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Docket Number

Docket No. 94630.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and David A. King, First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Hortin, Rogow Moors (by Thomas O. Moors), for defendant on appeal.

Judges

M.J. KELLY, P.J.

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Smart Summary

People v. Rivera, Docket No. 94630 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1987) — Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 1, 1985, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and one count of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592. In exchange for the plea, numerous charges, including armed robbery, first-degree murder and a supplemental information, were dismissed. The defendant previously appealed his manslaughter conviction; that conviction was affirmed by another panel of this Court (People v Rivera, unpublished per curiam opinion, July 18, 1986, Docket No. 82113). In the present appeal the defendant challenges only his larceny conviction, asserting a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals panel affirmed the larceny conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a claim that a defendant's right to a speedy trial was denied survives a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (i.e., whether such a claim is jurisdictional or is waived by a plea).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Rivera, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July 18, 1986 (Docket No. 82113).	Prior panel affirmed the manslaughter conviction and rejected the defendant's speedy trial claim on the basis that the nolo contendere plea waived nonjurisdictional defects.	Used to note procedural history: the defendant previously raised the same speedy trial issue and that appeal was resolved on waiver grounds.
People v Parshay, 104 Mich. App. 411; 304 N.W.2d 593 (1981), lv den 411 Mich. 1081 (1981)	Authority for the proposition that a speedy trial claim is waived by a plea.	Cited as one of the cases supporting the conclusion that speedy trial claims are nonjurisdictional and waived by a plea.
People v Williams, 145 Mich. App. 614; 378 N.W.2d 769 (1985)	Authority for the proposition that a speedy trial claim is waived by a plea.	Cited as one of the cases supporting the conclusion that speedy trial claims are nonjurisdictional and waived by a plea.
People v Davis, 123 Mich. App. 553; 332 N.W.2d 606 (1983)	Authority for the contrary position that a speedy trial claim survives a plea.	Noted as part of the line of authority taking the opposite position from Parshay/Williams.
People v Farmer, 127 Mich. App. 472; 339 N.W.2d 218 (1983)	Authority for the contrary position that a speedy trial claim survives a plea.	Noted as part of the line of authority taking the opposite position from Parshay/Williams.
People v Sickles, 162 Mich. App. 344; 412 N.W.2d 734 (1987)	Most recent case (at the time) siding with the view that a speedy trial issue survives a guilty plea; Sickles concluded New resolved the split.	Discussed and distinguished; the Court declined to accept Sickles' conclusion that People v New resolved the split in favor of survival.
People v New, 427 Mich. 482; 398 N.W.2d 358 (1986)	Holds that after pleading guilty, a defendant may raise only defenses that would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction; distinguishes defenses relating to state's authority to bring a defendant to trial from those subsumed by a guilty plea.	The Court considered the New language but concluded New did not resolve the speedy-trial-waiver issue in the way Sickles suggested; characterized New as more restrictive and as rejecting earlier broader language.
People v White, 411 Mich. 366, 398; 308 N.W.2d 128 (1981) (Moody, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)	Quoted in New for the proposition distinguishing rights that implicate the state's authority to prosecute from those regarding proof of guilt.	Quoted as part of the operative language taken from People v New; used to explain New's framework.
People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich. 424; 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976), cert den 429 U.S. 951; 97 S Ct 370; 50 L Ed 2d 319 (1976)	Earlier expansive language suggesting a guilty plea did not waive certain rights such as insufficient evidence at preliminary examination or failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence.	Noted as a decision whose broader language New expressly rejected; used to explain why New narrowed the rights preserved after a plea.
United States v Freed, 688 F.2d 24 (CA 6, 1982)	Federal authority cited in support of the proposition that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and waived by a plea.	Listed among authorities consistent with the Court's conclusion that speedy trial claims are nonjurisdictional and waived by a guilty or nolo contendere plea.
United States v Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (CA 8, 1974), cert den 419 U.S. 1003; 95 S Ct 322; 42 L Ed 2d 279 (1974)	Federal authority cited in support of the proposition that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and waived by a plea.	Listed among authorities consistent with the Court's conclusion that speedy trial claims are nonjurisdictional and waived by a guilty or nolo contendere plea.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the procedural posture that the defendant pled nolo contendere and that his prior appeal from the manslaughter conviction had been resolved on the ground that a plea waives nonjurisdictional defects, including the claimed speedy trial violation. The court acknowledged a split of authority within the Court of Appeals: some panels held a speedy trial claim is waived by a plea (citations: People v Parshay; People v Williams), while others held the claim survives a plea (citations: People v Davis; People v Farmer).

The court considered the more recent decision in People v Sickles, which held that the speedy trial issue survives a plea and relied on the Michigan Supreme Court's framework in People v New. The court examined the operative language from People v New (including a quotation from People v White) that limits post-plea challenges to those defenses that would preclude a valid conviction because they implicate the state's authority to prosecute.

Rejecting Sickles' view that New resolved the split in favor of survival, the court concluded that New actually adopted a more restrictive approach toward defendants' post-plea rights and expressly rejected the broader language of People v Alvin Johnson. Thus, panels concluding that a speedy trial claim survives a plea would have to reconcile their reasoning with New's narrowing of preserved rights after a plea.

Given this framework, the court concluded that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and therefore waived by a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere. In reaching that conclusion the court expressly aligned itself with People v Parshay, People v Williams, United States v Freed, and United States v Lee.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction on the larceny charge and ruled that a claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial is nonjurisdictional and is waived by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

Implications: As applied in this opinion, the direct effect is that the defendant's appeal on the speedy trial ground fails and the larceny conviction remains affirmed. The court framed its decision as consistent with earlier cases (People v Parshay; People v Williams) and certain federal decisions (United States v Freed; United States v Lee), and expressly declined to follow the contrary authority that treats speedy trial claims as surviving a plea. The opinion characterizes People v New as narrowing the scope of defenses preserved after a plea and rejects the view that New resolved the split in favor of survival as asserted by People v Sickles.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion's contents.

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PEOPLE v RIVERA

M.J. KELLY, P.J.

On February 1, 1985, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, and one count of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592. His appeal from the manslaughter conviction has already been affirmed by another panel of this Court. People v Rivera, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July 18, 1986 (Docket No. 82113). Now, defendant appeals his conviction on the larceny charge. We affirm.

In exchange for defendant's plea, numerous charges including armed robbery, first-degree murder and a supplemental information were subsequently dismissed. Defendant's sole argument here is that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant raised an identical issue in the previous appeal from his manslaughter conviction. In that instance this Court rejected defendant's claim on the basis that defendant's nolo contendere plea waived all nonjurisdictional defects. The Court concluded that the claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial was a nonjurisdictional defect and defendant's argument was waived by his plea.

There has been a split on this Court over whether a right to raise on appeal a claim of a denial of the right to a speedy trial survives a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere. For authority for the proposition that a speedy trial claim is waived by a plea, see People v Parshay, 104 Mich. App. 411; 304 N.W.2d 593 (1981), lv den 411 Mich. 1081 (1981), and People v Williams, 145 Mich. App. 614; 378 N.W.2d 769 (1985). For the contrary position, that a speedy trial claim survives a plea, see People v Davis, 123 Mich. App. 553; 332 N.W.2d 606 (1983), and People v Farmer, 127 Mich. App. 472; 339 N.W.2d 218 (1983).

The most recent case to decide this issue sided with those cases that have held that a speedy trial issue survives a guilty plea. See People v Sickles, 162 Mich. App. 344; 412 N.W.2d 734 (1987). However, Sickles based its conclusion not on the reasoning of the prior line of cases, but on the basis that People v New, 427 Mich. 482; 398 N.W.2d 358 (1986), resolved the split.

The operant language taken from People v New is as follows:

Today, we hold that a defendant, after pleading guilty, may raise on appeal only those defenses and rights which would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant. Such rights and defenses "reach beyond the factual determination of defendant's guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial. . . ." [ People v White, 411 Mich. 366, 398; 308 N.W.2d 128 (1981)] (MOODY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) In such cases, the state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant's factual guilt, it is subsumed by defendant's guilty plea. [ Id. at 491.]

From this language, Sickles concludes that, despite the fact that People v New did not involve a speedy trial defense, the rationale in People v New leads to the result that a plea of nolo contendere will not waive a speedy trial issue, because "[s]peedy trial issues do not relate to the state's capacity to prove a defendant's factual guilt but instead go more to the state's right to ultimately bring a defendant to trial." People v Sickles, supra at 351-351.

We are unable to agree that People v New has resolved this issue. The decision in People v New can only be characterized as more restrictive upon a defendant's rights subsequent to the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. People v New expressly rejected the more expansive language of People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich. 424; 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976), cert den 429 U.S. 951; 97 S Ct 370; 50 L Ed 2d 319 (1976). The portion of Johnson rejected by New as a misreading of federal authority and as unnecessary dictum provided that a guilty plea did not waive those rights "relating to insufficient evidence to bind over at preliminary examination and failure to suppress illegally-obtained evidence without which the people could not proceed. . . ." Id. at 444.

If panels of this Court could conclude that a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere operated as a waiver of a due process claim based on a denial of the right to a speedy trial despite the holding in People v Alvin Johnson, such reasoning must still survive the holding in People v New in light of its broader application of waiver in guilty plea cases.

Consequently, we conclude, consistent with People v Parshay, supra, People v Williams, supra, United States v Freed, 688 F.2d 24 (CA 6, 1982), and United States v Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (CA 8, 1974), cert den 419 U.S. 1003; 95 S Ct 322; 42 L Ed 2d 279 (1974), that a speedy trial claim is nonjurisdictional and thus waived by a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE v. RIVERA