The instant appeal is moot as a result of the expiration of the one-year placement period that was directed in the order being reviewed by this Court ( see, Matter of Mary R. v. Sullivan County Dept. of Social Servs., 217 A.D.2d 815; Matter of Jamie J., 209 A.D.2d 896; Matter of Demitris O., 193 A.D.2d 977, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 655; see generally, Matter of Brian R., 197 A.D.2d 870; Matter of Gerald H., 158 A.D.2d 599). In any event, petitioner's good-faith reliance on an August 7, 1995 Family Court order which unequivocally states that respondent's period of placement was for one year thereafter ( cf., Matter of Wayne S., 193 A.D.2d 371, 372) and the series of bad acts committed by respondent after the deadline for filing ( see, Matter of Loren S., 220 A.D.2d 857) constitute good cause for the late filing of the extension petition ( see, Family Ct Act § 355.3, [2]). We are also unpersuaded that Family Court was without jurisdiction when it extended respondent's placement ( see generally, Matter of Charles B., 209 A.D.2d 895, 896).
It was the intention of Family Court and the parties that the August 7, 1995 order be retroactive to June 14, 1995. The order was never amended or resettled to reflect same.
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, White and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.