MEMORANDUM.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Insofar as the petition seeks relief by way of prohibition, it is predicated on the concept that, by allowing over three years to elapse from petitioner's guilty plea without sentencing her and then adjourning the motion for a further year, respondent lost jurisdiction of the matter. The first three years were at petitioner's behest, however, and under the circumstances of this case the additional time does not constitute such an "extremely long and unreasonable" delay ( People ex rel. Harty v Fay, 10 N.Y.2d 374, 379) as to divest the court of its power to sentence.
Denial of mandamus relief was also proper. Mandamus will lie to compel the determination of a motion ( Matter of Briggs v Lauman, 21 A.D.2d 734, mot for lv to app den 15 N.Y.2d 481; see Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 73 A.D.2d 411, 413, affd 53 N.Y.2d 12; Matter of National Auto Weld v Clynes, 89 A.D.2d 689) as well as to compel a trial court to proceed with sentencing (CPL 380.30, subd 1; Matter of Hogan v Bohan, 305 N.Y. 110; see People ex rel. Prosser v Martin, 306 N.Y. 710). Here, however, sentencing has been delayed at petitioner's request, and in view of the medical testimony that further treatment might improve petitioner's physical condition, we cannot say in this instance that it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Judge to postpone disposition of the motion to dismiss pending receipt of a further medical report as to the success of such treatment.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, JONES, WACHTLER, MEYER and SIMONS concur.
On review of submissions pursuant to rule 500.2 (b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 N.Y.CRR 500.2 [g]), judgment affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.