ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant City of New York made out a prima facie case with respect to its contention that its employee, the defendant Daniel Johnson, was driving a vehicle it owned without its permission or consent at the time of the plaintiff's injury (see Vehicle Traffic Law § 388; Barrett v. McNulty, 27 N.Y.2d 928; Naidu v. Harwin, 281 A.D.2d 525; Headley v. Tessler, 267 A.D.2d 428). In opposition to the City's cross motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City was vicariously liable for Johnson's alleged negligence (cf. Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302-303; Lundberg v. State of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 467, 470-471; Overton v. Ebert, 180 A.D.2d 955). Furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated" (CPLR 3212[f]). Therefore, she was not entitled to denial of the cross motion on the basis that further discovery was necessary (see Berrios v. Kobal, 262 A.D.2d 514; Mazzaferro v. Barterama Corp., 218 A.D.2d 643).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
ALTMAN, J.P., McGINITY, TOWNES and CRANE, JJ., concur.