Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find no merit to the defendant's contention that the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in its Sandoval ruling that the People could inquire as to the defendant's past five out of seven convictions (see, People v. Aguilera, 156 A.D.2d 698; People v. Ortiz, 143 A.D.2d 107; People v. Magee, 126 A.D.2d 573, 574; see also, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292). The defendant's convictions demonstrated his willingness to place his own interests ahead of those of society, and were therefore directly relevant to the issue of his credibility had he testified (see, People v. Ortiz, supra; People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). Moreover, as we have noted previously, inquiry into the underlying facts of charges dismissed in satisfaction of a defendant's plea of guilty to other charges is permissible (see, People v. Magee, supra; People v. Capone, 114 A.D.2d 373).
Furthermore, although it was improper for the trial court to rule that the prosecutor could cross-examine the defendant as to his use of aliases in prior convictions unrelated to the crimes in question, this error was harmless in view of the overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt based on the trial testimony by undercover police officers of two separate sales of cocaine by him (see, People v. Jimenez, 79 A.D.2d 1012, mod on other grounds 55 N.Y.2d 895; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230).
To the extent that the Sandoval ruling permitted inquiry into the defendant's recent arrest for which no disposition had been made, the error, if any, was harmless (People v. Boyd, 149 A.D.2d 939).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Rubin, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.