Defendant's speedy trial motions were properly denied. The period from December 2, 1993, to January 6, 1994, was correctly excluded from the time chargeable to the People, pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (f), based on defense counsel's failure to appear for the calendar calls on December 2 and 14, 1993, regardless of the fact that the People had not yet declared readiness (see, People v. David, 253 A.D.2d 642, 644, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 948, People v. Lassiter, 240 A.D.2d 293, 293-294; People v. Brown, 195 A.D.2d 310, 311 lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 891). Moreover, the record establishes that the December 14 adjournment was due to counsel's engagement on trial. The certificates of readiness the People filed subsequent to answering not ready on August 2, 1994, January 25, 1995, and February 8, 1995, served "to toll the `speedy trial clock' from running for the remainder" of the adjournment periods (People v. Stirrup, 91 N.Y.2d 434, 440), and the good faith of such a certificate is not negated by the People's subsequent unreadiness at the next calendar call (People v. Acosta, 249 A.D.2d 161, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 892). The record fails to support defendant's claim that the certificates were illusory. Accordingly, the court correctly excluded from time chargeable to the People the periods that followed filing of the aforementioned certificates. Defendant's arguments as to other periods of time are unpreserved, and we decline to consider them in the interest of justice.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.