Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29), we conclude that the defendant's constructive possession of the rifle was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, since it was "`within [his] immediate control and reach'" (People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 509, quoting People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402; see, Penal Law § 10.00; People v. Lynch, 116 A.D.2d 56, 61).
This court has previously condemned any attempt by prosecutors to subvert the law relative to reasonable doubt, as was engaged in at this trial when the prosecutor stated during his summation that a "trial is not a search for doubt — it's a search for truth" (see, People v. McCorkle, 119 A.D.2d 700; People v. Reyes, 119 A.D.2d 596). We conclude, however, that the trial court's timely intervention, which included the sustaining of defense counsel's objection and the giving of a curative instruction, as well as its subsequent extensive instructions on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden of proof, and the meaning of reasonable doubt, negated any prejudice that might have resulted from such an improper comment (see, People v. McCorkle, supra).
The defendant's claim that he was not afforded the effective assistance of trial counsel because of his attorney's failure to call both the defendant and his uncle to testify as defense witnesses is not demonstrable on this record, absent an evidentiary exploration by collateral postconviction proceedings brought under CPL article 440 (see, People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852; People v. Rodriguez, 123 A.D.2d 405; People v. Roberts, 89 A.D.2d 912).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for our review and, in any event, without merit. Mollen, P.J., Weinstein, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.