Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record clearly establishes that he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. Accordingly, he cannot now challenge the propriety of the hearing court's denial of his suppression motion (see, People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273; People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1; People v. Butler, 198 A.D.2d 427; People v. Carter, 191 A.D.2d 640).
We further reject the defendant's claim that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see, CPL 220.60; People v. De Jesus, 199 A.D.2d 529; People v. McMahon, 163 A.D.2d 588). The defendant pleaded guilty after a complete and detailed plea allocution, during which he was fully apprised of the consequences of his plea (see, People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9). Moreover, the factual admissions made by the defendant during his plea allocution were sufficient to establish the elements of the crime, and his subsequent unsubstantiated claim of innocence did not warrant vacatur of the plea (see, People v. Butler, supra; People v. McDowell, 198 A.D.2d 236; People v. Smith, 192 A.D.2d 732). Furthermore, although the defendant claimed at sentencing that he was pressured into pleading guilty by the prosecution's insistence that both he and his codefendant either accept a plea agreement or proceed to trial, the record demonstrates that the defendant's plea was voluntarily entered (see, People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit. Balletta, J.P., Miller, Hart and Krausman, JJ., concur.