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Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training Appeals, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. State Appellate Defender Office (by Barbara L. Betsey) for defendant.
Judges
  • RYAN, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training Appeals, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. State Appellate Defender Office (by Barbara L. Betsey) for defendant.
Judges
  • RYAN, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Smart Summary

People v. Hill, Docket No. 55430 — Supreme Court of Michigan (Decided February 27, 1978)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder (MCLA 750.83; MSA 28.278) on March 28, 1967, in Detroit Recorder's Court and sentenced on April 14, 1967 to 50 to 75 years imprisonment. The events giving rise to the assault charge occurred January 17, 1966; defendant was arraigned on that charge January 18, 1966. While in custody, defendant was arraigned January 19, 1966 on a separate armed robbery charge (to which he later pled guilty and was sentenced April 19, 1966 to 5 to 15 years and delivered to the Department of Corrections). Following issuance of a separate warrant, defendant was arraigned January 21, 1966 on a first-degree murder charge; he was tried on that murder charge February 1–6, 1967 and acquitted.

Defendant appealed his assault-with-intent-to-murder conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed (22 Mich. App. 91; 177 N.W.2d 220 (1970)). The Supreme Court of Michigan granted leave to appeal primarily to decide whether there had been a violation of the 180-day statute applicable to prisoners (MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1)). The Supreme Court later allowed the appellate defender to brief and argue additional issues concerning jury instructions. The opinion ultimately remands to the trial court to augment the record regarding whether the prosecutor took the required good-faith action to bring the matter to trial within 180 days.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court was divested of jurisdiction under the 180-day statute (MCLA 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq.) because trial on the assault-with-intent-to-murder charge commenced 343 days after defendant's delivery to the state prison on an unrelated conviction.
  2. Whether defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated under federal and state standards (including Barker v. Wingo and People v. Hall).
  3. Whether alleged errors in jury instructions (raised later by permission to brief and argue) are reviewable given that defendant did not object at trial or in the lower courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • Defendant contended that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction under the 180-day statute when trial commenced 343 days after his delivery to the state prison on an unrelated conviction.
  • Defendant also argued that the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
  • By later motion to this Court, defendant sought review of jury instructions as additional issues (after the Court granted leave to brief and argue them).

Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution (and the trial court) took the position that the delay in trying the assault-with-intent charge resulted from an intervening, unrelated murder trial and that the prosecutor had acted in good faith in bringing the defendant to trial in compliance with the 180-day rule.
  • The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the information under the 180-day statute on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v. Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959) Held that prosecutor's prompt, good-faith preparation to bring a case to trial satisfies the statutory requirement of bringing the case to trial within 180 days from receipt of notice by the prosecutor; pretrial motions delaying trial do not necessarily divest jurisdiction if prosecutor acted in good faith. The Court relied on Hendershot for the proposition that the prosecution must take good-faith action within 180 days to ready the case for trial, and that trial need not be concluded within 180 days so long as good-faith action occurred. The opinion remands to establish whether such good-faith action occurred here.
People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147; 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963) Holds that the 180-day period cannot begin to run until a defendant is delivered to state prison authorities; suggests the Department of Corrections has duty to serve prosecutor with notice once defendant is delivered. The Court cites Castelli to support the temporal aspect of the statute (i.e., beginning of the 180-day period) and discusses that the 180 days did not commence before delivery to the Department of Corrections in the Castelli facts.
People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141; 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977) Recognition that a defendant has a right to separate trials (i.e., no inherent constitutional or statutory impediment to prosecuting unrelated offenses at consecutive trials). The Court cited Tobey to support the proposition that trying unrelated offenses at consecutive trials is permissible and that delay caused by other proceedings does not necessarily violate the 180-day statute.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514; 92 S. Ct. 2182; 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) Federal standards for evaluating the constitutional right to a speedy trial (factors to be balanced: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of right, prejudice to defendant). The Court adopted the Barker balancing test and applied it (along with People v. Hall) to conclude that the delay here did not establish a denial of the constitutional speedy-trial right given the specific circumstances (no showing of demand for trial or prejudice).
People v. Hall, 391 Mich. 175; 215 N.W.2d 166 (1974) Restated the Barker factors for application under Michigan law. The Court referenced Hall to confirm the four-factor balancing approach and applied those factors to the 343-day delay, concluding no constitutional speedy-trial violation on the record before it.
Court of Appeals decision affirming conviction, 22 Mich. App. 91; 177 N.W.2d 220 (1970) Appellate review upholding the conviction below (contextual procedural history). The Supreme Court noted this prior affirmance as part of the procedural posture; the Supreme Court then addressed the 180-day issue and other questions on further review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed both the statutory 180-day scheme (MCLA 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq.) and the constitutional speedy-trial guarantees. The analysis proceeded in several steps:

  1. Statutory interpretation: The Court examined the text and purpose of the 180-day statute, observing that the statute was designed to secure to state prison inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court reviewed prior Michigan decisions (Hendershot and Castelli) to determine when the statutory period may begin and what constitutes compliance.
  2. Development of a rule for commencement: The Court held that the statutory period begins when there is the coincidence of either condition 1 or 2 and condition 3 (as the Court enumerated): (1) issuance of a warrant/indictment/complaint against a person incarcerated in a state prison or detained in a local facility awaiting incarceration in a state prison; (2) incarceration/detention when such an untried charge is pending; and (3) the prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is incarcerated when the charge is issued, or the Department of Corrections knows or should know that a charge is pending against an inmate. The Court explained this construction as necessary to prevent law-enforcement officials from defeating the statute by failing or refusing to serve formal notice and to impose an obligation on law-enforcement to see that prisoners are brought to trial in good faith within 180 days.
  3. Good-faith action requirement: Relying on People v. Hendershot, the Court clarified that the statutory requirement is satisfied if the prosecution takes good-faith action within the 180-day period to ready the case for trial, even if the trial itself is not concluded within that period.
  4. Application to the present record: The Court observed that in this case defendant was arraigned promptly, but the trial on the assault charge was delayed to allow the trial of an intervening, unrelated murder charge. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to quash based on the view that an adjournment to permit another trial was reasonable per se. The Supreme Court held that such a per se rule is incorrect: delay to try an intervening case may be reasonable, but it is not necessarily so. Because the trial judge denied the motion without requiring the prosecutor to establish the requisite good-faith actions and the reasonableness of the delay, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to augment the record and establish the reasonableness of the intervening delay and that the prosecutor took the required good-faith steps within 180 days.
  5. Constitutional speedy-trial analysis: The Court applied the Barker v. Wingo balancing test, as restated in People v. Hall (factors: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of the right, prejudice). Weighing those factors, the Court concluded that the 343-day delay occasioned by trying another charge did not, on the record before the Court, demonstrate a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial because there was no evidence the defendant demanded trial or suffered prejudice.
  6. Jury instructions: The Court granted the defendant permission to brief and argue jury-instruction issues but concluded that those issues were not preserved because no objection was made at trial, in the Court of Appeals, or in the application to this Court; therefore the Court declined to review the instructional issues.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

REMANDED to the trial court for augmentation of the record to establish whether the prosecutor took the required good-faith action to bring the matter to trial within 180 days and to establish the reasonableness of any delay caused by intervening proceedings. The Court also articulated the rule that the statutory 180-day period begins when (a) either a warrant/indictment/complaint is issued against a state-prison inmate or the person is incarcerated/detained with an untried charge pending, and (b) the prosecutor or the Department of Corrections knows or should know of the other's knowledge/status (the "coincidence" rule described in the opinion).

Direct implications for the parties and procedure:

  • The Supreme Court did not overturn the conviction on the record before it; instead it remanded to allow the trial court to establish facts supporting the trial court's finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith to comply with the 180-day statute.
  • The Court declined to review alleged jury instruction errors because defendant failed to preserve the objections at trial or on direct appeal.
  • The opinion places an obligation on law-enforcement and prosecutorial authorities (as articulated by the Court) to see that state-prison inmates are brought to trial in good faith within 180 days, and it clarifies the circumstances that trigger the statutory running of the 180-day period as described above.

The opinion did not purport to set aside the conviction in this instance; rather, it remanded for factual augmentation to determine statutory compliance. The Court also held that, based on the Barker/Hall balancing factors, the record did not show a violation of the constitutional speedy-trial right under the circumstances presented.

Show full summary ...

PEOPLE v. HILL

KAVANAGH, C.J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, MCLA 750.83; MSA 28.278 on March 28, 1967 in Detroit Recorder's Court. His appeal to the Court of Appeals raised three issues: violation of the 180-day rule; the improper admission of certain testimony into evidence; and a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, 22 Mich. App. 91; 177 N.W.2d 220 (1970). We granted leave to appeal to decide whether or not there had been a violation of the 180-day rule and later granted the appellate defender's request to brief and argue three additional issues with respect to instructions given at defendant's trial. We remand for augmentation of record.

THE FACTS

On January 18, 1966 defendant was arraigned on the instant charge of assault with intent to commit murder. This charge arose out of an incident on January 17, 1966, in which a police officer was shot. On January 19, 1966, while defendant was in custody, a complaint was filed, a warrant issued, and defendant was arraigned on a second charge of robbery armed. On January 21, 1966, following the filing of a complaint and issuance of a warrant, defendant was arraigned on a third charge of first-degree murder. Disposition of these three distinct cases, each arising out of separate incidents, occurred as follows:

Robbery armed: On April 15, 1966 the defendant pled guilty to robbery unarmed and on April 19, 1966 he received a sentence of 5 to 15 years imprisonment, and was delivered to the Department of Corrections.

Murder, first degree: Following two pretrial hearings and one adjournment defendant was brought to trial on the murder charge on February 1, 1967, 12 months after his arraignment. On February 6, 1967 defendant was acquitted.

Assault with intent to commit murder: On February 27, 1967, over one year after arraignment and before trial commenced on the assault with intent to murder charge, defendant brought a motion to quash the information alleging violation of the 180-day rule. On February 28, 1967, the trial judge denied defendant's motion finding that since the delay resulted from the intervening murder trial, the prosecutor had brought defendant to trial on the instant charge in good-faith compliance with the 180-day rule, MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). Following one adjournment on March 14, 1967, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of assault with intent to commit murder on March 28, 1967. On April 14, 1967, defendant was sentenced to 50 to 75 years imprisonment.

I. 180-DAY RULE

Defendant contends that the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction under MCLA 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. when trial in the instant case commenced 343 days after defendant's delivery to the state prison on another unrelated conviction.

The act provides in pertinent part:

"Sec. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate and a request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail.

"Sec. 2. The department of corrections shall notify each prisoner of any request forwarded under the provisions of section 1 of this act.

"Sec. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."

This Court has addressed the issue of compliance with this statute in only two cases: People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959), and People v Castelli, 370 Mich. 147; 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963).

In Hendershot, supra, defendant was sentenced to a term in a state prison pursuant to his conviction for manslaughter. The prosecutor filed a detainer notifying the Department of Corrections of an outstanding warrant for carrying a concealed weapon. Almost seven years later, when defendant was about to be released, the Department of Corrections served notice upon the prosecuting attorney requesting that action be taken toward final disposition of the untried concealed weapons charge. The prosecutor prepared the case for trial but defendant's pretrial motions delayed the actual trial beyond 180 days from the date of receipt of notice by the prosecutor. This Court held that the prosecutor's good-faith action in promptly readying the case for trial satisfied the statutory requirement of bringing the case to trial within 180 days from receipt of notice. The trial court was not, therefore, divested of jurisdiction under MCLA 780.133; MSA 28.969(3).

In Castelli, supra, this Court held that the 180-day period could not begin to run until a defendant was delivered to state prison authorities. Dictum in Castelli suggests that once defendant was delivered to state prison, the Department of Corrections would be charged with a duty to serve the prosecutor with notice to begin proceedings within 180 days.

"In this case the department of corrections never did notify the prosecuting attorney of Oakland county of defendant's imprisonment or request disposition of the information. However, inasmuch as defendant was not delivered to the department and to State prison until March 3, 1961, no duty could have reposed on the department to do so before that date. 180 days thereafter had not yet expired when, on August 25, 1961, the Oakland county prosecuting attorney commenced proceedings, under the Hendershot holding, by habeas corpus to bring defendant before the magistrate for examination. Jurisdiction to try defendant, accordingly, was not lost and he is not entitled to discharge on the ground just considered." 370 Mich. 153.

Therefore, while the defendant in Castelli was already in the custody of county authorities when a warrant charging an unrelated offense was issued, the 180 days did not commence until he was delivered to state prison authorities. This Court held that prosecution was timely under Hendershot.

We read MCLA 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. as an effort to secure to state prison inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial.

We hold that the statutory period begins with the coincidence of either conditions 1 or 2 and condition 3:

1) The issuance of a warrant, indictment or complaint against a person incarcerated in a state prison or under detention in any local facility awaiting incarceration in any state prison;

2) The incarceration of a defendant in a state prison or the detention of such defendant in a local facility to await such incarceration when there is an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint pending against such defendant; and

3) The prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the warrant, indictment, information or complaint is issued or the Department of Corrections knows or should know that a warrant, indictment, or complaint is pending against one sentenced to their custody.

We so hold because we are confident that the Legislature which drafted the 180-day rule did not intend to empower law-enforcement officials to defeat this statutory protection afforded to defendants by failing or refusing to serve formal notice. Our holding imposes a duty upon all law-enforcement officials to see that state prison inmates are brought to trial on outstanding warrants in good faith within 180 days.

We have held that defendant's trial need not be concluded within 180 days, but that the prosecution must take good-faith action within that time to ready the case for trial. People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959).

In the instant case, defendant was arraigned promptly after the warrant was issued, but the trial was delayed to allow the trial of another unrelated charge against the defendant. More than 180 days elapsed from the time of the charge and trial on it, but that does not determine the issue.

There is no constitutional or statutory impediment inherent in prosecuting unrelated offenses against the same defendant at consecutive trials. Defendant, in fact, had a right to separate trials. See People v Tobey, 401 Mich. 141; 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977). Delay which results from other proceedings against the defendant will not necessarily constitute a violation of the 180-day statute.

Delay reasonably necessary to try an intervening case will not militate against a finding of good-faith action.

This record shows that defendant raised the question of compliance with the 180-day statute by a motion to quash the information. The trial judge denied the motion without the prosecutor establishing good-faith action to bring this matter to trial, apparently holding that adjournment of trial to permit another trial was reasonable per se and adequate compliance with the statute without regard to whether the intervening trial was unreasonably delayed. We do not agree that the delay here was necessarily reasonable, and accordingly remand for the purpose of establishing its reasonableness and that the prosecutor took the required good-faith action to ready this case for trial.

Defendant also argues that the delay here violated his right to a speedy trial. A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is legislatively observed in both the 180-day statute, which specifically addressed speedy trial rights of those already incarcerated in state prison, and more generally in MCLA 768.1; MSA 28.1024:

"Sec. 1. The people of this state and persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall have a speedy trial and determination of all prosecutions and it is hereby made the duty of all public officers having duties to perform in any criminal case, to bring such case to a final determination without delay except as may be necessary to secure to the accused a fair and impartial trial."

We are bound by the above statutory provisions as well as by the Federal and our own case law construing the right. This Court has adopted the Federal standards for a speedy trial enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972). Recently, in People v Hall, 391 Mich. 175; 215 N.W.2d 166 (1974), we restated the principles. The factors to be balanced in determining whether or not a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial are: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Here the delay of 343 days for the purpose of trying another charge against this defendant without any evidence that he demanded trial or was prejudiced by the delay, will not support a conclusion that defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

On July 2, 1975, this Court granted defendant's motion to brief and argue additional issues challenging the propriety of the jury instructions. We granted leave to appeal these issues improvidently because defendant raised no objection to the instructions at trial, in the Court of Appeals, or in his application to this Court. Defendant consequently did not preserve his right to appeal and we will not review the alleged error.

Remanded to the trial court for establishment of record to support the trial court's finding of the prosecutor's good-faith action to bring this matter to trial within 180 days.

WILLIAMS, LEVIN, and FITZGERALD, JJ., concurred with KAVANAGH, C.J.

RYAN, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I agree that there was no violation of the provisions of MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1) and that the defendant's conviction of assault with intent to commit murder should be affirmed.

However, I dissent from the Court's action in judicially creating three new conditions which in future cases, if found to exist in the announced combination, will trigger the running of the 180-day period.

MCLA 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), which has come to be known in the lexicon of criminal jurisprudence of this state as the 180-day rule, is unambiguously plain on its face. It is an expression of legislative will that in those cases in which the specific circumstances delineated in the statute obtain, there is a duty imposed upon the prosecuting attorney to bring an accused person to trial within 180 days. The essentially operative conditions precedent to the commencement of the running of the 180 days are: 1) that the Department of Corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint, 2) against an inmate of a penal institution, 3) that the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint sets forth a criminal offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, 4) that the Department of Corrections causes written notice of the place of the inmate's imprisonment to be delivered to the prosecutor of the county wherein the charge is pending, and 5) the Department of Corrections requests a final disposition of the pending case. There is no justification for a judicial rewriting of this statute simply because the legislative mandate of trial within 180 days does not speak to those cases in which none of the required notices are given, but it is concluded that the prosecuting attorney should have known of the inmate's status or the Department of Corrections should have known of the pendency of the untried charges. That is an undertaking entirely beyond our authority.

The concluding sentences of the statute describe additional information which is to be included in the notice to be delivered by the Department of Corrections, to wit:
"The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail."

There are other means to assure prompt disposition of pending criminal charges against a prison inmate in this state, not the least of which is recognition of an accused person's right to speedy trial. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCLA 768.1; MSA 28.1024.

The Court's understandable concern that the statute in question may be insufficient to meet a factual situation which may arise in another case on another day should be addressed when that case is before us, not in the abstract fashion of today's dictum.

COLEMAN, J., concurred with RYAN, J.

BLAIR MOODY, JR., J., took no part in the decision of this case.

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PEOPLE v. HILL
(Feb 27, 1978)