DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove (1) the standard of care in the locality where the treatment occurred, (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care, and (3) that the breach of the standard was the proximate cause of injury (see, Gibson v. D'Amico, 97 A.D.2d 905; see also, Gross v. Friedman, 138 A.D.2d 571, affd 73 N.Y.2d 721; Kelly v. Lieber, 261 A.D.2d 441). To sustain this burden, a plaintiff must present expert testimony that the defendant's conduct constituted a deviation from the requisite standard of care (see, Reid v. Rye Ridge Orthopedic Assocs., P.C., ___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Jan. 31, 2000]; Lasek v. Nachtigall, 189 A.D.2d 749; Gibson v. D'Amico, supra). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and affording him the benefit of every favorable inference (see, CPLR 4401; Ryan v. Kassay, ___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Dec. 6, 1999]; Kelly v. Lieber, supra), he failed to establish a prima facie case of malpractice. The plaintiff presented no expert testimony to demonstrate that the defendant departed from an accepted standard of care in prescribing the medication "Coumadin" to reduce the plaintiff's risk of suffering a stroke.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages based on lack of informed consent was properly dismissed because he failed to offer expert testimony as required by CPLR 4401-a, to establish the qualitative insufficiency of his consent (see, Lopez v. Sheskier, 262 A.D.2d 536; Storch v. LaGuardia Med. Group, 209 A.D.2d 689; Gonzalez v. Moscarella, 142 A.D.2d 550), and to prove that a reasonably prudent person in his position would not have taken the prescribed drug if fully informed of its potential risks (see, Innucci v. Bauersachs, 201 A.D.2d 460; Evans v. Holleran, 198 A.D.2d 472; Hylick v. Halweil, 112 A.D.2d 400).
MANGANO, P.J., THOMPSON, KRAUSMAN AND FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.