When this appeal was initially before us, we found that Family Court's order contained inconsistencies and also failed to specify the type of facility in which respondent would be placed (see, Family Ct Act § 353.3). Accordingly, we withheld decision and remitted the matter to Family Court for further clarification ( 191 A.D.2d 909). On remittal Family Court specified that its intention was to place respondent with the Division for Youth for a period of one year with the authorization that such placement could be in a secure facility.
Respondent's challenge to his placement in a restrictive facility has become moot as a result of the expiration of the one-year placement period that was directed in the dispositional order (see, Matter of Darryl G., 184 A.D.2d 204; Matter of Gerald H., 158 A.D.2d 599). In any event, it does not appear that Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in placing respondent in a restrictive facility (see, Matter of Edward B., 170 A.D.2d 270; Matter of Dennis ZZ., 159 A.D.2d 880; Matter of Terry LL., 158 A.D.2d 861). Respondent's previous performance on probation on two prior juvenile delinquency petitions proved to be unmotivated. In addition, other placement referrals all rejected respondent after consideration was made of his social and legal history (see, Matter of Katherine W., 62 N.Y.2d 947). Family Court also took into consideration the reports of two psychologists who specifically found that a structured setting with 24-hour supervision was required.
Weiss, P.J., Mikoll, Mercure, Mahoney and Casey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.