Ordered that the order dated May 3, 1995, as amended, is reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, with costs, and the plaintiffs' motion to vacate their default is denied.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion to vacate their default. Our review of the record reveals that the proffered excuse of law office failure was not a reasonable excuse for the plaintiffs' default ( see, CPLR 2005; Correa v. Ahn, 205 A.D.2d 575; American Sigol Corp. v Zicherman, 166 A.D.2d 628, 629; Gass v. Gass, 101 A.D.2d 849). Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to adequately demonstrate that their claim has merit. The injured plaintiff's affidavit of merit failed to set forth evidentiary facts and contained only conclusory assertions ( see, Starr Block Co. v. Tedesco, 146 A.D.2d 692, 693). Additionally, the plaintiffs' complaint and bill of particulars were verified by their attorney, not by a person with personal knowledge ( see, Terranova v. Gallagher Truck Ctr., 121 A.D.2d 621). Since the plaintiffs failed to establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious claim, the motion to vacate their default should have been denied ( see generally, Putney v. Pearlman, 203 A.D.2d 333; Fennell v. Mason, 204 A.D.2d 599; Schiavetta v. McKeon, 190 A.D.2d 724).
In light of our determination, we need not address the appellant's remaining contention. Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.