DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondent.
"It is well settled that a person may be deemed to have more than one employer — a general employer and a special employer — for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law" (Stein v. Beaver Concrete Breaking Co., 281 A.D.2d 616, citing Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 557 and Kramer v. NAB Constr. Corp., 250 A.D.2d 818, 819). Where, as here, the plaintiff received Workers' Compensation benefits from her general employer, she may not maintain an action at law against her special employer (see Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29; Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra at 560; Hintze v. Brookhaven Natl. Lab., 278 A.D.2d 456; Martin v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., 271 A.D.2d 579).
The Supreme Court properly determined that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was a special employee of the defendant Victoria Home, s/h/a Victoria Home, Victoria Home for the Aged, Victoria Home for the Aged British Men and Women, and Victoria Home for Retired Men and Women (hereinafter Victoria Home). The record discloses that the plaintiff was placed in the employ of Victoria Home by a nurse-staffing agency, and that while she was working at Victoria Home, where the accident occurred, the employees of Victoria Home exclusively controlled and directed the manner, details, and ultimate result of her work (see Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra; Martin v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., supra; Causewell v. Barnes Noble Bookstores, 238 A.D.2d 536) . The complaint and cross claim against Victoria Home therefore were properly dismissed as barred by the Workers' Compensation Law (see Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra; Hintze v. Brookhaven Natl Lab., 278 A.D.2d 456; Martin v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist., supra).
O'BRIEN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.