McCarty, J.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner's application for leave to file a late notice of claim for the alleged medical malpractice. The petitioner failed to proffer any hospital records or other evidentiary proof sufficient to establish that the respondent acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's claim within the prescribed 90-day period or a reasonable time thereafter ( see, Matter of Caruso v County of Westchester, 220 A.D.2d 746; Munnerlyn v City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 437; Carroll v City of New York, 130 A.D.2d 702). Furthermore, the petitioner's excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, that she did not discover the torn Achilles tendon until 10 months after the initial surgery, cannot be accepted without supporting medical evidence explaining why the injury took so long to become apparent and diagnose ( see, Lefkowitz v City of New York, 272 A.D.2d 56; Matter of Gomez v City of New York, 250 A.D.2d 443; Gaudio v City of New York, 235 A.D.2d 228; Matter of Plantin v New York City Hous. Auth., 203 A.D.2d 579).
The petitioner's contention regarding the application of the continuous treatment doctrine may not be raised for the first time on appeal ( see, Orellano v Samples Tire Equip. Supply Corp., 110 A.D.2d 757, 758).