Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
We reject the appellant's contention that the gun recovered from the vehicle in which he was riding should have been suppressed on the basis that the police stop of the vehicle was a pretext to an improper investigation. Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing established that the officer properly stopped the vehicle upon observing that it had a broken taillight and made a left turn without signaling (see, People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393; People v. Espinal, 209 A.D.2d 538; see also, People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773; People v. Pincus, 184 A.D.2d 666). Furthermore, the officer took an "appropriate safety precaution" by ordering the rear-seat passenger out of the vehicle in light of that passenger's nervous and suspicious behavior (People v. Espinal, supra, at 538; see also, People v McFadden, 194 A.D.2d 567; People v. Pincus, supra; People v Shapiro, 141 A.D.2d 577).
In addition, the court properly refused to apply the exception to the automobile gun possession presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) (a), which is applicable when the weapon is found "upon the person of one of the occupants thereon" (see, People v. Verez, 83 N.Y.2d 921; People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505; People v. O'Brien, 212 A.D.2d 741; People v. Scott, 199 A.D.2d 436), and the appellant failed to rebut that presumption (see, People v. McFadden, 194 A.D.2d 567; People v. Delvas, 181 A.D.2d 740). Thompson, J.P., Copertino, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.