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Docket Number

Docket Nos. 60399, 61672.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Civil and Appeals, and Larry L. Roberts, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Cohn Slameka (by Robert E. Slameka), for defendant Wright. Andreas M. Getschmann, for defendant Chestnut.

Judges

D.F. WALSH, P.J.

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Smart Summary

People v Wright; People v Chestnut — Michigan Court of Appeals (Decided August 31, 1983)

Factual and Procedural Background

The prosecutor appealed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of charges filed against defendants Glenn Wright and Reginald Chestnut. In docket no. 60399, Wright was charged with kidnapping, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and felony-firearm; Chestnut was charged with kidnapping (and was bound over on that charge) and was also charged with felony-firearm but bound over only on the kidnapping charge. In docket no. 61672, Wright was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver.

At arrest and detention in the Wayne County jail, both defendants were parolees and parole holds were placed on them by the Department of Corrections because of potential parole violations. The trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all charges, ruling that the 180-day statute (1957 PA 177; MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq.) had been violated. The Court of Appeals accepted the trial court's finding that the prosecutor failed to take good faith action to bring defendants to trial within 180 days of the filing of the parole holds.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a person detained in a local facility against whom a parole hold has been filed is "under detention awaiting incarceration in a state prison" such that the 180-day statutory period (1957 PA 177) begins to run.
Whether the filing of parole holds on the defendants triggered the running of the 180-day period so that the trial court lost jurisdiction and dismissal with prejudice was required.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959)	Cited for the proposition that if the 180-day rule applies, the court loses jurisdiction.	The court noted that if the 180-day statute were triggered by the parole holds, jurisdiction would have been lost under this authority.
People v Hill, 420 Mich. 272, 280-281; 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978)	Defines when the 180-day period begins to run: the coincidence of either issuance/incarceration conditions (1 or 2) and condition (3) regarding knowledge by prosecutor or Department of Corrections.	The court applied Hill's standard to determine whether parole holds satisfied the "awaiting incarceration" condition and concluded they did not.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the controlling question under the Hill standard: whether a person detained locally with a parole hold is "under detention awaiting incarceration in a state prison" so as to trigger the 180-day statutory period. The court answered this negatively.

The court reasoned that until parole is actually revoked, a paroled prisoner detained locally may not be returned to state prison to finish the original sentence. Parolees accused of parole violations are entitled to parole revocation hearings within 45 days of return to state prison or availability for return; such hearings may occur locally and must be preceded by preliminary probable cause hearings or written notice. Parole revocation depends on a preponderance finding, and even if a violation is established the parole board may decline to revoke parole.

Because revocation is not automatic and may not occur, the mere filing of a parole hold does not make the detainee "awaiting incarceration" within the meaning of the Hill standard. Therefore, the Hill condition (the coincidence of incarceration/issuance and knowledge) was not satisfied by the parole holds alone, and the 180-day rule did not apply on that basis. The court nevertheless accepted the trial court's finding that the prosecutor failed to take good faith action within 180 days measured from the parole holds, but held that that failure did not trigger the statutory jurisdictional bar because the statute was not triggered by the parole holds.

The court also noted that parolees retain the same ability as other defendants to assert constitutional speedy trial claims.

Finally, the court remanded for further proceedings and permitted the trial court to hold evidentiary hearings to determine whether the defendants' paroles had in fact been revoked before the entry of the orders of dismissal; if revocation occurred prior to dismissal, the trial court should determine whether the 180-day rule was violated by delay between revocation and dismissal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissals and remanded the cases for further proceedings. REVERSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

The filing of a parole hold alone does not trigger the 180-day period in 1957 PA 177; therefore the trial court lost no jurisdiction on that basis.
The trial court's dismissal with prejudice was reversed and the cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The defendants (as all defendants) remain able to assert constitutional speedy trial claims.
The reversal was without prejudice to motions in the trial court for evidentiary hearings to determine whether parole revocations occurred before the dismissals; if so, the trial court must determine whether the 180-day rule was violated by any delay between revocation and dismissal.

Disposition: Reversed. The Court of Appeals did not retain jurisdiction.

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PEOPLE v WRIGHT PEOPLE v CHESTNUT

D.F. WALSH, P.J.

The prosecutor appeals the dismissal with prejudice of charges filed against defendants Glenn Wright and Reginald Chestnut. In docket no. 60399, defendant Wright was charged with, and bound over to Detroit Recorder's Court on, kidnapping, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and felony-firearm. MCL 750.349, 750.520b(1), 750.227b; MSA 28.581, 28.788(2)(1), 28.424(2). Defendant Chestnut was charged with kidnapping and felony-firearm but was bound over to recorder's court only on the kidnapping charge. In docket no. 61672, defendant Wright was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). In each case, the trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all charges, ruling that the 180-day rule had been violated. MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq.

At the time of their arrests and detention in Wayne County jail, both of these defendants were parolees. Immediately after their arrests, and because of the possibility of violations of the terms of their paroles, parole holds were placed on them by the Department of Corrections. For purposes of this appeal, we accept the trial court's finding that the prosecutor failed to take good faith action to bring defendants to trial within 180 days of the filing of the parole holds. If the 180-day rule applies to these fact the court lost jurisdiction in these cases. See People v Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300; 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959).

1957 PA 177 provides:

"Sec. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate and a request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail. [MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).]

* * *

"Sec. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3).

In People v Hill, 420 Mich. 272, 280-281; 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978), the Supreme Court discussed the issue of when the 180-day period begins to run:

"We hold that the statutory period begins with the coincidence of either conditions 1 or 2 and condition 3:

"(1) The issuance of a warrant, indictment or complaint against a person incarcerated in a state prison or under detention in any local facility awaiting incarceration in any state prison;

"(2) The incarceration of a defendant in a state prison or the detention of such defendant in a local facility to await such incarceration when there is an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint pending against such defendant; and

"(3) The prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the warrant, indictment, information or complaint is issued or the Department of Corrections knows or should know that a warrant, indictment, or complaint is pending against one sentenced to their custody."

The issue presented in this case is whether a person detained in a local facility, and against whom a parole hold has been filed, is under detention awaiting incarceration in a state prison. We answer this question in the negative, and hold that the filing of the parole holds in these cases did not trigger the running of the 180-day statutory period.

Until revocation of parole, it is possible that a paroled prisoner who is being detained, for whatever reason or reasons, in a local facility will not be returned to state prison to finish out his or her original sentence. Paroled prisoners who are under accusation of violation of parole are entitled to parole revocation hearings within 45 days of their return to state prison or of their availability for return to prison. The hearing may take place at the prison or locally. MCL 791.240a(1); MSA 28.2310(1)(1). Such hearings are to be preceded by preliminary probable cause hearings or written notice of the charges and the evidence to be presented against the parole at the fact-finding, parole revocation hearing. MCL 791.239a; MSA 28.2309(1). Only if a violation of a parole is established by a preponderance of the evidence can parole be revoked. Even if a violation of parole is established, the parole board may decline to revoke parole. MCL 791.240a(6); MSA 28.2310(1)(6).

Until revocation of parole, a paroled prisoner who is being detained locally, and against whom a parole hold has been filed, is not, because of the hold, awaiting incarceration in a state prison. The Hill standard is, therefore, not satisfied and the 180-day rule does not apply. Of course, a parolee, as all other defendants, is not precluded from claiming violation of his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial.

We reverse the dismissals of the aforementioned charges and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Our order of reversal is without prejudice to the filing of motions in the trial court for evidentiary hearings in that forum for a determination of whether defendants' paroles were revoked before entry of the orders of dismissals. If their paroles were revoked before dismissal, it shall be for the trial court to determine if the 180-day rule was violated by virtue of the delay between revocation and dismissal.

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

PEOPLE v. WRIGHT