Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
With respect to the defendant's claim that the hearing court improperly refused to suppress statements made by him during a traffic stop by the police, we find that the events occurring between the stop and the defendant's arrest cannot be characterized as the functional equivalent of a custodial situation requiring Miranda warnings (see, Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; Berkemer v McCarty, 468 U.S. 420; People v Mathis, 136 A.D.2d 746).
We further find that the court's Sandoval ruling (People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371), which permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant with respect to similar convictions of driving while impaired or intoxicated was proper. The mere fact the defendant has committed crimes similar to the ones charged does not automatically preclude the prosecutor from using evidence of such crimes for impeachment purposes (see, People v Salcedo, 133 A.D.2d 129). In this case, the prior convictions were highly relevant on the issue of credibility and demonstrated the defendant's willingness to deliberately further his self-interest at the expense of society (see, People v McAleavey, 133 Misc.2d 987).
Finally, we disagree with the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's summation resulted in prejudicial error which deprived him of a fair trial. Although the Assistant District Attorney stated in summation that the defendant's witness was a thief, there was no testimony that this witness actually took another's property. The statement, however, was harmless, as the court immediately took curative action to ameliorate any prejudicial effect (see, People v Roopchand, 65 N.Y.2d 837; People v Robinson, 137 A.D.2d 564). Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Bracken and Rubin, JJ., concur.