Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the motions for summary judgment are granted, the plaintiff's cross motion to serve an amended bill of particulars is denied, and, upon searching the record, the complaint and first and second third-party complaints are dismissed in their entirety; and it is further,
Ordered that the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs are awarded one bill of costs payable by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, an employee of the third-party defendant Louis Calhoun (hereinafter Calhoun), was injured while working at a construction site owned by the defendants Marc, Howard, Joel, and Maxine Beige (hereinafter the Beiges), while he and an employee of another subcontractor, Hilco Construction Company, Inc. (hereinafter Hilco), were carrying a 15-foot steel "reinforcement bar" weighing some 16 to 18 pounds. The plaintiff commenced an action against Hilco, the Beiges, and the general contractor, Ira S. Salk Construction Corporation (hereinafter Salk), for common-law negligence and for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 (6). Salk and Hilco commenced third-party actions against the plaintiff's employer, Calhoun. The plaintiff subsequently conceded that he had no causes of action under Labor Law §§ 200 and 240.
All the defendants except Hilco moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and Calhoun moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaints. After their motions were denied, Salk moved to "renew" and Calhoun moved to "renew and reargue" their motions. These new motions were really applications for reargument, because they were not based upon any additional material facts, and, in the case of the challenge to the plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action, were grounded upon a change in the law as stated by the Court of Appeals in Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. ( 81 N.Y.2d 494) (see, e.g., Matter of Huie [Furman], 20 N.Y.2d 568; Savory v Romex Realty Corp., 194 A.D.2d 601). Ordinarily no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, Savory v Romex Realty Corp., supra). However, where, as here, the court denies the motion to reargue but addresses the merits of the motion, and then adheres to its original determination, the order is appealable (see, CPLR 5517 [a] [1]; Price v Palagonia, 212 A.D.2d 765; Matter of Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v Pellegrino, 203 A.D.2d 457).
Upon granting reargument, the court should have granted the motions to dismiss the causes of action based on Labor Law § 241 (6), and should have denied the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to serve an amended bill of particulars, because the plaintiff failed to cite in his purported amended bill of particulars any "concrete specifications" of the Industrial Code which, upon the facts of this case, could be said to have been violated by the defendants (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra, at 505; see also, Goordineer v County of Orange, 205 A.D.2d 584). In view of this fact, and upon searching the record, we conclude that the plaintiff's cause of action based on Labor Law § 241 (6) should be dismissed as to all defendants, including the Beiges, the owners of the premises under construction.
In addition, because the plaintiff previously consented to the dismissal of his causes of action under Labor Law § 200 and because Labor Law § 200 is merely a codification of an owner's and general contractor's common-law duty to provide workers with a safe place to work (see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra; DeLuca v Lett, 173 A.D.2d 760), the plaintiff's common-law negligence cause of action as against all the defendants should likewise be dismissed.
Accordingly, the complaint and both the first and second third-party complaints are dismissed in their entirety. Bracken, J.P., Joy, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.
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