Upon consideration of the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the charge, the period of pretrial incarceration and whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay (see, People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445), we find that defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. The People were responsible for only 72 days of the 25-month period between defendant's arrest and his plea, with most of the remaining time attributable to defendant's motion practice and his request for records from the police department. In addition, the charges against defendant were serious, he was in any event incarcerated during this 25-month period as a result of his conviction for an unrelated crime (see, People v Jackson, 178 A.D.2d 305, 306, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 948), and he claims no specific prejudice as a result of the delay (see, People v Hammer, 190 A.D.2d 521, 522, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 971). Any statutory speedy trial rights pursuant to CPL 30.30 were waived by defendant's guilty plea (People v Friscia, 51 N.Y.2d 845).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Asch, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.