Judgments affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the joinder of several counts of two separate indictments for trial was improper. The evidence before the court clearly established that proof of the first set of offenses would be material and admissible as evidence-in-chief upon the trial of the second set of offenses (see, CPL 200.20 [b]). Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the joinder of said counts for trial (see, e.g., People v Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1; People v Bongarzone, 116 A.D.2d 164; People v Shelby, 111 A.D.2d 1038; People v Simpkins, 110 A.D.2d 790).
Similarly unavailing is the defendant's argument that certain trial testimony by one of the complainants included a reference to prejudicial evidence of an uncharged crime committed by the defendant. The record reveals that the challenged remark was part of the complainant's narrative description of the offense and was probative of the defendant's actions and movements through the house which he burglarized (see generally, People v Vails, 43 N.Y.2d 364; People v Gines, 36 N.Y.2d 932; People v Gantz, 104 A.D.2d 692). Moreover, any potential prejudice which could have arisen from this testimony was minimized by the trial court's specific curative instruction, to which defense counsel consented (see, People v Santiago, 52 N.Y.2d 865; People v Lee, 118 A.D.2d 593; People v Burnell, 112 A.D.2d 1089; People v Lovejoy, 105 A.D.2d 807).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lazer, J.P., Thompson, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.