DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is well settled that a person may be deemed to have more than one employer — a general employer and a special employer — for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law (see, Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 557; Kramer v. NAB Construction Corp., 250 A.D.2d 818, 818-819). When an employee elects to receive workers' compensation benefits, both the general employer and the special employer are shielded from any action at law commenced by that employee (see, Workers' Compensation Law §§ 10, 11, and 29; Hintze v. Brookhaven National Laboratory, 278 A.D.2d 456 [2d Dept., Dec. 26, 2000]; Kramer v. NAB Construction Corp., supra).
The Supreme Court properly determined that, as a matter of law, Beaver Concrete Breaking Co., Inc., (hereinafter Beaver) was the general employer of the appellant on the date of the accident. Thus, since it is undisputed that the appellant received workers' compensation benefits from his special employer, JAB Construction, Inc., Beaver was entitled to summary judgment (see, Workers' Compensation Law § 29; Hintze v. Brookhaven National Laboratory, supra).