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Docket Number

Docket No. 46738.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Peter D. Houk, Prosecuting Attorney, Michael G. Woodworth, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Janis L. Blough, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. P.E. Bennett, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

People v. Wright, Docket No. 46738 (Mich. Ct. App. May 6, 1980)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was originally charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. On April 25, 1979, he pled guilty to attempted carrying of a concealed weapon, contrary to MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287; MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, pursuant to a sentence agreement. The sentence provided 60 days in jail with credit for 66 days already served. Defendant appeals as of right, raising (1) that the knife he carried was a hunting knife excepted from the concealed-weapon statute and (2) that his guilty plea was involuntary because he pled while incarcerated to obtain release.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant's carrying of a sheathed knife on his person fell within the statutory exception for "hunting knives adapted and carried as such" under MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424.
Whether the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary because he was incarcerated at the time and pled in order to secure release.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The knife he carried was a hunting knife falling within the statutory exception ("hunting knives adapted and carried as such").
His guilty plea was involuntary because he was incarcerated when he pled and pled only to get out of jail.

People (as reflected in the opinion)

The opinion reflects the legal position that the burden is on the defendant to prove any exception to the statute, including that a knife is "adapted and carried as such."

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 444 (1976)	Review of claims pertaining to the prosecution's entitlement to bring litigation.	Used to justify reviewing defendant's claim about improper charge because it pertains to the prosecution's entitlement to prosecute.
People v Kincade, 61 Mich. App. 498, 502, 233 N.W.2d 54 (1975)	Purpose of the concealed-weapons statute: to prevent sudden drawing of hidden weapons by quarrelling or criminal persons.	Cited to explain statutory purpose guiding whether a carried knife falls within the statute's proscription.
People v Henderson, 45 Mich. App. 511, 206 N.W.2d 771 (1973)	Principle that the defendant must prove exemptions or exceptions to a statute (example: license to carry).	Included among authorities supporting the court's view that the burden rests on the defendant to prove an exception.
People v Hooper, 36 Mich. App. 123, 193 N.W.2d 203 (1971)	Authority regarding defendant's burden to establish statutory exceptions.	Used to support the allocation of burden to the defendant to prove entitlement to an exception.
People v Gilleylen, 31 Mich. App. 416, 188 N.W.2d 131 (1971)	Another authority on burden of proof for exceptions to weapons statutes.	Serves as additional support for the court's allocation of the burden to the defendant.
People v Gatt, 77 Mich. App. 310, 258 N.W.2d 212 (1977)	That possession in a home or business can be a basis for an exception; used as authority for types of proof an accused may assert.	Cited among cases illustrating matters a defendant might prove to establish an exception (possession in home or business).
People v Jiminez, 27 Mich. App. 633, 183 N.W.2d 853 (1970)	Relevant to exceptions based on possession in certain places (home/business).	Cited as supporting authority for how an exception may be established.
People v Clark, 21 Mich. App. 712, 176 N.W.2d 427 (1970)	Authority concerning possession in dwelling or business as potential exception evidence.	Used with other cases to show examples of exceptions and the burden to prove them.
People v Iverson, 34 Mich. App. 519, 191 N.W.2d 745 (1971)	Fact-based example where carrying a knife in hunting country supported an exception.	Distinguished on facts: Iverson involved hunting country and hunting context; Wright did not, so Iverson did not control.
People v Sumlin, 32 Mich. App. 1, 3, 188 N.W.2d 144 (1971)	Detention alone is not inherently coercive enough to invalidate a plea.	Cited to reject defendant's claim that incarceration made his plea involuntary.
People v Steele, 4 Mich. App. 352, 358, 144 N.W.2d 834 (1966)	Same principle: detention does not automatically render a plea involuntary.	Used with Sumlin to support the voluntariness conclusion regarding pleas entered while detained.
People v Grades, 35 Mich. App. 383, 384, 192 N.W.2d 655 (1971)	Pleading to avoid extended incarceration does not render a plea involuntary.	Cited to show that motivation to obtain earlier release is not sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea.
People v Kindell, 17 Mich. App. 22, 168 N.W.2d 909 (1969)	Observation that plea bargains commonly involve expectations of leniency and that such expectations do not render pleas involuntary.	Quoted (via Baines) to explain ordinary plea-bargain considerations and voluntariness.
People v Guest, 47 Mich. App. 500, 209 N.W.2d 601 (1973)	Similar principle regarding plea bargains and voluntariness.	Quoted (via Baines) in support of the view that expectation of leniency does not make a plea involuntary.
People v Baines, 83 Mich. App. 570, 573, 269 N.W.2d 228 (1978)	Discussion describing why plea bargains do not, by their nature, render pleas involuntary.	Quoted for the general proposition that expecting leniency does not invalidate a plea.
People v Belanger, 73 Mich. App. 438, 451, 252 N.W.2d 472 (1977)	Standard of review: a lower court's finding on plea voluntariness will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.	Applied to uphold the trial court's finding that defendant's plea was voluntary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed both of the defendant's claims in turn.

On the statutory-exception claim, the court first identified the statute's purpose—to prevent quarrelling or criminal persons from suddenly drawing hidden weapons—and explained that the statute expressly excepts "hunting knives adapted and carried as such." The court concluded that the burden of proving any statutory exception rests with the defendant (citing MCL 776.20; MSA 28.1274(1) and supporting caselaw). Reviewing the facts, the court found that the evidence did not establish that the knife was "adapted and carried as such": the defendant carried a sheathed knife on his belt under his coat while in Lansing City Hall; he was not wearing hunting clothes; it was not hunting season; and he was not in hunting country. An asserted explanation that the knife was being carried to be repaired did not satisfy the burden. Given the statute's focus on the possibility of drawing hidden weapons and the defendant's heated arguments with city workers prior to arrest, the trial judge's conclusion that the possession fell within the statute's intent was not irrational.

On the voluntariness-of-plea claim, the court relied on precedent holding that detention by itself is not inherently coercive and that pleading simply to avoid extended incarceration does not render a plea involuntary. The court observed that the defendant's plea agreement provided benefits (early release and dismissal of the substantive concealed-weapon charge and an unrelated simple larceny charge), and that the defendant stated on the record that he was voluntarily entering the plea agreement. Applying the standard that a trial court's finding on plea voluntariness will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, the court concluded the plea was entered freely, voluntarily, and with understanding as required by GCR 1963, 785.7.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's conviction for attempted carrying of a concealed weapon and the sentence imposed under the plea agreement are upheld. The court determined the defendant failed to carry the burden of proving the hunting-knife exception and that his guilty plea was voluntary despite his incarceration at the time of pleading. The opinion does not announce a new rule of law; it applies existing precedent and standards to the particular facts of this case.

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PEOPLE v WRIGHT

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was originally charged with carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. On April 25, 1979, he pled guilty to attempted carrying of a concealed weapon, contrary to MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287; MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. He was sentenced to 60 days in jail according to a sentence agreement, with credit for 66 days already served. Defendant now appeals as of right.

Defendant first claims that he was improperly charged and convicted under the concealed weapon statute because he was carrying a hunting knife excepted under that statute. We will review this claim since it pertains to the prosecution's entitlement to bring the instant litigation. See People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 444; 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976).

The pertinent statute, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424 provides:

"A person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him; and a person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person, or, whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, without a license to carry the pistol as provided by law, or if licensed, carrying in a place or manner inconsistent with any restrictions upon such license, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by fine of not more than $2,500.00." (Emphasis added.)

The statute's purpose is to prevent quarrelling or criminal persons from suddenly drawing hidden weapons without notice to other persons. People v Kincade, 61 Mich. App. 498, 502; 233 N.W.2d 54 (1975).

An exception was carved out from this law for hunting knives "adapted and carried as such" where the purpose of carrying a weapon is to go hunting, not to surprise unwary victims. The defendant claims that his carrying of a hunting knife fell within this exception.

Michigan law requires that the defendant prove any exemption or exception to the statute, MCL 776.20; MSA 28.1274(1), i.e., that he had a license to carry the weapon, People v Henderson, 45 Mich. App. 511; 206 N.W.2d 771 (1973), People v Hooper, 36 Mich. App. 123; 193 N.W.2d 203 (1971), People v Gilleylen, 31 Mich. App. 416; 188 N.W.2d 131 (1971), or that he possessed it in his home or business, People v Gatt, 77 Mich. App. 310; 258 N.W.2d 212 (1977), People v Jiminez, 27 Mich. App. 633; 183 N.W.2d 853 (1970), People v Clark, 21 Mich. App. 712; 176 N.W.2d 427 (1970). We believe that the burden similarly rests on the defendant to prove that his hunting knife was "adapted and carried as such". After reviewing all the evidence adduced below, we must conclude that defendant has not met this burden.

At the time of the offense, the instant defendant was carrying a sheathed knife on his belt under his coat. He was not wearing hunting clothes, nor was it the hunting season. Unlike the defendant who was arrested in People v Iverson, 34 Mich. App. 519; 191 N.W.2d 745 (1971), defendant was not in hunting country, (there, the Ontonagon area of Michigan's upper peninsula) but was in Lansing City Hall. The facts do not firmly establish that defendant's hunting knife was "adapted and carried as such" despite defendant's assertion that he was carrying it merely to have it repaired.

It is the possibility of drawing weapons, not the actual occurrence, that the concealed weapons statute seeks to prevent. In light of defendant's heated arguments with city workers prior to arrest, it was not irrational for the trial judge to conclude that defendant's possession fell within the intent of the statute.

Defendant also contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was incarcerated at the time of pleading, and only pled guilty to get out of jail.

Detention, itself, has never been recognized as so inherently coercive that it will render a guilty plea invalid. See People v Sumlin, 32 Mich. App. 1, 3; 188 N.W.2d 144 (1971), People v Steele, 4 Mich. App. 352, 358; 144 N.W.2d 834 (1966). Pleading merely to avoid an extended incarceration does not make a plea involuntary. See People v Grades, 35 Mich. App. 383, 384; 192 N.W.2d 655 (1971).

"All plea bargains involve some consideration passing from the prosecution to the defendant in order to induce the defendant to waive a full trial. Almost all defendants who enter guilty pleas do so because they expect to be treated more leniently if they plead guilty. If they had nothing to gain by pleading guilty and nothing to lose by going to trial, most of those defendants would choose the trial in the hope that they might somehow be acquitted. The fact that they would not plead guilty were it not for a promise or expectation of leniency does not render their pleas involuntary. People v Kindell, 17 Mich. App. 22; 168 N.W.2d 909 (1969), People v Guest, 47 Mich. App. 500; 209 N.W.2d 601 (1973)." People v Baines, 83 Mich. App. 570, 573; 269 N.W.2d 228 (1978).

A lower court's finding on the voluntariness of a plea will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. People v Belanger, 73 Mich. App. 438, 451; 252 N.W.2d 472 (1977). In the instant case, defendant's plea agreement provided not only for an early release, but for dismissal of the substantive concealed weapon charge and an unrelated simple larceny charge. The defendant stated on the record that he was voluntarily entering into this plea agreement. After reviewing the entire record, we are in accord with the lower court's conclusion that defendant's plea was freely, voluntarily, and understandingly made as required by GCR 1963, 785.7.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE v. WRIGHT