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Docket Number

Docket No. 51185.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and John L. Wildeboer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Susan J. Smith, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

People v. Walker, Docket No. 51185 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1981) — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was originally convicted by a jury of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. On October 2, 1978, this Court reversed that conviction and remanded for a new trial (People v Walker, 86 Mich. App. 155; 272 N.W.2d 222 (1978)). Defendant was rearraigned on the original charge and counsel was appointed on November 7, 1978. No further action occurred for 226 days until June 21, 1979, when a notice for trial was filed. On June 21, 1979, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss alleging a violation of the 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of entering without breaking, MCL 750.111; MSA 28.306, and was sentenced to 3 to 5 years with 954 days credit. Defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the prosecution violated the 180-day rule (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1)) by failing to commence action within 180 days after the prosecutor was notified of the defendant's incarceration, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction under MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3).
Whether the 180-day rule applies following reversal of a conviction when defendant is rearraigned, or whether an exception applies because any sentence on retrial would be retroactive to the original sentencing date.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

Defense argued the prosecution violated the 180-day rule, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed when it accepted his guilty plea.

Prosecution's Arguments

The prosecutor contended the 180-day rule did not apply after reversal because any sentence imposed on retrial would be retroactive to the date of the original sentencing, and therefore applying the statute would be inconsistent with its legislative intent.
The trial court found that although the prosecuting attorney was aware of defendant's incarceration, the 180-day rule did not apply since defendant was rearraigned on the principal charge after reversal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Walker, 86 Mich. App. 155; 272 N.W.2d 222 (1978)	This Court's prior reversal of defendant's conviction.	Noted as the antecedent procedural event: the conviction had been reversed and the defendant was rearraigned on the original information after that reversal.
People v Hill, 402 Mich. 272; 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978)	That the statutory period begins to run, inter alia, upon the incarceration of a defendant in a state prison when there is an untried information pending and the prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the information is issued.	The court applied this principle to conclude the 180-day period began to run on November 7, 1978, when defendant was rearraigned while incarcerated and the prosecutor knew of the incarceration.
People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959)	The prosecution must take good faith action within the 180-day period to ready the case for trial.	The court found the record insufficient to warrant a finding of prosecutorial good faith to justify the 226-day delay and applied Hendershot to require such good faith action within 180 days.
People v Moore, 96 Mich. App. 754; 293 N.W.2d 700 (1980)	Authority for the proposition that exceptions to statutory mandates should be created by the Legislature, not the Court.	The court invoked Moore to reject the prosecutor's policy-based argument and stated that any exception for post-reversal cases should be written by the Legislature.
Blackwell v Bornstein, 100 Mich. App. 550, 554; 299 N.W.2d 397 (1980)	Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, inquiry into legislative intent is unnecessary and the statute will be applied as written.	The court relied on Blackwell to apply the 180-day statute as written and to decline the prosecutor's argument about legislative intent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in these analytical steps based on the record and statutory text:

Identified the operative statutory provisions (MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(1) and 28.969(3)) and quoted the relevant language describing the 180-day requirement and the jurisdictional consequence of noncompliance.
Applied People v Hill to determine when the statutory 180-day period begins: the period began when defendant, already a state prison inmate, was rearraigned on November 7, 1978, and the prosecutor knew of his incarceration.
Compared the statutory period to the timeline in the case: the next prosecutorial action occurred 226 days later, on June 21, 1979, when a notice for trial was filed.
Relied on People v Hendershot to state that although the trial need not be concluded within 180 days, the prosecution must take good faith action within that time to ready the case; the record here was insufficient to find prosecutorial good faith to justify the delay.
Addressed and rejected the prosecutor's contention that the statute should not apply post-reversal because sentences on retrial would be retroactive: the court held that once conviction was reversed, an untried information was pending and the statutory language applied; any exception for post-reversal situations should be created by the Legislature (People v Moore).
Invoked Blackwell v Bornstein to apply the statute as written, noting the statute was clear and unambiguous and that the purpose of the 180-day rule includes guaranteeing an inmate's constitutional right to a speedy trial (Hill, supra).
Concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss, and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court reversed the conviction and dismissed the information with prejudice. The court's disposition is: Reversed, and the conviction is dismissed with prejudice.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's conviction and subsequent plea-based sentence were vacated and the charge was dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the 180-day statutory requirement. The opinion rejects a court-created exception for post-reversal situations and indicates that any such exception must be enacted by the Legislature. The opinion does not announce any additional broader changes beyond applying the statute as written to the facts of this case.

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PEOPLE v WALKER

PER CURIAM.

Defendant originally was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. On October 2, 1978, a panel of this Court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. People v Walker, 86 Mich. App. 155; 272 N.W.2d 222 (1978). On November 7, 1978, defendant was rearraigned on the original charge, and counsel was appointed. No further action was taken in defendant's case for 226 days until June 21, 1979, when a notice for trial was filed. On the same day, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges alleging violation of the 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). This motion was denied, and subsequently defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of entering without breaking, MCL 750.111; MSA 28.306. Thereafter sentenced from 3 to 5 years imprisonment with 954 days credit, he appeals as of right.

Defendant claims that the prosecution violated the 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), and thus, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction under MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) when it accepted his guilty plea. The trial court found that, although the prosecuting attorney was aware of defendant's imprisonment, the 180-day rule did not apply since the defendant was rearraigned on the principal charge after reversal of his conviction.

MCL 780.131 and 780.133; MSA 28.969(1) and 28.969(3), commonly known as the 180-day rule, provide respectively in pertinent part:

"SEC. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate and a request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint."

And:

"SEC. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."

The statutory period begins to run, inter alia, upon the incarceration of a defendant in a state prison when there is an untried information pending against such defendant and the prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the information is issued. People v Hill, 402 Mich. 272; 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978).

The record in this case indicates that the defendant was rearraigned on the original information and arraigned on a supplemental information on November 7, 1978. He was a state prison inmate on this date, and the prosecutor knew of defendant's incarceration. Therefore, the statutory 180-day period began to run on the date of arraignment. The next action in this case was taken 226 days later when a notice for trial was filed on June 21, 1979. We find the record insufficient to warrant a finding of prosecutorial good faith that would justify the 226-day delay. Although defendant's trial did not need to be concluded within 180 days, the prosecution must take good faith action within that time to ready the case for trial. People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959).

Further, we are not persuaded by the prosecutor's argument that the 180-day rule is inapplicable since any sentence imposed on retrial would be retroactive to the date of the original sentencing and, therefore, not within the legislative intent of the 180-day statute. Once the conviction was reversed, an untried information was pending, and the language of the statute clearly applied. If an exception is to be made for cases after reversal, that distinction should be written by the Legislature, not by this Court. See People v Moore, 96 Mich. App. 754; 293 N.W.2d 700 (1980). Where, as here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, any inquiry into legislative intent is unnecessary, and the statute will be applied as written. Blackwell v Bornstein, 100 Mich. App. 550, 554; 299 N.W.2d 397 (1980). Even if we examined legislative intent, we would find the prosecution's assertion to be without merit. The purpose of the 180-day rule is not only to give an inmate the opportunity to have sentences run concurrently, but to guarantee inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial. Hill, supra.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss and that it had no jurisdiction to accept defendant's plea. We reverse defendant's conviction and dismiss with prejudice.

Reversed.

PEOPLE v. WALKER