Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the application for leave to file a late notice of claim is denied.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petitioner's application for leave to file a late notice of claim. While the petitioner's claim sounds in medical malpractice, and he asserts that his physical condition contributed to his delay in seeking leave to file a late notice, his application was supported solely by his own conclusory and self-serving allegations and those of his counsel (see, Ribeiro v. Town of N. Hempstead, 200 A.D.2d 730; Matter of Dominguez v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 178 A.D.2d 186; Carroll v. City of New York, 130 A.D.2d 702). Further, and contrary to the petitioner's contentions, there is no evidence in the record establishing that the appellant acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's claim within the prescribed 90-day period or a reasonable time thereafter (see, Munnerlyn v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 437; Carroll v. City of New York, supra). The appellant's possession of the petitioner's hospital records is insufficient to provide notice of the facts constituting his claim (Matter of Fallon v. County of Westchester, 184 A.D.2d 510, 511; Matter of Aviles v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 172 A.D.2d 237; Perkins v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 167 A.D.2d 150; Bailey v. City of New York, 159 A.D.2d 280). Under the circumstances, the petitioner's application should have been denied. Miller, J.P., Thompson, Ritter and Krausman, JJ., concur.