DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) imputes to the owner of a motor vehicle the negligence of one who uses or operates it with the owner's permission. That section gives rise to a presumption that the vehicle is being operated with the owner's consent, but the presumption may be rebutted by substantial evidence to the contrary (see, Headley v. Tessler, 267 A.D.2d 428; Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 205 A.D.2d 857, 858-859; Stewart v. Town of Hempstead, 204 A.D.2d 431; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. White, 175 A.D.2d 122). The respondent made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him by submitting evidence that, at the time of the accident, the defendant Amos D. Scott was driving the vehicle in a place and for a purpose that exceeded the terms of the consent given (see, Barrett v. McNulty, 27 N.Y.2d 928, 929; Headley v. Tessler, supra; Molina v. NYRAC, Inc., 228 A.D.2d 655; Bruno v. Privilegi, 148 A.D.2d 652). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to proffer competent evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion.