DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the award of counsel fees to the plaintiff to defend against his then-pending appeals and to prosecute her cross appeals from two prior orders was a proper exercise of discretion in light of the economic disparity between the parties (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a]; O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 192-193). The plaintiff demonstrated that she lacked the money to pay her attorney's fees on the appeals and cross appeals, and that the defendant had a superior financial position and ability to pay (see Palumbo v. Palumbo, 292 A.D.2d 358; LeRoy v. LeRoy, 276 A.D.2d 442). Moreover, the plaintiff's motion was properly brought in the Supreme Court (see Taft v. Taft, 135 A.D.2d 809), and the court "properly relied upon its own knowledge, experience and familiarity with the parties' financial circumstances" in determining the application (LeRoy v. LeRoy, supra).
We note that the defendant raises issues in his brief arising from a separate order of the Supreme Court, entered April 10, 2001, which directed him to pay for an appraisal of certain real property. Since the defendant did not appeal from that order, we lack jurisdiction to review it.
O'BRIEN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.