Judgment affirmed.
Having failed either to move to withdraw his plea prior to the imposition of sentence or to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10, the defendant has not preserved for appellate review the issue of the sufficiency of his plea allocution (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Pellegrino, 60 N.Y.2d 636). Moreover, were we to review this issue in the interest of justice, vacatur would not be required (see, People v. Santana, 110 A.D.2d 789).
Further, by his plea of guilty, the defendant waived his right to claim that "he was entitled to have the indictment dismissed on the ground that the People were not ready for trial within the time prescribed by CPL 30.30" (People v. Savage, 54 N.Y.2d 697, 698; see, People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009; People v. Howe, 56 N.Y.2d 622). "[O]ur interests of justice powers (see CPL 470.15, subd 6) [do not] authorize review of issues waived by a plea of guilty (People v. Howe, 56 N.Y.2d 622)" (People v. Macy, 100 A.D.2d 557).
With respect to the defendant's claim that the sentence imposed was excessive, we note that the sentence was imposed in accordance with the defendant's negotiated plea (see, People v Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816), and was the mandatory minimum allowable under the law (see, Penal Law § 70.06, [3] [d]; [4]; see also, People v. Borrero, 19 N.Y.2d 332).
Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment to Penal Law § 140.25 (2) (see, People v. Kepple, 98 A.D.2d 783; People v. Buyce, 97 A.D.2d 632). Bracken, J.P., Niehoff, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.