Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Special Term erroneously awarded appellate counsel fees to the defendant wife on the sole basis that she had been the successful respondent in a matrimonial appeal. Domestic Relations Law § 237 (b) places an award on counsel fees "in the court's discretion, [as] justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties". We have previously interpreted such language to require the court in its exercise of discretion to "consider the relative merits of the parties and their respective financial situations" (Martin v Martin, 28 A.D.2d 897). Thus, in rendering an award of counsel fees, the "court must consider the financial circumstances of both parties" (Marocco v Marocco, 53 A.D.2d 707, 708). In this regard, the "sufficiency" of one spouse's financial means will not, standing alone, preclude an award of counsel fees (see, Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 56 A.D.2d 834; Ross v Ross, 47 A.D.2d 866; Press v Press, 49 A.D.2d 603). In Goldsmith we did no more than affirm our rule under Domestic Relations Law § 237 that it is not "mandatory that financial need be proved" (Martin v Martin, supra). Indeed, in Goldsmith we focused our attention on the merits of the respondent's position on the prior appeal because her financial entitlement to an award of counsel fees had already been determined in the trial of the action (see, Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 52 A.D.2d 616; cf. Mittman v Mittman, 30 A.D.2d 867, affd 24 N.Y.2d 826). Accordingly, Goldsmith did not represent a departure from prior law mandating consideration of both the merits and respective financial positions of the parties. Special Term erred in awarding appellate counsel fees based on defendant's successful defense of a prior appeal without considering the parties' relative financial positions. Accordingly, we remit for a hearing to consider the appropriate standard. Additionally, if it is determined at the hearing that defendant is entitled to an award of counsel fees, plaintiff may "challenge the value and extent of counsel's claimed services" (Jerman v Jerman, 80 A.D.2d 825, 826). Gibbons, J.P., Bracken, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.