Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The first count of the indictment, charging the defendant with the sexual abuse of one victim, was joinable with the latter three counts of the indictment which involved the attempted rape, robbery, and sexual abuse of another victim since it was established that proof of the first count would be material and admissible as evidence-in-chief upon a trial of the latter counts (see, CPL 200.20 [b]). Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied the defendant's application to sever the first count of the indictment from the remaining counts (see, People v Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1, 7; People v. Diaz, 122 A.D.2d 279, 280, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 999; People v. Andrews, 109 A.D.2d 939, 942-943).
The claim of improper bolstering has not been preserved for appellate review (People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 1025). Under the circumstances of this case, where proof of the defendant's guilt of all counts charged was overwhelming, consideration of this claim in the interest of justice is unwarranted.
The sentence imposed was not excessive and appellate modification is unwarranted (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Rubin, J.P., Kooper, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.