Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly concluded that there are no triable issues of fact with respect to the plaintiff's cause of action sounding in tortious interference with precontractual relations. In order to successfully oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff was required to offer proof in admissible form that "[she] would have received a contract but for the malicious, fraudulent and deceitful acts of [the defendants]" (Union Car Adv. Co. v Collier, 263 N.Y. 386, 401, remittitur amended 264 N.Y. 599; see also, Susskind v Ipco Hosp. Supply Corp., 49 A.D.2d 915). "The requirements for establishing liability for interference with prospective contractual relations are more demanding than those for interference with [the] performance of an existing contract" (Gertler v Goodgold, 107 A.D.2d 481, 490, affd 66 N.Y.2d 946, citing Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183).
Here, the plaintiff failed to offer any evidentiary proof that she would have entered into a contract for the sale of real property but for the defendants' alleged tortious interference. Thus, the plaintiff's conclusory allegations of tortious interference with precontractual relations are insufficient to defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment (see, Datlow v Paleta Intl. Corp., 199 A.D.2d 362; Mogull Music Corp. v Madison-59th St. Corp., 162 A.D.2d 336). Lawrence, J.P., O'Brien, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.