Ordered that the judgments are modified, on the law, by reducing the mandatory surcharges imposed on each conviction from $100 to $75; as so modified, the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the mandatory surcharges imposed represented an abuse of discretion in light of his alleged indigency is premature (see, People v. Martin, 132 A.D.2d 626; People v. Peralta, 127 A.D.2d 803, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 953; People v. Perrine, 111 A.D.2d 193). Moreover, the court properly imposed a surcharge with respect to each judgment of conviction (see, Penal Law § 60.35; People v. Baynes, 121 A.D.2d 643, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 767; People v. Cusick, 119 A.D.2d 830, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 667). We find, however, that the court erred in imposing surcharges in the amount of $100 each, since Penal Law § 60.35 required a mandatory surcharge of $75 at the time the criminal acts underlying the instant convictions were committed (see, L 1985, ch 59; cf., People v. Valdelamar, 122 A.D.2d 289, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 918; People v. Clarke, 111 A.D.2d 11). Mollen, P.J., Bracken, Rubin, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.