Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom the provision which conditioned the vacatur of the plaintiff's default upon payment of $500 to the Supreme Court, Kings County, by March 20, 1997, and substituting therefor a provision conditioning the vacatur of the plaintiff's default upon payment by the plaintiff of the sum of $500 to the defendants' attorneys within 20 days after service upon him of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; in the event this condition is not complied with, then the order dated February 21, 1997, is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the order dated December 2, 1996, is reinstated.
The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to vacate the dismissal of the complaint upon his default in appealing for trial. The affidavits of the plaintiff and a witness to the underlying incident demonstrated both a reasonable excuse for the default, i.e., an illness which prevented the plaintiff from traveling from Boston, and a meritorious cause of action ( see, Peterson v. Scandurra Trucking Co., 226 A.D.2d 691; Matter of McCaffrey v. McCaffrey, 210 A.D.2d 409).
An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of monetary sanctions pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) ( see, Paz v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 204 A.D.2d 611; Workman v. Amato, 231 A.D.2d 627). However, those sanctions are to be paid to the opposing party or counsel and not to the Supreme Court. The order appealed from has therefore been modified accordingly.
Mangano, P.J., Copertino, Joy, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.