Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court's ruling permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant regarding his 1989 convictions for grand larceny in the fourth degree and attempted robbery in the second degree was not an improvident exercise of discretion. The mere fact that a defendant's prior crimes are similar or even identical to a crime presently charged does not automatically preclude their use for impeachment purposes on cross-examination (see, People v Ardila, 202 A.D.2d 514, affd 85 N.Y.2d 846; People v Bowman, 211 A.D.2d 590; People v Coates, 166 A.D.2d 389; People v Mingues, 165 A.D.2d 774; People v McAleavey, 159 A.D.2d 646; People v Torres, 110 A.D.2d 794). Moreover, the prior offenses were "indicative of his willingness to place his * * * interests above those of society and his possible willingness to do so again on the witness stand" and therefore were relevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility (People v Ardila, supra, at 514; see also, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377; People v Bowman, supra, at 591; People v Lynch, 209 A.D.2d 827).
The prosecutor's comments during summation do not warrant reversal. The trial court's prompt curative instructions mitigated any prejudice resulting to the defendant (see, People v Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294; People v Arce, 42 N.Y.2d 179).
The defendant's sentence was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Johnson, 161 A.D.2d 732; People v Brown, 81 N.Y.2d 798). Balletta, J.P., Ritter, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.