Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the People failed to prove his guilt of criminal possession of a weapon beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence presented at trial rebutted the statutory presumption concerning possession of a firearm in an automobile (Penal Law § 265.15). However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence adduced at trial established that police officers recovered a loaded and operable .38 caliber revolver from the backseat of a car in which the defendant was a passenger. Although the driver of the car testified that the revolver belonged to him and that it was actually in the trunk of his car, the driver's testimony, which was significantly impeached on cross-examination, presented an issue of credibility for the jury to resolve (see, People v Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505; People v Coleman, 153 A.D.2d 643; People v Terry, 148 A.D.2d 478; People v Hutchenson, 136 A.D.2d 737; cf., People v Cullen, 138 A.D.2d 501). Moreover, the jury rationally could have inferred that the driver did not exclusively possess the revolver since it was not found on his person (see, People v Lemmons, supra; People v Hutchenson, supra). Accordingly, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, and find that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.