Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. We disagree. After subtracting periods of delay directly resulting from the defendant's pretrial motions (CPL 30.30 [a]; People v Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523, 527; People v Brown, 113 A.D.2d 812, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 649), delays to which the defendant consented by failing to object (CPL 30.30 [b]; People v Seabrook, 126 A.D.2d 583, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 955; People v Gaggi, 104 A.D.2d 422, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 636, rearg denied 65 N.Y.2d 1054), adjournments at the defendant's request (CPL 30.30 [b]; People v Brown, supra), and delays resulting from the failure or inability of the defendant or his counsel to appear (CPL 30.30 [c]; People v Hall, 61 A.D.2d 1050, 1051), the total time chargeable to the People is well within the permitted six calendar months, which, in this case, totaled 184 days (see, e.g., People v Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, 188, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 was properly denied.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.