Defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied. The period from February 9, 1999 to March 9, 1999 was correctly excluded as an adjournment granted at the request of the defendant (CPL 30.30[b]; People v. Delacruz, 241 A.D.2d 328, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 939). The period from March 23, 1999 to April 14, 1999 was also correctly excluded, since the record establishes that defense counsel was on trial on both March 23, 1999 and April 6, 1999 and that defense counsel's unavailability was the predominant cause of these adjournments (CPL 30.30[f]; People v. Douglas, 264 A.D.2d 671, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 862). In view of these determinations, the amount of time that could be charged to the People falls below the statutory threshold and we therefore need not consider any other periods of delay.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.