Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the motion is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings.
Contrary to the defendant's present contention, the instant appeal is clearly timely, as the People filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order appealed from was entered (see, CPL 460.10 [a]; see generally, People v Jayson, 31 A.D.2d 551; People v Mullins, 103 A.D.2d 994). The defendant's reliance upon People v Coaye ( 68 N.Y.2d 857) is misplaced, as that case stands for the proposition that where a motion pursuant to CPL 330.30 is granted and sentence is then imposed on the same date, the order and sentence are subsumed in the judgment of conviction and both the People and the defendant have 30 days after the imposition of sentence within which to file their respective notices of appeal. Conversely, only the People have been aggrieved by the court's order of dismissal in the case at bar, and that order is not subsumed in any other judgment. Hence, there exists no risk of a separate appeal by the defendant and an appeal by the People proceeding through the courts independently of each other (see, People v Coaye, supra, at 858-859), and the time within which to appeal from the order is governed by the applicable language of CPL 460.10 (1) (a).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30. After subtracting those periods of delay directly attributable to the defendant's pretrial motions (CPL 30.30 [a]; People v Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523; People v Brown, 113 A.D.2d 812, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 649), the delays occasioned by adjournments requested by or consented to by the defense (CPL 30.30 [b]; People v Meierdiercks, 68 N.Y.2d 613; People v Kopciowski, 68 N.Y.2d 615), and a reasonable time for the People to arrange the defendant's arraignment (see, People v Pappas, 128 A.D.2d 556; People v Gaggi, 104 A.D.2d 422, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 636, rearg denied 65 N.Y.2d 1054), the total time chargeable to the People is well within the permitted six-calendar-month time limit (see, e.g., People v Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529; People v Seabrook, 126 A.D.2d 583). We further note that the People announced on the record their readiness to proceed to the hearing and trial on September 11, 1984 (see, People v Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331); thus, the court erred in rejecting their announcement of readiness on that date and instead should have commenced the pretrial hearing at that time. Mangano, J.P., Niehoff, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.
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