Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The People established the defendant's constructive possession of the weapon, which was both "`within [his] immediate control and reach'" and was "`available for unlawful use if he so desire[d]'" (People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 509-510, quoting People v Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402; see, Penal Law § 10.00; People v Hicks, 138 A.D.2d 519; People v. Ogelsby, 128 A.D.2d 556, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 1007). Moreover, proof of the intent to use the loaded firearm unlawfully against another (Penal Law § 265.03) was provided by the statutory presumption (Penal Law § 265.15), which the jury was warranted in accepting under the circumstances of the case (see, People v. Taylor, 121 A.D.2d 581, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 817; People v. Evans, 106 A.D.2d 527).
We reject the defendant's claim that the trial court's erroneous ruling precluding his codefendant from establishing the complainant's bias, hostility or motive to lie unduly prejudiced him, for the evidence at issue tended to establish the witness's motive to falsely implicate his codefendant alone of the robbery, of which the defendant was acquitted (see, People v. Ellis, 126 A.D.2d 663, lv granted 69 N.Y.2d 949, appeal dismissed 71 N.Y.2d 1012).
Finally, we perceive of no basis upon which to modify the sentence (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mollen, P.J., Brown, Eiber and Kooper, JJ., concur.