NAVEDO v. 250 WILLIS AVE. S

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Docket Number

5511

Attorney(S)

EDWARD C. LEHMAN for PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. LOWELL D. APTMAN for DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Judges

Peter Tom
Richard T. Andrias
David Friedman

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a slip and fall accident in a supermarket where the plaintiff, Awilda Navedo, slipped on a puddle of liquid detergent while pushing her cart in the household products aisle. Plaintiff and a neighbor overheard the store manager instructing an employee to clean up the spill prior to the accident. The defendant supermarket moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there was no admissible evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether there was admissible evidence demonstrating the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition (the puddle) prior to the accident.
Whether hearsay statements by the store manager could be admitted as evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge under the principal/agent admission exception.
Whether the defendant's failure to produce an accident report, which was essential to plaintiff's opposition, rendered the summary judgment motion premature.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff and a neighbor overheard the store manager instructing an employee to clean the spill prior to the accident, evidencing actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.
The store manager’s statements, though hearsay, fall within the principal/agent admission exception and are competent evidence of actual notice.
The defendant failed to produce an accident report that the manager was obligated to prepare, which was essential for the plaintiff to oppose the summary judgment motion, rendering the motion premature.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant contended there was no admissible evidence proving actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle prior to the accident.
The defendant presumably relied on the absence of direct evidence and the argument that hearsay statements were inadmissible.
The defendant stipulated to produce the accident report but failed to do so.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Fasolino v. Charming Stores, 77 N.Y.2d 847	Liability in slip and fall cases requires proof of a dangerous condition and defendant's actual or constructive knowledge prior to the fall.	Established the standard for proving knowledge of the hazardous condition.
Guzman v. L.M.P. Realty Corp., 262 A.D.2d 99, 100	Hearsay evidence may suffice to demonstrate triable issues when not the sole evidence.	Supported admissibility of hearsay alongside other evidence to create triable issues.
Koren v. Weihs, 201 A.D.2d 268, 269	Hearsay can be sufficient to raise triable issues of fact.	Reinforced that hearsay alone may not suffice but can contribute to triable issues.
Carpenter v. D'Agostino Supermarkets, 270 A.D.2d 51	Store manager's statements are admissible to show actual knowledge of hazardous conditions.	Allowed admission of the store manager’s statements as evidence of actual notice.
Bransfield v. Grand Union Co., 24 A.D.2d 586; affd 17 N.Y.2d 474	Admissions by a manager as agent bind the employer.	Supported the principle that a manager's statements bind the defendant employer.
Loschiavo v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 86 A.D.2d 624; affd 58 N.Y.2d 1040	Manager's admissions bind the principal employer.	Further supported agency admission exception.
Kasper v. Buffalo Bills of Western New York, 42 A.D.2d 87, 92	Manager’s admissions bind the employer under agency principles.	Confirmed the applicability of the principal/agent admission exception.
Petrell v. Victory Markets, Inc., 283 A.D.2d 955	Summary judgment should be denied if essential discovery has not been produced.	Supported denial of summary judgment due to failure to produce accident report.
Esposito v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 264 A.D.2d 370	Premature summary judgment motions where discovery is incomplete should be denied.	Reinforced the principle that summary judgment was premature without production of the accident report.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence concerning the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous condition. It found that the plaintiff and a neighbor’s testimony about overhearing the store manager instruct an employee to clean the spill constituted admissible evidence under the principal/agent admission exception, despite being hearsay. This demonstrated actual knowledge of the hazard prior to the accident, creating triable issues of fact.

Additionally, the court noted that even absent the hearsay statements, the defendant’s failure to produce an accident report, which the manager was responsible for preparing and which the defendant had agreed to produce, rendered the summary judgment motion premature under CPLR 3212(f). The court cited precedent holding that summary judgment should not be granted when essential discovery remains outstanding.

Consequently, the court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, denied the defendant’s motion, and reinstated the complaint, emphasizing that the evidentiary record presented triable issues precluding summary dismissal.

Holding and Implications

The court unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's order granting summary judgment to the defendant, denied the defendant's motion, and reinstated the complaint.

The direct effect of this decision is to allow the plaintiff's slip and fall claim to proceed to trial, as triable issues of fact exist regarding the defendant's knowledge of the hazardous condition. The court did not establish new precedent but applied existing principles regarding agency admissions, hearsay exceptions, and discovery obligations in summary judgment contexts.

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AWILDA NAVEDO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT v. 250 WILLIS AVENUE SUPERMARKET, ETC., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

This is an action for damages arising from a slip and fall accident which occurred when plaintiff was pushing her cart in the household products aisle at defendant's supermarket and slipped on a puddle of liquid detergent on the floor. Plaintiff and a neighbor testified at their examinations before trial that each overheard the store manager tell a store employee that the puddle should have been cleaned up prior to the accident. The neighbor testified that she heard the store manager acknowledge that he had instructed the employee to "clean that awhile ago." The IAS court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no admissible evidence that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. Liability in a slip and fall case requires proof of a dangerous condition and the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of that condition prior to the fall (see, e.g.,Fasolino v. Charming Stores, 77 N.Y.2d 847). Hearsay evidence may be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable fact where it is not the only evidence submitted (see, Guzman v. L.M.P. Realty Corp., 262 A.D.2d 99, 100; Koren v. Weihs, 201 A.D.2d 268, 269). A store manager's statement is admissible on the issue of whether a defendant store had actual knowledge of an allegedly hazardous condition (Carpenter v. D'Agostino Supermarkets, 270 A.D.2d 51). Here, plaintiff and her neighbor both overheard the manager advising the porter that he should have cleaned up the spill earlier, evidencing actual knowledge prior to the accident. A manager has the authority to bind its employer by an admission made as agent on behalf of the employer (see, e.g.,Bransfield v. Grand Union Co., 24 A.D.2d 586, affd 17 N.Y.2d 474; Loschiavo v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 86 A.D.2d 624, affd 58 N.Y.2d 1040;Kasper v. Buffalo Bills of Western New York, 42 A.D.2d 87, 92). The alleged statements of the store manager, although hearsay, fall within the principal/agent admission exception and are, therefore, competent evidence on the issue of whether defendant supermarket had actual notice. Assuming that defendant met its burden of proof on the motion, plaintiff submitted sufficient admissible evidence which demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact.

Even without consideration of the hearsay evidence of the store manager's statements, defendant's summary judgment motion should have been denied. Other deposition testimony established that the store manager was present, that he responded to the accident and that his duties included filing out accident reports. The manager apparently spoke with plaintiff and took down her answers. Plaintiff demanded production of any report created by the manager and defendant stipulated to produce such a report. Defendant did not, however, produce any report. The IAS court should have denied defendant's motion as premature since plaintiff had established that production of such report was essential to justify opposition to the motion (CPLR 3212(f); see, Petrell v. Victory Markets, Inc., 283 A.D.2d 955; Esposito v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 264 A.D.2d 370).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.