State has no legitimate interest in conforming family life to a state-designed ideal by requiring family members to talk together. Nor can the State's interest in protecting a parent's interest in shaping a child's values and lifestyle overcome the liberty interests of a minor acting with the consent of a single parent or court. The combined force of the separate interest of one parent and the minor's privacy interest outweighs the separate interest of the second parent, and the justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in the abortion decision rests entirely on the best interests of the child. The fact that the two-parent requirement is virtually an oddity among state and federal consent provisions governing childrens' health, welfare, and education further demonstrates its unreasonableness and the ease with which the State can adopt less burdensome means to protect the minor's welfare. Pp. 450-455.

JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concluded in Parts V and VI that:

1. Three separate but related interests are relevant to the constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period and the two-parent notification requirement. First, the State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely. That interest justifies a state-imposed requirement that the minor notify and consult with a parent before terminating her pregnancy. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 510-511. Second, parents have an interest in controlling their childrens' education and upbringing, and a natural parent's stake in the relationship with a child may rise to the level of a protected liberty interest if the parent has demonstrated his commitment by assuming personal, financial, or custodial responsibility for the child. Third, the family has a privacy interest in its childrens' upbringing and education which is constitutionally protected against undue state interference. When government intrudes on the family's choices, the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation must be carefully examined. Pp. 444-448.

2. To the extent that subdivision 2 of the state statute requires that a minor wait 48 hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to obtain an abortion, it reasonably furthers the legitimate state interest in ensuring that the minor's decision is knowing and intelligent. The State may properly enact laws designed to aid a parent who has assumed "primary responsibility" for a minor's wellbeing in discharging that responsibility, and the 48-hour delay provides the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a family physician, to inquire into the competency of the abortion doctor, and to discuss the decision's religious and moral implications with the minor and provide needed guidance and counsel as to how the decision will affect her future. The delay imposes only a minimal burden on the minor's rights. The statute does not impose any period of delay if the parents or a court, acting in loco parentis, provide consent to the procedure. Moreover, the record reveals that the waiting period may run concurrently with the time necessary to make an appointment for the abortion. Pp. 448-449.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR concluded that subdivision 6 of the state statute — two-parent notification plus judicial bypass — passes constitutional muster because the interference with the family's internal operation required by subdivision 2's two-parent notice requirement simply does not exist where the minor can avoid notifying one or both parents by using the bypass procedure. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90-91. P. 461.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded:

1. The state statute's 48-hour waiting period is necessary to enable notified parents to consult with their daughter or her physician, if they so wish, results in little or no delay, and is therefore constitutional. Pp. 496-497.

2. Subdivision 6 of the statute — which requires two-parent notification unless the pregnant minor obtains a judicial bypass — is constitutional. By creating a judicial mechanism to identify, and exempt from the strictures of the law, those cases in which the minor is mature or in which parental notification is not in her best interest, subdivision 6 precisely addresses the concern underlying the Court's invalidation of subdivision 2: the possibility that, in some cases, two-parent notification would not work to the benefit of minors or their parents. In providing for the bypass, moreover, Minnesota has simply attempted to fit its legislation into the framework supplied by this Court's previous cases, particularly Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, which stands for the proposition that a two-parent consent law is constitutional if it provides for a sufficient judicial bypass alternative. See id., at 643 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The conclusion that subdivision 6 must be sustained is compelled not only by Bellotti but also by H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, in which the Court held that a two-parent notice statute without a bypass was constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best interests would be served by notice. If that is the case, but if such a law is not constitutional as applied to minors who are mature or whose best interests are not so served, a judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are not. Pp. 497-501.

STEVENS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 458. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 461. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 479. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 480.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part.

I

I join all but Parts III and VIII of JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. While I agree with some of the central points made in Part III, I cannot join the broader discussion. I agree that the Court has characterized "[a] woman's decision to beget or to bear a child [as] a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Ante, at 434. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 687 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-503 (1965) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). This Court extended that liberty interest to minors in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) ( Bellotti II), and Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), albeit with some important limitations: "[P]arental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor." Bellotti II, supra, at 640-641 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 423 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct, while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("[M]inors are treated differently from adults in our laws, which reflects the simple truth derived from communal experience, that juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibility that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in the rights and duties of modern life").

It has been my understanding in this area that "[i]f the particular regulation does not "unduly burde[n]" the fundamental right, . . . then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It is with that understanding that I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that the "statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not reasonably related to legitimate state interests. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 97; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S., at 704 (opinion of Powell, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-195, 199 (1973)." Ante at 436.

I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that Minnesota has offered no sufficient justification for its interference with the family's decisionmaking processes created by subdivision 2 — two-parent notification. Subdivision 2 is the most stringent notification statute in the country. See ante at 425, n. 5. The only other state that defines the generic term "parents," see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-201, Art. III(6) (Supp. 1989) (adoption statute) ("'Parents' means either the singular or plural of the word 'parent'"); see also ante at 437, n. 23, as "both parents" is Arkansas, and that statute provides for numerous exceptions to the two-parent notification requirement and permits bypassing notification where notification would not be in the best interests of the minor. See Ark. Code §§ 20-16-802, 20-16-804, 20-16-808 (Supp. 1989).

The Minnesota exception to notification for minors who are victims of neglect or abuse is, in reality, a means of notifying the parents. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, see ante, at 426, n. 7, to avail herself of the neglect or abuse exception, the minor must report the abuse. A report requires the welfare agency to immediately "conduct an assessment." Minn. Stat. § 626.556(10)(a) (1988). If the agency interviews the victim, it must notify the parent of the fact of the interview; if the parent is the subject of an investigation, he has a right of access to the record of the investigation. §§ 626.556(10)(c); 626.556(11); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19 ("[I]t turns out that the reporting statute in Minnesota requires that, after it's reported to the welfare department, the welfare department has to do an assessment and tell the parents about the assessment. This could all be done in a timeframe even before the abortion occurs"). The combination of the abused minor's reluctance to report sexual or physical abuse, see ante, at 440, n. 26, with the likelihood that invoking the abuse exception for the purpose of avoiding notice will result in notice, makes the abuse exception less than effectual.

Minnesota's two-parent notice requirement is all the more unreasonable when one considers that only half of the minors in the State of Minnesota reside with both biological parents. See ante, at 437. A third live with only one parent. Ibid. Given its broad sweep and its failure to serve the purposes asserted by the State in too many cases, I join the Court's striking of subdivision 2.

In a series of cases, this Court has explicitly approved judicial bypass as a means of tailoring a parental consent provision so as to avoid unduly burdening the minor's limited right to obtain an abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147-148 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 642-644. In Danforth, the Court stated that the

"primary constitutional deficiency lies in [the notification statute's] imposition of an absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. . . . [A] materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute condition upon the minor's right, but would assure in most instances consultation between the parent and child." 428 U.S., at 90-91.

Subdivision 6 passes constitutional muster because the interference with the internal operation of the family required by subdivision 2 simply does not exist where the minor can avoid notifying one or both parents by use of the bypass procedure.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.

I concur in Parts I, II, IV, and VII of JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion for the Court in No. 88-1309. Although I do not believe that the Constitution permits a State to require a minor to notify or consult with a parent before obtaining an abortion, compare ante, at 445 with infra, at 463-472, I am in substantial agreement with the remainder of the reasoning in Part V of the JUSTICE STEVEN'S opinion. For the reasons stated by the Court, ante, at 450-455, Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement is not even reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. Therefore, that requirement surely would not pass the strict scrutiny applicable to restrictions on a woman's fundamental right to have an abortion.

I dissent from the judgment of the Court in No. 89-1125, however, that the judicial bypass option renders the parental notification and 48-hour delay requirements constitutional. See ante at 497-501 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); post, at 497-501 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). The bypass procedure cannot save those requirements because the bypass itself is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. At the very least, this scheme substantially burdens a woman's right to privacy without advancing a compelling state interest. More significantly, in some instances it usurps a young woman's control over her own body by giving either a parent or a court the power effectively to veto her decision to have an abortion.

This Court has consistently held since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that the constitutional right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id., at 153. We have also repeatedly stated that "[a] woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986). Accord, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420, n. 1 (1983); Roe, supra, at 155. As we reiterated in American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra, "Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision — with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe — whether to end her pregnancy." Id., at 772. Accordingly, we have subjected state laws limiting that right to the most exacting scrutiny, requiring a State to show that such a law is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest. Roe, supra, at 155; Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at 427. Only such strict judicial scrutiny is sufficiently protective of a woman's right to make the intensely personal decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.

Roe remains the law of the land. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 525 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 537, 560 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, today's decision reaffirms the vitality of Roe, as five Justices have voted to strike down a state law restricting a woman's right to have an abortion. Accordingly, to be constitutional, state restrictions on abortion must meet the rigorous test set forth above.

I strongly disagree with the Court's conclusion that the State may constitutionally force a minor woman either to notify both parents (or in some cases only one parent) and then wait 48 hours before proceeding with an abortion, or disclose her intimate affairs to a judge and ask that he grant her permission to have an abortion. See post, at 497-501 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Cf. ante, at 448-449 (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (finding that requiring minor to wait 48 hours after notifying one parent reasonably furthers legitimate state interest). First, the parental notification and delay requirements significantly restrict a young woman's right to reproductive choice. I base my conclusion not on my intuition about the needs and attitudes of young women, but on a sizable and impressive collection of empirical data documenting the effects of parental notification statutes and of delaying an abortion. Second, the burdensome restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling state interest. Finally, for the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, the judicial bypass procedure does not save the notice and delay requirements.

Neither the scope of a woman's privacy right nor the magnitude of a law's burden is diminished because a woman is a minor. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) ( Bellotti II) (opinion of Powell, J.); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). Rather, a woman's minority status affects only the nature of the State's interests. Although the Court considers the burdens that the two-parent notification requirement imposes on a minor woman's exercise of her right to privacy, ante, at 450-451, and n. 36, it fails to recognize that forced notification of only one parent also significantly burdens a young woman's right to have an abortion, see ante, at 459-460 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); post, at 491-497 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Cf. ante, at 448-449 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).

A substantial proportion of pregnant minors voluntarily consult with a parent regardless of the existence of a notification requirement. See, e.g., Torres, Forrest, Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 Family Planning Perspectives 284, 287, 288, 290 (1980) (51% of minors discussed abortion with parents in the absence of a parental consent or notification requirement). Minors 15 years old or younger are even more likely voluntarily to discuss the abortion decision with their parents. Id., at 290 (69% of such minors voluntarily discuss abortion with parents). For these women, the notification requirement by itself does not impose a significant burden. But for those young women who would choose not to inform their parents, the burden is evident: the notification requirement destroys their right to avoid disclosure of a deeply personal matter. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).

A notification requirement can also have severe physical and psychological effects on a young woman. First, forced notification of one parent, like forced notification of both parents, can be extremely traumatic for a young woman, depending on the nature of her relationship with her parents. Cf. ante, at 450-451, and n. 36. The disclosure of a daughter's intention to have an abortion often leads to a family crisis, characterized by severe parental anger and rejection. Osofsky Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychosocial Considerations, 21 Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 1161 1164-1165 (1978). The impact of any notification requirement is especially devastating for minors who live in fear of physical, psychological, or sexual abuse. See, e.g., Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72 American J. of Pub. Health 283, 284 (1982) (finding that many minors chose not to inform parents voluntarily because of fear of negative consequences such as physical punishment or other retaliation). See also Tr. 911 (testimony of Dr. Elissa Benedek) (stating that usually minors accurately predict parental reaction to news about daughters' pregnancies). Cf. ante, at 438-440, and n. 25. Certainly, child abuse is not limited to families with two parents.

Second, the prospect of having to notify a parent causes many young women to delay their abortions, thereby increasing the health risks of the procedure. See Cates, Schulz Grimes, The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 New England J. of Medicine 621, 623 (1983) (finding that for women 19 years old and younger, the number of deaths per 100,000 abortions was 0.2 for the first 8 weeks of pregnancy, 0.6 for weeks 9 through 12, 3.4 for weeks 13 through 16, and 7.8 for week 17 and after). See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 439 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The risks posed by this delay are especially significant because adolescents already delay seeking medical care until relatively late in their pregnancies, when risks are higher. See 1 National Research Council, Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing 114 (C. Hayes ed. 1987).

In addition, a notification requirement compels many minors seeking an abortion to travel to a State without such a requirement to avoid notifying a parent. Cartoof Klerman, Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 American J. of Pub. Health 397, 399 (1986) (finding that one-third of minors seeking abortions traveled outside of State to avoid Massachusetts' parental notice requirement). Other women may resort to the horrors of self-abortion or illegal abortion rather than tell a parent. Torres, Forrest, Eisman, supra, at 288 (9% of minors attending family planning clinics said they would have a self-induced or illegal abortion rather than tell a parent); H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 439, and n. 26 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also Greydanus Railsback, Abortion in Adolescence, 1 Seminars in Adolescent Medicine 213, 214 (1985) (noting 100-times greater death rate for women who obtain illegal abortions than for those who obtain legal ones). Still others would forgo an abortion entirely and carry the fetus to term, Torres, Forrest, Eisman, supra, at 289, 291 (9% of minors in family planning clinics said they would carry fetus to term rather than inform parents of decision to abort), subjecting themselves to the much greater health risks of pregnancy and childbirth and to the physical, psychological, and financial hardships of unwanted motherhood. See Greydanus Railsback, supra, at 214 (noting that minor's overall risk of dying from childbirth is over nine times greater than risk of dying from legal abortion); Lewis, Minors' Competence to Consent to Abortion, 42 American Psychologist 84, 87 (1987) ("[P]regnancy continuation poses far greater psychological, physical, and economic risks to the adolescent than does abortion") (citation omitted). See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 642 (plurality opinion) ("[C]onsidering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor"). Clearly, then, requiring notification of one parent significantly burdens a young woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.

The 48-hour delay after notification further aggravates the harm caused by the pre-notification delay that may flow from a minor's fear of notifying a parent. Moreover, the 48-hour delay burdens the rights of all minors, including those who would voluntarily consult with one or both parents. JUSTICE STEVENS' assertion that the 48-hour delay "imposes only a minimal burden," ante, at 449; see also post, at 496 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), ignores the increased health risks and costs that this delay entails. The District Court specifically found as a matter of fact that "[d]elay of any length in performing an abortion increases the statistical risk of mortality and morbidity." 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (Minn 1986). Even a brief delay can have a particularly detrimental impact if it pushes the abortion into the second trimester, when the operation is substantially more risky and costly. Ibid. See also C. Tietze S. Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A World Review 1986, pp. 103-104 (6th ed. 1986) (rate of major complications nearly doubles in the week following the end of the first trimester and increases significantly thereafter). Moreover, the District Court found that the 48-hour delay "frequently is compounded by scheduling factors such as clinic hours, transportation requirements, weather, a minor's school and work commitments, and sometimes a single parent's family and work commitments," often resulting in an effective delay of a week or more. 648 F. Supp., at 765. The increased risk caused by a delay of that magnitude, the District Court found, is statistically significant at any point in the pregnancy. Ibid. Certainly no pregnant woman facing these heightened risks to her health would dismiss them as "minimal."

Because the parental notification and delay requirements burden a young woman's right freely to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, the State must show that these requirements are justified by a compelling state interest and are closely tailored to further that interest. The main purpose of the notification requirement is to "protect the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss with their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies" Id., at 766. The 44-hour delay, in turn, is designed to provide parents with adequate time to consult with their daughters. Ante, at 448-449 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); post, at 496 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). As JUSTICE STEVENS states, such consultation is intended to ensure that the minor's decision is "knowing and intelligent." Ante, at 448. I need not determine whether the State's interest ultimately outweighs young women's privacy interests, however, because the strictures here are not closely tailored to further the State's asserted goal.

For the many young women who would voluntarily consult with a parent before having an abortion, see supra, at 464-465, the notification and delay requirements are superfluous, and so do not advance the State's interest. The requirements affect only those women who would not otherwise notify a parent. But compelled notification is unlikely to result in productive consultation in families in which a daughter does not feel comfortable consulting her parents about intimate or sexual matters. See Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 American Psychologist 79, 81 (1987) (stating that, in many families, compelled parental notification is unlikely to result in meaningful discussion about the daughter's predicament); Tr. 1357-1358 (testimony of Dr. Steven Butzer) (stating that involuntary disclosure is disruptive to family and has "almost universally negative" effects, in accord with minor's expectations). Moreover, in those families with a history of child abuse, a pregnant minor forced to notify a parent is more likely to be greeted by physical assault or psychological harassment than open and caring conversation about her predicament. See Tr. 316 (testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker) (stating that forced notification in dysfunctional families is likely to sever communication patterns and increase the risk of violence); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 446 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Forced notification in such situations would amount to punishing the daughter for the lack of a stable and communicative family environment, when the blame for that situation lies principally, if not entirely, with the parents. Parental notification in the less-than-ideal family, therefore, would not lead to an informed decision by the minor.

The State also claims that the statute serves the interest of protecting parents' independent right "to shape the[ir] child[ren]'s values and lifestyle[s]" and "to determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their children." Brief for Petitioners in No. 88-1309, p. 26. If this is so, the statute is surely under-inclusive, as it does not require parental notification where the minor seeks medical treatment for pregnancy, venereal disease, or alcohol and other drug abuse. See Minn. Stat. § 144.343(1) (1988). Are we to believe that Minnesota parents have no interest in their children's wellbeing in these other contexts?

In any event, parents' right to direct their children's upbringing is a right against state interference with family matters. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that this Court's decisions "have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925). Yet, ironically, the State's requirements here affirmatively interfere in family life by trying to force families to conform to the State's archetype of the ideal family. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution prevents [the state] from standardizing its children — and its adults — by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns"); ante, at 452. It is a strange constitutional alchemy that would transform a limitation on state power into a justification for governmental intrusion into family interactions. Moreover, as a practical matter, "state intervention is hardly likely to resurrect parental authority that the parents themselves are unable to preserve." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 448 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo., 428 U.S., at 75 (finding it unlikely that parental veto power over abortion "will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure").

Even if the State's interest is construed as merely the facilitation of the exercise of parental authority, the notification and delay requirements are not narrowly drawn. Parental authority is not limitless. Certainly where parental involvement threatens to harm the child, the parent's authority must yield. Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 169-170; H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 449 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Yet the notification and delay requirements facilitate the exercise of parental authority even where it may physically or psychologically harm the child. See supra, at 470.

Furthermore, the exercise of parental authority in some instances will take the form of obstructing the minor's decision to have an abortion. A parent who objects to the abortion, once notified, can exert strong pressure on the minor — in the form of stern disapproval, withdrawal of financial support, or physical or emotional abuse — to block her from getting an abortion. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 647 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct . . . an abortion"). See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 438-439 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In such circumstances, the notification requirement becomes, in effect, a consent requirement. As discussed below, infra, at 473, the State may not permit any person, including a parent, to veto a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Because the notification and delay requirements effectively give parents the opportunity to exercise an unconstitutional veto in some situations, those requirements are not narrowly tailored to the State's interest in facilitating legitimate exercises of parental authority.

The parental notification and 48-hour delay requirements, then, do not satisfy the strict scrutiny applicable to laws restricting a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion. The judicial bypass procedure cannot salvage those requirements because that procedure itself is unconstitutional.

The State argues that the bypass procedure saves the notification and delay requirements because it provides an alternative way to obtain a legal abortion for minors who would be harmed by those requirements. This Court has upheld a one-parent consent requirement where the State provided an alternative judicial procedure "'whereby a pregnant minor [could] demonstrate that she [was] sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests.'" Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S., at 439-440).

I continue to believe, however, that a judicial bypass procedure of this sort is itself unconstitutional because it effectively gives a judge "an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and his patient." Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, supra, at 504 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 655 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("The provision of an absolute veto to a judge . . . is to me particularly troubling. . . . It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties") (footnote omitted); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo., supra, at 74 ("[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent"). No person may veto any minor's decision, made in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy. An "immature" minor has no less right to make decisions regarding her own body than a mature adult.

Minnesota's bypass provision allows a judge to authorize an abortion if he determines either that a woman is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own or, if she is not sufficiently mature, that an abortion without parental notification would serve her best interests. Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988). Of course, if a judge refuses to authorize an abortion, a young woman can then reevaluate whether she wants to notify a parent. But many women will carry the fetus to term rather than notify a parent. See supra, at 466-467. Other women may decide to inform a parent, but then confront parental pressure or abuse so severe as to obstruct the abortion. For these women, the judge's refusal to authorize an abortion effectively constitutes an absolute veto.

The constitutional defects in any provision allowing someone to veto a woman's abortion decision are exacerbated by the vagueness of the standards contained in this statute. The statute gives no guidance on how a judge is to determine whether a minor is sufficiently "mature" and "capable" to make the decision on her own. See Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6)(c)(i) (1988) (judge shall authorize abortion if he "determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion"). Cf. Lewis, 42 American Psychologist, at 84, 87 (noting the absence of a judicial standard for assessing maturity). The statute similarly is silent as to how a judge is to determine whether an abortion without parental notification would serve an immature minor's "best interests." § 144.343(6)(c)(i) (judge shall authorize abortion for immature minor without notification "if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman's best interests would be served thereby"). Is the judge expected to know more about the woman's medical needs or psychological makeup than her doctor? Should he consider the woman's financial and emotional status to determine the quality of life the woman and her future child would enjoy in this world? Neither the record nor the Court answers such questions. As JUSTICE STEVENS wrote in Bellotti II, the best interest standard "provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor — particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision — is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision." 443 U.S., at 655-656 (opinion concurring in judgment). It is difficult to conceive of any reason, aside from a judge's personal opposition to abortion, that would justify a finding that an immature woman's best interests would be served by forcing her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her will.

Even if I did not believe that a judicial bypass procedure was facially unconstitutional, the experience of Minnesota's procedure in operation demonstrates that the bypass provision before us cannot save the parental notification and delay requirements. This Court has addressed judicial bypass procedures only in the context of facial challenges. See Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, 462 U.S., at 490-493 (opinion of Powell, J.); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S., at 439-442; Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 643-644 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court has never considered the actual burdens a particular bypass provision imposes on a woman's right to choose an abortion. Such consideration establishes that, even if judges authorized every abortion sought by petitioning minors, Minnesota's judicial bypass is far too burdensome to remedy an otherwise unconstitutional statute.

The District Court found that the bypass procedure imposed significant burdens on minors. First, "scheduling practices in Minnesota courts typically require minors to wait two or three days between their first contact with the court and the hearing on their petitions. This delay may combine with other factors to result in a delay of a week or more. 648 F. Supp., at 763. As noted above, supra, at 467-468, a delay of only a few days can significantly increase the health risks to the minor; a week-long delay inevitably does. Furthermore, in several counties in Minnesota, no judge is willing to hear bypass petitions, forcing women in those areas to travel long distances to obtain a hearing.

648 F. Supp., at 763; Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 Family Planning Perspectives 259, 264 (1983) (50% of Minnesota minors utilizing bypass were not residents of city in which court was located); Melton, 42 American Psychologist, at 80 ("In Minnesota, where judges in rural counties have often recused themselves from participation in the abortion hearings, minors sometimes have to travel a round-trip of more than 500 miles for the hearing"). The burden of such travel, often requiring an overnight stay in a distant city, is particularly heavy for poor women from rural areas. Furthermore, a young woman's absence from home, school, or work during the time required for such travel and for the hearing itself can jeopardize the woman's confidentiality. See ibid.

The District Court also found that the bypass procedure can be extremely traumatic for young women.

"The experience of going to court for a judicial authorization produces fear and tension in many minors. Minors are apprehensive about the prospect of facing an authority figure who holds in his hands the power to veto their decision to proceed without notifying one or both parents. Many minors are angry and resentful at being required to justify their decision before complete strangers. Despite the confidentiality of the proceeding, many minors resent having to reveal intimate details of their personal and family lives to these strangers. Finally, many minors are left feeling guilty and ashamed about their lifestyle and their decision to terminate their pregnancy. Some mature minors and some minors in whose best interests it is to proceed without notifying their parents are so daunted by the judicial proceeding that they forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry to term.

"Some minors are so upset by the bypass proceeding that they consider it more difficult than the medical procedure itself. Indeed the anxiety resulting from the bypass proceeding may linger until the time of the medical procedure and thus render the latter more difficult than necessary." 648 F. Supp., at 763-764.

Yet, despite the substantial burdens imposed by these proceedings, the bypass is, in effect, a "rubber stamp," id., at 766 (testimony of Hon. William Sweeney); only an extremely small number of petitions are denied, id., at 765. See also Melton, supra, at 80 ("Available research indicates that judicial bypass proceedings are merely pro forma. Although they represent substantial intrusion on minors' privacy and take up significant amounts of court time, there is no evidence that they promote more reasoned decisionmaking or screen out adolescents who may be particularly immature or vulnerable. . . . The hearings typically last less than 15 minutes. . . . Despite the complex issues involved (maturity and the best interests of the minor), experts are rarely if ever called to testify"). The judges who have adjudicated over 90% of the bypass petitions between 1981 and 1986 could not identify any positive effects of the bypass procedure. See 648 F. Supp., at 766; ante, at 441-442, and n. 29. The large number of women who undergo the bypass process do not receive any sort of counseling from the court — which is not surprising, given the court's limited role and lack of expertise in that area. The bypass process itself thus cannot serve the state interest of promoting informed decisionmaking by all minors. If the State truly were concerned about ensuring that all minors consult with a knowledgeable and caring adult, it would provide for some form of counseling rather than for a judicial procedure in which a judge merely gives or withholds his consent.

Thus, regardless of one's view of the facial validity of a bypass procedure, Minnesota's procedure in practice imposes an excessive burden on young women's right to choose an abortion. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 655 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he need to commence judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of a parent"). Furthermore, the process does not serve the State's interest of ensuring that minors' decisions are informed. Surely, then, a State could not require that all minor women seeking an abortion obtain judicial approval. The Court's holding that the burdensome bypass procedure saves the State's burdensome notification and delay requirements thus strikes me as the equivalent of saying that two wrongs make a right. I cannot accept such a novel judicial calculus.

A majority of the Court today strikes down an unreasonable and vastly overbroad requirement that a pregnant minor notify both her parents of her decision to obtain an abortion. With that decision I agree. At the same time, though, a different majority holds that a State may require a young woman to notify one or even both parents and then wait 48 hours before having an abortion, as long as the State provides a judicial bypass procedure. From that decision I vehemently dissent. This scheme forces a young woman in an already dire situation to choose between two fundamentally unacceptable alternatives: notifying a possibly dictatorial or even abusive parent and justifying her profoundly personal decision in an intimidating judicial proceeding to a black-robed stranger. For such a woman, this dilemma is more likely to result in trauma and pain than in an informed and voluntary decision.

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

As I understand the various opinions today: One Justice holds that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional with bypass, ante, at 459-461 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is constitutional with or without bypass, post, at 488-497 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is unconstitutional with or without bypass, though the four apply two different standards, ante, at 455-458 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), ante, at 472-479 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); six Justices hold that one-parent notification with bypass is constitutional, though for two different sets of reasons, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 510-517; post, at 522-524 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); and three Justices would hold that one-parent notification with bypass is unconstitutional, post, at 526-527 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). One will search in vain the document we are supposed to be construing for text that provides the basis for the argument over these distinctions, and will find in our society's tradition regarding abortion no hint that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant, much less any indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to be resolved. The random and unpredictable results of our consequently unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the lawyer's — and hence not in the judge's — workbox. I continue to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from the illusion that we have authority to do so.

JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

"'There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support.'" Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 640-641 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-411 (1981); id., at 422-423 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Danforth, supra, at 94-95 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 102-103 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Today the Court holds that a statute requiring a minor to notify both parents that she plans to have an abortion is not a permissible means of furthering the interest described with such specificity in Bellotti II. This conclusion, which no doubt will come as a surprise to most parents, is incompatible with our constitutional tradition and any acceptable notion of judicial review of legislative enactments. I dissent from the portion of the Court's judgment affirming the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Minnesota two-parent notice statute is unconstitutional.

The Minnesota statute also provides, however, that if the two-parent notice requirement is invalidated, the same notice requirement is effective unless the pregnant minor obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed. Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988). The Court of Appeals sustained this portion of the statute, in effect a two-parent notice requirement with a judicial bypass. Five Members of the Court, the four who join this opinion and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, agree with the Court of Appeals' decision on this aspect of the statute. As announced by JUSTICE STEVENS, who dissents from this part of the Court's decision, the Court of Appeals' judgment on this portion of the statute is therefore affirmed.

The provisions of the statute before us are straightforward. In essence, the statute provides that, before a physician in Minnesota may perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor, the physician or the physician's agent must notify both of the minor's parents, if each one can be located through reasonable effort, either personally or by certified mail at least 48 hours before the abortion is performed. Minn. Stat. §§ 144.343(2)-(3) (1988). Notification is not required if the abortion is necessary to prevent the minor's death; or if both parents have consented to the abortion; or if the minor declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse. § 144.343(4). Failure to comply with these requirements is a misdemeanor, and the statute authorizes a civil action against the noncomplying physician by the minor's parents. § 144.343(5).

The statute also provides that, if a court enjoins the notice requirement of subdivision 2, parental notice under the subdivision shall still be required unless the minor obtains a court order dispensing with it. Under the statute, the court is required to authorize the physician to perform the abortion without parental notice if the court determines that the minor is "mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion" or that "the performance of an abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests." § 144.343(6).

The State identifies two interests served by the law. The first is the State's interest in the welfare of pregnant minors. The second is the State's interest in acknowledging and promoting the role of parents in the care and upbringing of their children. JUSTICE STEVENS, writing for two Members of the Court, acknowledges the legitimacy of the first interest, but decides that the second interest is somehow illegitimate, at least as to whichever parent a minor chooses not to notify. I cannot agree that the Constitution prevents a State from keeping both parents informed of the medical condition or medical treatment of their child under the terms and conditions of this statute.

The welfare of the child has always been the central concern of laws with regard to minors. The law does not give to children many rights given to adults, and provides, in general, that children can exercise the rights they do have only through and with parental consent. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (STEWART, J., concurring in judgment). Legislatures historically have acted on the basis of the qualitative differences in maturity between children and adults, see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-267 (1984); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853-854 (1988) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (collecting cases); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and not without reason. Age is a rough but fair approximation of maturity and judgment, and a State has an interest in seeing that a child, when confronted with serious decisions such as whether or not to abort a pregnancy, has the assistance of her parents in making the choice. If anything is settled by our previous cases dealing with parental notification and consent laws, it is this point. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 640-641; Matheson, 450 U.S., at 409-411; id., at 422-423 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

Protection of the right of each parent to participate in the upbringing of her or his own children is a further discrete interest that the State recognizes by the statute. The common law historically has given recognition to the right of parents, not merely to be notified of their children's actions, but to speak and act on their behalf. Absent a showing of neglect or abuse, a father "possessed the paramount right to the custody and control of his minor children, and to superintend their education and nurture." J. Schouler, Law of Domestic Relations 337 (3d. ed. 1882); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *452-*453; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *203-*206; G. Field, Legal Relations of Infants 63-80 (1888). In this century, the common law of most States has abandoned the idea that parental rights are vested solely in fathers, with mothers being viewed merely as agents of their husbands, cf. ante, at 446, n. 32; it is now the case that each parent has parental rights and parental responsibilities, see W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, ch. 4, § 18, p. 115 (5th ed. 1984). Limitations have emerged on the prerogatives of parents to act contrary to the best interests of the child with respect to matters such as compulsory schooling and child labor. As a general matter, however, it remains "cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

A State pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it attempts to foster and preserve the parent-child relation by giving all parents the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of their children. We have held that parents have a liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in having a reasonable opportunity to develop close relations with their children. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 (1972). We have recognized, of course, that there are limits to the constitutional right of parents to have custody of or to participate in decisions affecting their children. If a parent has relinquished the opportunity to develop a relation with the child, and his or her only link to the child is biological, the Constitution does not require a State to allow parental participation. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-265 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-256 (1978). But the fact that the Constitution does not protect the parent-child relationship in all circumstances does not mean that the State cannot attempt to foster parental participation where the Constitution does not demand that it do so. A State may seek to protect and facilitate the parent-child bond on the assumption that parents will act in their child's best interests. See Parham v. J.R., supra, at 602-603; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Indeed, we have held that a State cannot terminate parental rights based upon a presumption that a class of parents is unfit without affording individual parents an opportunity to rebut the presumption. See Stanley, supra, at 654-658; Santosky, supra, at 753 ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents . . ."). If a State cannot legislate on the broad assumption that classes of parents are unfit and undeserving of parental rights without affording an opportunity to rebut the assumption, it is at least permissible for a State to legislate on the premise that parents, as a general rule, are interested in their children's welfare and will act in accord with it.

The Court's descriptions of the State's interests in this case are caricatures, both of the law and of our most revered institutions. The Court labels these interests as ones in "standardizing its children and adults,".and in ensuring that each family, to the extent possible, "conform to some state-designed ideal." Ante, at 452; see also ante, at 471 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (accusing Minnesota of "trying to force families to conform to the State's archetype of the ideal family"). Minnesota asserts no such purpose, by explicit statement or by any permissible inference. All that Minnesota asserts is an interest in seeing that parents know about a vital decision facing their child. That interest is a valid one without regard to whether the child is living with either one or both parents, or to the attachment between the minor's parents. How the family unit responds to such notice is, for the most part, beyond the State's control. The State would no doubt prefer that all parents, after being notified under the statute, would contact their daughters and assist them in making their decisions with the child's best interests at heart; but it has not, contrary to the Court's intimation, "decreed" communication, nor could it. What the State can do is make the communication possible by at least informing parents of their daughter's intentions.

Minnesota has done no more than act upon the common-sense proposition that, in assisting their daughter in deciding whether to have an abortion, parents can best fulfill their roles if they have the same information about their own child's medical condition and medical choices as the child's doctor does; and that to deny parents this knowledge is to risk, or perpetuate, estrangement or alienation from the child when she is in the greatest need of parental guidance and support. The Court does the State, and our constitutional tradition, sad disservice by impugning the legitimacy of these elemental objectives.

Given the societal interest that underlies parental notice and consent laws, it comes as no surprise that most States have enacted statutes requiring that, in general, a physician must notify or obtain the consent of at least one of her parents or legal guardian before performing an abortion on a minor. See Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 881, 963-965 (1989) (collecting statutes). Five States, including Minnesota, appear to require, as a general rule, the notification of both parents before a physician may perform an abortion on a minor. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-16-801 through 20-16-808 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Code § 18-610(6) (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-4-202 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1990). Another six States appear to require, with varying exceptions, the consent of both parents. See Del. Code Ann., Title 24, § 1790(b)(3) (1987); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 81-54(3) (1989); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.732 (Michie 1990); Mass. Gen. Laws § 112, § 12S (1988); Miss. Code. Ann. § 41-41-53 (Supp. 1989); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-03.1 (1981). Whether these statutes are more or less restrictive than the Minnesota statute is not the issue, although I pause to note that, because the Court's decision today turns upon its perception that the law's requirements, despite its exceptions, are the most "stringent" in the country, see ante, at 459 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the Court's decision has no import for the validity of these other statutes. What is important is that Minnesota is not alone in acknowledging the vitality of these governmental interests and adopting laws that, in the legislature's judgment, are best suited to serving them while protecting the minor's welfare.

On a more general level, the current trend among state legislatures is to enact joint custody laws making it the norm for divorced or separated parents to share the legal responsibility and authority for making decisions concerning their children's care, education, religion, and medical treatment. See 2 H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.5 (2d ed. 1987); Folberg, Joint Custody Law — The Second Wave, 23 J. Family L. 1, 14-55 (1984-1985) (collecting statutes). Under Minnesota law, for example, there exists a presumption in divorce proceedings that joint custody, if requested by either or both parents, is in the best interests of the child. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17(2) (Supp. 1989). Even if joint custody is not awarded, Minnesota law provides that each parent, unless the court specifically directs otherwise to protect the welfare of a parent or the child, "has the right of access to, and to receive copies of, school, medical, dental, religious training, and other important records and information about the minor children; the responsibility to "keep the other party informed as to the name and address of the school of attendance of the minor children"; the responsibility to "notify the other party of [an accident or serious illness of a minor child], and the name of the health care provider and the place of treatment"; and "the right to reasonable access and telephone contact with the minor children." Minn. Stat. § 518.17(3) (1988). Minnesota's two-parent notification law does no more than apply these general principles to the specific case of abortion.

Federal law contains similar provisions regulating the health and welfare of children that require the notification or consent of both parents. For example, one condition for obtaining a grant under the Adolescent Family Life Act is that an applicant must provide assurances that it will "notify the parents or guardians of any unemancipated minor requesting services [relating to family planning] from the applicant and . . . will obtain the permission of such parents or guardians with respect to the provision of such services." 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a) (22)(A)(i) (1982 ed.); see § 300z-5(a)(22)(A)(ii) (requiring only notice to parents or guardians if the unemancipated minor is pregnant). See also 42 U.S.C. § 5671(d) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (authorizing funding for certain experimental juvenile drug and alcohol treatment programs if safeguards are established for obtaining the informed consent of the "parents or guardians" of minors); 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(c)(4) (1982 ed.) (permitting induction of 17-year-olds into the Armed Forces with the written consent of his "parents or guardian"); 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (1989) (requiring consent of both parents before a minor may participate in medical research posing more than a "minimal" risk of harm). With all respect, I submit the Court today errs when it states that Minnesota's two-parent notice law is an "oddity among state and federal consent provisions." Ante, at 454.

At least two Members of the Court concede, as they must, that a State has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor and that, in furtherance of this interest, the State may require the minor to notify, and consult with, one of her parents. See ante, at 444-446 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); cf. ante, at 469 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Court nonetheless holds the Minnesota statute unconstitutional because it requires the minor to notify not one parent, but both parents, a requirement that the Court says bears no reasonable relation to the minor's welfare. See ante, at 450-455; cf. ante, at 469-472 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Court also concludes that Minnesota does not have a legitimate interest in facilitating the participation of both parents in the care and upbringing of their children. Given the substantial protection that minors have under Minnesota law generally, and under the statute in question, the judicial bypass provisions of the law are not necessary to its validity. The two-parent notification law enacted by Minnesota is, in my view, valid without the judicial bypass provision of subdivision 6.

We have been over much of this ground before. It is beyond dispute that in many families, whether the parents are living together or apart, notice to both parents serves the interests of the parents and the minor, and that the State can legislate with this fact in mind. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), we considered the constitutionality of a statute which required a physician, before performing an abortion on a minor, to "'[n]otify, if possible, the [minor's] parents or guardian.'" Id., at 400 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978)) (emphasis added). We held that the statute, as applied to unmarried, dependent, and immature minors, "plainly serves important state interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not violate any guarantees of the Constitution." 450 U.S., at 413. Our holding was made with knowledge of the contentions, supported by citations to medical and sociological literature, that are proffered again today for the proposition that notification imposes burdens on minors. See id., at 436-441 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We nonetheless rejected arguments that a requirement of parental notification was the equivalent of a requirement of parental consent, id., at 411; that the statute was unconstitutional because it required notification only as to abortions, and not as to other medical procedures, id., at 412; and that the statute was unconstitutional because it might deter some minors from seeking abortions, id., at 413.

Our decision was based upon the well-accepted premise that we must defer to a reasonable judgment by the state legislature when it determines what is sound public policy. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion concurring in the Court's judgment relied upon an explicit statement of this principle. Concluding that the Utah statute requiring notification of both parents was valid as to all unmarried minors, both mature and immature, JUSTICE STEVENS reasoned that the State's interest in ensuring that a young woman considering an abortion receive appropriate consultation was "plainly sufficient to support a state legislature's determination that such appropriate consultation should include parental advice." Id., at 423. The Court today departs from this rule. It now suggests that a general requirement that both parents be notified is unconstitutional because of its own conclusion that the law is unnecessary when notice produces favorable results, see ante, at 450, and irrational in all of the instances when it produces unfavorable results, see ante, at 450-451. In Matheson, JUSTICE STEVENS rejected these same arguments as insufficient to establish that the Utah statute was unconstitutional:

"Of course, a conclusion that the Utah statute is invalid would not prevent young pregnant women from voluntarily seeking the advice of their parents prior to making the abortion decision. But the State may legitimately decide that such consultation should be made more probable by ensuring that parents are informed of their daughter's decision . . . .

. . . . .

"Utah's interest in its parental-notice statute is not diminished by the fact that there can be no guarantee that meaningful parent-child communication will actually occur. Good-faith compliance with the statute's requirements would tend to facilitate communication between daughters and parents regarding the abortion decision. The possibility that some parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon being informed of their daughter's predicament or that, even if they are receptive, they will incorrectly advise her, does not undercut the legitimacy of the State's attempt to establish a procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant young woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to make the abortion decision. 450 U.S., at 423-424 (emphasis added).

JUSTICE STEVENS' reasoning was correct then and it remains correct today.

In applying the standards established in our prior decisions to the case at hand, "we must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely sensitive issues, such as the one involved here, 'the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, K T R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.).' Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-480 (1977) (footnote omitted)." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 465 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). The Minnesota Legislature, like the legislatures of many States, has found it necessary to address the issue of parental notice in its statutory laws. In my view it has acted in a permissible manner.

All must acknowledge that it was reasonable for the legislature to conclude that in most cases notice to both parents will work to the minor's benefit. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 640, n. 20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (parental involvement, if compassionate and supportive, is highly desirable). This is true not only in what the Court calls the "ideal family setting," where both parents and the minor live under one roof, but also where the minor no longer lives with both parents. The Court does not deny that many absent parents maintain significant ties with their children, and seek to participate in their lives, to guide, to teach, and to care for them. It is beyond dispute that these attachments, in cases not involving mistreatment or abuse, are essential to the minor's wellbeing, and that parental notice is supportive of this kind of family tie. Although it may be true that notice to one parent will often result in notice to both, the State need not rely upon the decision of one parent to notify the other, particularly where both parents maintain ties with their daughter but not with each other, and when both parents share responsibilities and duties with respect to the child.

I acknowledge that, in some cases, notifying both parents will not produce desirable results despite the fact that no actual instance is in the record before us, as the two-parent notification requirement was enjoined before it went into effect. Cf. ante, at 438 (stating as a matter of historical fact that the "two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful effects on both the minor and the custodial parent" and that fears that notification of an absent parent would produce harmful results " were often realized") (emphasis added). We need not decide today, however, whether the Constitution permits a State to require that a physician notify both biological parents before performing an abortion on any minor, for the simple reason that Minnesota has not enacted such a law.

The Minnesota statute in fact contains exceptions to ensure that the statutory notice requirement does not apply if it proves a serious threat to the minor's health or safety. First, the statute does not require notice at all costs; to comply with the law, a physician need only use "reasonably diligent effort" to locate and notify both of the minor's parents. If the second parent cannot be located, as may be the case if the parent has deserted the family or ceased to maintain contact with the minor or the other parent, the only notice required is to the first parent. Minn. Stat. § 144.343(3) (1988).

Second, even where both parents can be located, notice is not required if the physician certifies that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to provide the required notice, § 144.343(4)(a); if the minor's parents have authorized the abortion in writing, § 144.343(4)(b); or if the minor declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse, § 144.343(4)(c). Under Minnesota law, "neglect" of a minor means the failure of a parent "to supply a child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care when reasonably able to do so or failure to protect a child from conditions or actions which imminently and seriously endanger the child's physical or mental health when reasonably able to do so," Minn. Stat. § 626.556(2)(c) (Supp. 1989); physical abuse is defined as "any physical injury inflicted by a person responsible for the child's care on a child other than by accidental means," § 626.556(2)(d); and sexual abuse includes any sexual contact by a parent or other person responsible for the child's care or in a position of authority with respect to the child. § 626.556(2)(a). I cannot believe that these exceptions are too narrow to eliminate from the statute's coverage those instances in which notice would place the minor in danger of parental violence or other conduct that is a real threat to the physical or mental health of the child.

The Court challenges the efficacy of this last exception because it believes that the statutory requirement that a physician report a minor's declaration of abuse to appropriate authorities, see Minn. Stat. § 144.343(4)(c) (1988), will deter minors from using the exception. This is not a proper basis for declaring the law invalid. Laws are not declared unconstitutional because of some general reluctance to follow a statutory scheme the legislature finds necessary to accomplish a legitimate state objective. Beyond any question, it is reasonable for the State to require that physicians report declarations of abuse to ensure that mistreatment is known to authorities responsible for the protection of minors. This requirement is but a single manifestation of the broad duty in Minnesota to report suspected cases of child abuse to the proper authorities. See Minn. Stat. § 626.556(1) (1988) (declaring it to be the public policy of the State "to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse, neglect or sexual abuse" and "to strengthen the family and make the home, school, and community safer for children by promoting responsible child care in all settings").

No one can contend that a minor who is pregnant is somehow less deserving of the State's protection. It is reasonable to provide that any minor who contends that she cannot notify her parent or parents because she is the victim of neglect or abuse allow the State to use its power to investigate her declaration and protect her from harm. Any parent, moreover, who responds to notice by threatening or harming the minor or the other parent may be prosecuted by the State to the full extent of its laws. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (1988) (Domestic Abuse Act); Minn. Stat. §§ 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224 (1988 and Supp. 1989) (assault statutes); §§ 609.341 through 609.345 (sexual abuse statutes); § 609.378 (criminal neglect statute). Just as it relies upon such laws as its first line of defense for dealing with all other instances of abuse in family situations, so too is the State entitled to rely upon them here.

Notwithstanding the exceptions and protections we have discussed, it does remain possible, of course, that in some instances notifying one or both parents will not be in the minor's best interests. Allegations of a similar possibility, based upon sociological evidence similar to that presented in this case, was made by the appellant in Matheson. See Brief for Appellant H. L. v. Matheson, O. T. 1980, No. 79-5903, pp. 10-11; Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae in Matheson, 16-31. The Court there held that the parental notification law was valid, at least as to immature minors, for the simple reason that a law is not invalid if it fails to further the governmental interest in every instance. This point formed the cornerstone of JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion in Matheson, see 450 U.S., at 423-424, and it finds its most explicit statement in the Court's opinion in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S., at 602-603:

"The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More importantly, historically, it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. . . .

"As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attest to this. That some parents may at times be acting against the best interests of their children . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests."

The only cases in which a majority of the Court has deviated from this principle are those in which a State sought to condition a minor's access to abortion services upon receipt of her parent's consent to do so. In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court invalidated a Missouri law requiring that a physician obtain the consent of one parent before performing an abortion. The Court's reasoning was unmistakable: "[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." Id., at 74. The Court today, ignoring this statement, relies heavily upon isolated passages from Danforth, see ante, at 452-453, and other cases involving parental consent laws, see, e.g., ante, at 453 (citing Bellotti II). JUSTICE MARSHALL, on the other hand, expressly equates laws requiring parental consent with laws requiring parental notification, see ante, at 471-472 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).

The difference between notice and consent was apparent to us before, and is apparent now. Unlike parental consent laws, a law requiring parental notice does not give any third party the legal right to make the minor's decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one performed. We have acknowledged this distinction as "fundamental," and as one "substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge." Bellotti v. Baird ( Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132, 145, 148 (1976); see also Matheson, supra, at 411, n. 17. The law before us does not place an absolute obstacle before any minor seeking to obtain an abortion, and it represents a considered weighing of the competing interests of minors and their parents.

"It cannot be doubted that as long as a state statute is within 'the bounds of reason and [does not] assum[e] the character of a merely arbitrary fiat . . . [then] [t]he State . . . must decide upon measures that are needful for the protection of its people . . . .'" Akron, 462 U.S., at 459 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (quoting Purity Extract Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204-205 (1912)). Like all laws of general application, the Minnesota statute cannot produce perfect results in every situation to which it applies; but the State is under no obligation to enact perfect laws. The statute before us, including the 48-hour waiting period, which is necessary to enable notified parents to consult with their daughter or their daughter's physician, if they so wish, and results in little or no delay, represents a permissible, reasoned attempt to preserve the parents' role in a minor's decision to have an abortion without placing any absolute obstacles before a minor who is determined to elect an abortion for her own interest as she sees it. Section 144.343, without the judicial bypass provision of subdivision 6, is constitutional. I would reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Because a majority of the Court holds that the two-parent notice requirement contained in subdivision 2 is unconstitutional, it is necessary for the Court to consider whether the same notice requirement is constitutional if the minor has the option of obtaining a court order permitting the abortion to proceed in lieu of the required notice. Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988). Assuming, as I am bound to do for this part of the analysis, that the notice provisions standing alone are invalid, I conclude that the two-parent notice requirement with the judicial bypass alternative is constitutional.

The Court concludes that Minnesota's two-parent notice law without a judicial bypass is unconstitutional because of the possibility that, in some cases, the rule would not work to the benefit of minors or their parents. If one were to attempt to design a statute that would address the Court's concerns, one would do precisely what Minnesota has done in § 144.343(6): create a judicial mechanism to identify, and exempt from the strictures of the law, those cases in which the minor is mature or in which notification of the minor's parents is not in the minor's best interests. The bypass procedure comports in all respects with our precedents. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 643-644; (opinion of Powell, J.); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 505 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, p. 502.

In providing for the bypass, Minnesota has done nothing other than attempt to fit its legislation into the framework that we have supplied in our previous cases. The simple fact is that our decision in Bellotti II stands for the proposition that a two-parent consent law is constitutional if it provides for a sufficient judicial bypass alternative, and it requires us to sustain the statute before us here. In Bellotti II, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute which required a physician to obtain, in most circumstances, the consent of both of a minor's parents before performing an abortion on the minor. See 443 U.S., at 625-626 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979)). Although eight Members of the Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, five indicated that they would uphold a two-parent consent statute with an adequate judicial bypass.

For four of the eight Justices forming the majority in Bellotti II, the failure of the statute lay in its inadequate bypass procedure, not its requirement that both of the minor's parents consent to the abortion. See 443 U.S., at 643 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell's opinion specifically stated that "if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained," ibid. (emphasis added), and then stated the minimum requirements for such a procedure. In response to the dissent's contention that his opinion was advisory, Justice Powell stated that the four Members of the Court thought it necessary

"to provide some guidance as to how a State constitutionally may provide for adult involvement — either by parents or a state official such as a judge — in the abortion decision of minors. In view of the importance of the issue raised, and the protracted litigation to which these parties already have been subjected, we think it would be irresponsible simply to invalidate [the Massachusetts law] without stating our views as to the controlling principles." Id., at 652, n. 32.

See also id., at 651-652 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring) (joining Justice Powell's opinion because "unless and until [the Court is willing to overrule Danforth], literally thousands of judges cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance offered by a truly fragmented holding of this Court").

JUSTICE WHITE dissented from the Court's judgment that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional. In his view, no bypass was necessary, so it must follow that a two-parent consent statute with an adequate bypass procedure would have been valid. See id., at 656-657. In sum, five Members of the Court in Bellotti II found, either by express statement or by implication, that it was permissible under the Constitution for a State to require the consent of two parents, as long as it provides a consent substitute in the form of an adequate judicial bypass procedure.

I cannot accept JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion today that Justice Powell, in announcing these rules, did not "consider" the fact that he was doing so in the context of a two-parent consent requirement, see ante, at 34. The statute was explicit in its command that both parents consent to the abortion. See 443 U.S., at 625-626. Justice Powell indicated that he was aware of this fact, see id., at 630, and n. 10, and the dissent drew a specific contrast between the two-parent consent requirement then before the Court and the one-parent consent requirement before the Court in Danforth, see 443 U.S., at 656-657 (opinion of WHITE, J.); see also id., at 653 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Aware of all of these circumstances, Justice Powell stated the controlling principles with specific reference to laws requiring the consent of "one or both" parents. Id., at 643. Justice Powell's considered reasoning, coupled with the dissenting views of JUSTICE WHITE, was intended to set forth the dispositive principles of law for deciding the constitutionality of parental consent laws. The Court has relied upon these principles in deciding the constitutionality of laws requiring notice or the consent of one parent, see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S., at 439-442 (consent); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 511-514 (notice). As Bellotti II dealt with the far more demanding requirement of two-parent consent, and approved of such a requirement when coupled with a judicial bypass alternative, I must conclude that these same principles validate a two-parent notice requirement when coupled with a judicial bypass alternative.

A second precedent that compels the conclusion that a two-parent notice law with a judicial bypass alternative is constitutional is our decision in Matheson. There we held that a two-parent notice statute without a bypass was constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best interests would be served by notice. Like the statute before the Court in Matheson, the Minnesota statute, as amended by subdivision 6, requires a physician to notify the parents of those immature minors whose best interest will be served by the communication.

If a two-parent notification law may be constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best interests are served by the law, but not as applied to minors who are mature or whose best interests are not so served, a judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are not. JUSTICE STEVENS' characterization of the judicial bypass procedure discussed in our past cases as a necessary "exception" to a "reasonable general rule," such as a one-parent consent requirement, see ante, at 456, 457, is far off the mark. If a judicial bypass is mandated by the Constitution at all, it must be because a general consent rule is unreasonable in at least some of its applications, and the bypass is necessary to save the statute. See, e.g., Bellotti II, supra, at 643; (opinion of Powell, J.); Matheson, 450 U.S., at 420 (Powell, J., concurring). No reason can be given for refusing to apply a similar analysis to the less demanding case of a notice statute. It follows that a similar result should obtain: a law that requires notice to one or both parents is constitutional with a bypass. I thus concur in that portion of the judgment announced, but not agreed with, by JUSTICE STEVENS which affirms the Court of Appeals' conclusion that § 144.343(6) is constitutional.

In this case, the Court rejects a legislature's judgment that parents should at least be aware of their daughter's intention to seek an abortion, even if the State does not empower the parents to control the child's decision. That judgment is rejected, although it rests upon a tradition of a parental role in the care and upbringing of children that is as old as civilization itself. Our precedents do not permit this result.

It is true that, for all too many young women, the prospect of two parents, perhaps even one parent, sustaining her with support that is compassionate and committed is an illusion. Statistics on drug and alcohol abuse by parents and documentations of child neglect and mistreatment are but fragments of the evidence showing the tragic reality that becomes day-to-day life for thousands of minors. But the Court errs in serious degree when it commands its own solution to the cruel consequences of individual misconduct, parental failure, and social ills. The legislative authority is entitled to attempt to meet these wrongs by taking reasonable measures to recognize and promote the primacy of the family tie, a concept which this Court now seems intent on declaring a constitutional irrelevance.