DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Family Court properly determined that there was clear and convincing proof of the appellant's abandonment of his child during the six-month period prior to the filing of the petition, in view of the total absence of contact between the appellant and the child during that period (see Social Services Law § 384-b[a][b]; Matter of Derrick J., 287 A.D.2d 503; Matter of Ronald D., 282 A.D.2d 533). The appellant's incarceration did not prevent him from contacting his child or the agency by telephone or letter (see Matter of Derrick J., supra; Matter of Ronald D., supra). The petitioner was under no obligation to arrange for visitation (see Social Services Law § 384-b[b]; Matter of Julius P., 63 N.Y.2d 477; Matter of Derrick J., supra), and it did not prevent or discourage contact between the appellant and his child (see Matter of Derrick J., supra).
Under the circumstances, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion when it determined that a dispositional hearing was not required before terminating the appellant's parental rights (see Matter of Little Flower Children's Servs. v. Clinton Tracy M., 222 A.D.2d 507; Matter of St. Vincent's Servs. v. Donald D., 205 A.D.2d 785; Matter of Dlaine Bernice S., 72 A.D.2d 775, 776).
Finally, contrary to the appellant's contention, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel (see Matter of Omar B., 175 A.D.2d 834; Matter of Erin G., 139 A.D.2d 737, 739; see also People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137).
RITTER, J.P., ALTMAN, H. MILLER and ADAMS, JJ., concur.